This paper presents a novel framework for cooperative robotics competitions (coopetitions) that promote the transferability and composability of robotics modules, including software, hardware, and data, across heterogeneous robotic systems. The framework is designed to incentivize collaboration between teams through structured task design, shared infrastructure, and a royalty-based scoring system. As a case study, the paper details the implementation and outcomes of the first euROBIN Coopetition, held under the European Robotics and AI Network (euROBIN), which featured fifteen robotic platforms competing across Industrial, Service, and Outdoor domains. The study highlights the practical challenges of achieving module reuse in real-world scenarios, particularly in terms of integration complexity and system compatibility. It also examines participant performance, integration behavior, and team feedback to assess the effectiveness of the framework. The paper concludes with lessons learned and recommendations for future coopetitions, including improveme
Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate. Little is known about people’s preferred responses to norm violations across countries. Here, in a study of 57 countries, the authors highlight cultural similarities and differences in people’s perception of the appropriateness of norm violations.
An influential body of psychological and anthropological theories holds that societies exhibit heterogeneous cooperation systems that differ both in their level of in-group favoritism and in the tools that they employ to enforce cooperative behavior. According to some of these theories, entire bundles of functional psychological adaptations – religious beliefs, moral values, negative reciprocity, emotions, and social norms – serve as “psychological police officer” in different cooperation regimes. This paper uses an anthropological measure of the tightness of historical kinship systems to study the structure of cooperation patterns and enforcement devices across historical ethnicities, contemporary countries, ethnicities within countries, and among migrants. The results document that societies with loose ancestral kinship ties cooperate and trust broadly, which appears to be enforced through a belief in moralizing gods, individualizing moral values, internalized guilt, altruistic punishment, and large-scale institutions. Societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure, on the other hand, cheat on and distrust the out-group but readily support in-group members in need. This cooperation regime in turn is enforced by communal moral values, emotions of external shame, revenge-taking, and local governance structures including strong social norms. These patterns suggest that various seemingly unrelated aspects of culture are all functional and ultimately serve the same purpose of regulating economic behavior.
Extensive behavioral experiments reveal that conditional cooperation is a prevalent phenomenon. Previous game-theoretical studies have predominantly relied on hard-manner models, where cooperation is triggered only upon reaching a specific threshold. However, this approach contrasts with the observed flexibility of human behaviors, where individuals adapt their strategies dynamically based on their surroundings. To capture this adaptability, we introduce a soft form of conditional cooperation by integrating the Q-learning algorithm from reinforcement learning. In this form, players not only reciprocate mutual cooperation but may also defect in highly cooperative environments or cooperate in less cooperative settings to maximize rewards. To explore the effects of hard and soft conditional cooperators, we examine their interactions in two scenarios: structural mixture (SM) and probabilistic mixture (PM), where the two behavioral modes are fixed and probabilistically adopted, respectively. In SM, hard conditional cooperators enhance cooperation when the threshold is low but hinder it otherwise. Surprisingly, in PM, the cooperation prevalence exhibits two first-order phase transitions as the probability is varied, leading to high, low, and vanishing levels of cooperation. Analysis of Q-tables offers insights into the "psychological shifts" of soft conditional cooperators and the overall evolutionary dynamics. Model extensions confirm the robustness of our findings. These results highlight the novel complexities arising from the diversity of conditional cooperators.
Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from 0% to 96.7%, demonstrating communication as a robust coordination mechanism. In contrast, we find that curriculum learning is highly sensitive to design choices: our pedagogical curriculum through progressively complex games reduced agent payoffs by 27.4% in an Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment, demonstrating that optimizing for short-term rationality can actively undermine alignment goals. Qualitative analysis reveals that curricula emphasizing defection-equilibrium games can induce "learned pessimism" in agents. These findings suggest that for coordination problems, simple communication protocols may be more reliable than experience-based training, and that curriculum design for social dilemmas requires careful attention to the strategic lessons embedded in game sequences.
Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules are indeed quite different for the resolution (relaxation) of the two dilemmas. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.
Ettore Camerlenghi, Sergio Nolazco, D. Farine
et al.
Cooperation may emerge from intrinsic factors such as social structure and extrinsic factors such as environmental conditions. Although these factors might reinforce or counteract each other, their interaction remains unexplored in animal populations. Studies on multilevel societies suggest a link between social structure, environmental conditions and individual investment in cooperative behaviours. These societies exhibit flexible social configurations, with stable groups that overlap and associate hierarchically. Structure can be seasonal, with upper-level units appearing only during specific seasons, and lower-level units persisting year-round. This offers an opportunity to investigate how cooperation relates to social structure and environmental conditions. Here, we study the seasonal multilevel society of superb fairy-wrens (Malurus cyaneus), observing individual responses to experimental playback of conspecific distress calls. Individuals engaged more in helping behaviour and less in aggressive/territorial song during the harsher non-breeding season compared to the breeding season. The increase in cooperation was greater for breeding group members than for members of the same community, the upper social unit, comprised of distinct breeding groups in association. Results suggest that the interaction between social structure and environmental conditions drives the seasonal switch in cooperation, supporting the hypothesis that multilevel societies can emerge to increase cooperation during harsh environmental conditions.
Cooperation beyond familial and group boundaries is core to the functioning of human societies, yet its evolution remains unclear. To address this, we examined grooming, coalition, and food-sharing patterns in bonobos (Pan paniscus), one of our closest living relatives whose rare out-group tolerance facilitates interaction opportunities between groups. We show that, as in humans, positive assortment supports bonobo cooperation across borders. Bonobo cooperative attitudes toward in-group members informed their cooperative relationships with out-groups, in particular, forming connections with out-group individuals who also exhibited high cooperation tendencies. Our findings show that cooperation between unrelated individuals across groups without immediate payoff is not exclusive to humans and suggest that such cooperation can emerge in the absence of social norms or strong cultural dispositions. Description Editor’s summary Humans are very good at cooperating with others outside of our family, kin, and cultural groups. Although cooperation among individuals within groups is also common in other animals, doing so outside of such groups has rarely been observed. Samuni and Surbeck looked at cooperative behaviors such as grooming and food sharing in bonobos and found that individuals that cooperated more within their own group were also more likely to cooperate with those in other groups (see the Perspective by Silk). Furthermore, such cooperation was neither rare nor opportunistic. Social openness in one of our closest relatives suggests that our cooperativeness may be older than we thought. —Sacha Vignieri Bonobo cooperation across groups offers a window into humanity’s evolutionary past.
asadollah abbassi, abolfazl moghadam, yasser heidari
et al.
Context and purpose:Increasing the access of all sections of society to the facilities of cooperatives has become a major policy focus in developing countries in recent years as a tool to increase productivity and living standards. The main goal of this research is to investigate the relationship between the facilities granted by the cooperative sector in creating job opportunities according to the development plans of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare. Methodology/approach: been studied.To test the hypotheses of the model Panel Data Used.After doing the test F Limer and Hausman to choose the right model, it was determined that the model is of fixed effects type.Therefore, regression with width was estimated from fixed origins .The data of all the provinces of the country during a period of 6 years (2017-2022) has Findings and conclusions:.The estimation results showed that all variables are compatible with economic theories in terms of signs.The facilities of the cooperative sector, the number of approved projects have had a positive and significant impact on the job opportunities created in the country. It was also found that the added value per capita of the provinces and the growth of the general price level had a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable.Originality.In previous studies, facilities and credits are usually measured as a secondary variable in the success of cooperatives. In this research, the role of facilities in creating job opportunities in the provinces has been studied.
With the progress of artificial intelligence and the emergence of global online communities, humans and machines are increasingly participating in mixed collectives in which they can help or hinder each other. Human societies have had thousands of years to consolidate the social norms that promote cooperation; but mixed collectives often struggle to articulate the norms which hold when humans coexist with machines. In five studies involving 7917 individuals, we document the way people treat machines differently than humans in a stylized society of beneficiaries, helpers, punishers, and trustors. We show that a different amount of trust is gained by helpers and punishers when they follow norms over not doing so. We also demonstrate that the trust-gain of norm-followers is associated with trustors’ assessment about the consensual nature of cooperative norms over helping and punishing. Lastly, we establish that, under certain conditions, informing trustors about the norm-consensus over helping tends to decrease the differential treatment of both machines and people interacting with them. These results allow us to anticipate how humans may develop cooperative norms for human-machine collectives, specifically, by relying on already extant norms in human-only groups. We also demonstrate that this evolution may be accelerated by making people aware of their emerging consensus.
Áron Székely, Francesca Lipari, A. Antonioni
et al.
Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change to reducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength of the norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change. Large-scale cooperation is needed to reduce existential risks like those posed by pandemics and climate change. Here the authors demonstrate that social norms can emerge and sustain cooperation in situations of collective risk and that the level of risk influences the strength of the norms.
Human societies are organized and developed through collective cooperative behaviours. Based on the information in their environment, individuals can form collective cooperation by strategically changing unfavourable surroundings and imitating superior behaviours. However, facing the rampant proliferation and spreading of misinformation, we still lack systematic investigations into the impact of misinformation on the evolution of collective cooperation. Here, we study this problem by classical evolutionary game theory. We find that the existence of misinformation generally impedes the emergence of collective cooperation on networks, although the level of cooperation is slightly higher for weak social cooperative dilemma below a proven threshold. We further show that this possible advantage diminishes as social connections become denser, suggesting that the detrimental effect of misinformation further increases when ‘social viscosity’ is low. Our results uncover the quantitative effect of misinformation on suppressing collective cooperation, and pave the way for designing possible mechanisms to improve collective cooperation.
Isaiah Paolo A. Lee, O. T. Eldakar, J. Gogarten
et al.
Cooperation exists across all scales of biological organization, from genetic elements to complex human societies. Bacteria cooperate by secreting molecules that benefit all individuals in the population (i.e., public goods). Genes associated with cooperation can spread among strains through horizontal gene transfer (HGT). We discuss recent findings on how HGT mediated by mobile genetic elements promotes bacterial cooperation, how cooperation in turn can facilitate more frequent HGT, and how the act of HGT itself may be considered as a form of cooperation. We propose that HGT is an important enforcement mechanism in bacterial populations, thus creating a positive feedback loop that further maintains cooperation. To enforce cooperation, HGT serves as a homogenizing force by transferring the cooperative trait, effectively eliminating cheaters.
Cathryn Townsend, J. Ferraro, Heather Habecker
et al.
A major evolutionary transition in individuality involves the formation of a cooperative group and the transformation of that group into an evolutionary entity. Human cooperation shares principles with those of multicellular organisms that have undergone transitions in individuality: division of labour, communication, and fitness interdependence. After the split from the last common ancestor of hominoids, early hominins adapted to an increasingly terrestrial niche for several million years. We posit that new challenges in this niche set in motion a positive feedback loop in selection pressure for cooperation that ratcheted coevolutionary changes in sociality, communication, brains, cognition, kin relations and technology, eventually resulting in egalitarian societies with suppressed competition and rapid cumulative culture. The increasing pace of information innovation and transmission became a key aspect of the evolutionary niche that enabled humans to become formidable cooperators with explosive population growth, the ability to cooperate and compete in groups of millions, and emergent social norms, e.g. private property. Despite considerable fitness interdependence, the rise of private property, in concert with population explosion and socioeconomic inequality, subverts potential transition of human groups into evolutionary entities due to resurgence of latent competition and conflict. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions’.
Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from multi-agent reinforcement learning populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.
Debottam Bhattacharjee, S. Waasdorp, Esmee Middelburg
et al.
Cooperation is widespread and arguably a pivotal evolutionary force in maintaining animal societies. Yet, proximately, what underlying motivators drive individuals to cooperate remains relatively unclear. Since ‘free-riders’ can exploit the benefits by cheating, selecting the right partner is paramount. Such decision rules need not be based on complex calculations and can be driven by cognitively less-demanding mechanisms, like social relationships (e.g., kinship, non-kin friendships, dyadic tolerance), social status (e.g., dominance hierarchies) and personalities (social and non-social traits); however, holistic evidence related to those mechanisms is scarce. Using the classical ‘loose-string paradigm’, we tested cooperative tendencies of a hierarchical primate, the long-tailed macaque (Macaca fascicularis). We studied three groups (n=32) in social settings, allowing free partner choice. We supplemented cooperation with observational and experimental data on social relationships, dominance hierarchies, and personality. Friendship and dissimilarity in a non-social ‘exploration’ personality trait predicted the likelihood of cooperative dyad formation. Furthermore, the magnitude of cooperative success was positively associated with friendship, low rank-distance, and dissimilarity in an ‘activity-sociability’ personality trait. Kinship did not affect cooperation. While some findings align with prior studies, the evidence of (non-social)personality heterophily promoting cooperation may deepen our understanding of the proximate mechanisms and, broadly, the evolution of cooperation.
Daniel Smith, Philip Schlaepfer, Katie Major
et al.
Storytelling is a human universal. From gathering around the camp-fire telling tales of ancestors to watching the latest television box-set, humans are inveterate producers and consumers of stories. Despite its ubiquity, little attention has been given to understanding the function and evolution of storytelling. Here we explore the impact of storytelling on hunter-gatherer cooperative behaviour and the individual-level fitness benefits to being a skilled storyteller. Stories told by the Agta, a Filipino hunter-gatherer population, convey messages relevant to coordinating behaviour in a foraging ecology, such as cooperation, sex equality and egalitarianism. These themes are present in narratives from other foraging societies. We also show that the presence of good storytellers is associated with increased cooperation. In return, skilled storytellers are preferred social partners and have greater reproductive success, providing a pathway by which group-beneficial behaviours, such as storytelling, can evolve via individual-level selection. We conclude that one of the adaptive functions of storytelling among hunter gatherers may be to organise cooperation.Storytelling entails costs in terms of time and effort, yet it is a ubiquitous feature of human society. Here, Smith et al. show benefits of storytelling in Agta hunter-gatherer communities, as storytellers have higher reproductive success and storytelling is associated with higher cooperation in the group.