Hasil untuk "Metaphysics"

як В. Андреєв, Д. Богоявленська, Наталья Анатольевна Вишнякова et al.

Philosophy of education is a branch of philosophy that determines the nature and purpose of education through thought and reasoning. It is a practical or practical concept that deals with the conditions and goals of education and the philosophical problems arising from educational theory and practice. Since this practice has many aspects in human life, its social and personal manifestations are diverse and its impact on the current situation touches on many issues such as the general context, ethics, culture and ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy and other areas of thought

David Kaplan

M. Heidegger

M. Heim

Fei Xu, S. Carey

Philipp Berghofer, Harald A. Wiltsche

This chapter reexamines wave function realism (WFR) through the lens of phenomenology. We begin by situating WFR within the broader debate about the ontology of the quantum state and the temptation to "read off" metaphysics from mathematical formalism. Against this background, we turn to the London-Bauer interpretation (LBI), the most explicit attempt to interpret quantum mechanics through phenomenological categories. On this view, the measurement transition is not a physical discontinuity but a reflective articulation of objectivity, and the wave function formally encodes the horizonal structure of world-givenness. We develop this idea by reconfiguring the notion of realism itself: not as objectivist, but as correlational and transcendental. The resulting picture suggests that quantum mechanics, rather than depicting a world "minus observers," mathematically articulates the very correlation through which a world becomes manifest at all.

Maureen Linker

The metaphysically magic moment of real sisterhood bonding between myself and Catherine Hundleby happened on a six-hour drive to a FEMMSS (Feminist Epistemologies, Methodologies, Metaphysics, and Science Studies) conference in 2012. I picked Cate up at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit and we set out together to College State, Pennsylvania. Cate and I had met before and shared ideas and material we were working on following meetings at OSSA (Ontario Society for the Study of Argument) in Windsor and various APA (American Philosophical Association) meetings in the U.S. I think we were together in the late 1990s at a conference organized by Nancy Tuana in Oregon and another at Notre Dame? Or was it Villanova? I remember several lunches in the Detroit area organized by Phyllis Rooney prior to that 2012 conference. The point is we were after all, in the early 2000s, youngish feminist scholars working on the intersections between feminist theory, reasoning, and argumentation. Both of us trained in the analytic tradition. Cate in argumentation theory and a fan (and thoughtful critic) of Douglas Walton’s work in argument schemas and me, in philosophy of language and Quinean models of indeterminancy. We were fortunate to be together, brought together by feminist theorists who were our seniors and saw the odd niche we both were trying to carve out professionally in analytic philosophy, argumentation theory, and critical thinking.

F. Jackson

F. Jackson

K. Himma

Nicola Bamonti

This paper investigates the mathematical and philosophical foundations of relational observables and reference frames using the fibre bundle formalism. Two paradigms are contrasted: the View from Nowhere, which interprets frame-dependent observables as perspectives on an invariant equivalence class, and the View from Everywhere which interprets each frame-dependent observables as a fully-fledged fundamental reality. The ontology endorsed by the View from Everywhere, termed Relality, is inherently fragmented, yet not solipsistic: inter-translatability between distinct, frame-dependent realities is possible. The paper challenges perspectivalist metaphysics and critiques the reliance on frame-free structures, arguing they obscure both empirical content and physical information. Central to the discussion is the challenge of providing a perspicuous and parsimonious characterisation of the gauge-invariant content of the theory.

Christian Wüthrich

This article presents the most interesting philosophical issues as they arise in causal set theory. The first concerns the apparent disappearance of spacetime at the fundamental level. It shows how the looming empirical incoherence is averted if we adopt spacetime functionalism. Second, classical sequential growth dynamics rekindles hope for a fundamental passage of physical time compatible with relativistic physics. The article argues that this hope is faint at best, as a block view offers the most natural interpretation of dynamical causal set theory. Third, causal set theory admits a very natural structuralist interpretation, enabling a fruitful interaction between debates in philosophy of science concerning structural realism and the metaphysics of causal sets.

Toby Peterken

In this work, we attempt to define a notion of compositeness compatible with Quantum Field Theory. Considering the analytic properties of the S-matrix, we conclude that there is no satisfactory definition of compositeness compatible with Quantum Field Theory. Without this notion, one must claim that all bound states are equally fundamental, that is, one cannot rigorously claim that everyday objects are made of atoms or that atoms are made of protons and neutrons. I then show how an approximate notion of compositeness may be recovered in the regime where the mass of a bound state is close to a multi-particle threshold. Finally, we see that rejecting compositeness solves several of the "problems of everyday objects" encountered in an undergraduate metaphysics course.

Roxana Doncu

All the characters in Máirtín Ó Cadhain’s novel are dead people, but they continue to speak as if they were still alive, and have not realized they are actually dead. Another paradox may be that although all of them are dead, none is really interested in death or its metaphysics. They go on with their earthly interests and spites, abusing and offending one another, spilling out secrets and shouting out loud. Speaking is the only thing they can still do while dead, and they take advantage of it: it is often quite difficult for the reader to understand whose voice it is in the general uproar. Gradually, voices become identifiable and attributable to characters: the reader learns to recognize them by the bad language they use, by certain quirks or by the expression of individual snobbery, pretence and hatred. By taking dead people as his characters, and faithfully recording their imagined speeches, Ó Cadhain re-imagines and refashions satire as a specific Irish genre. The speaking dead stand for the Gaelic rural communities whose language the political activist Ó Cadhain’s taught and promoted as the real repository of the idea of an Irish independent nation. The particular dialogic form of the novel, though seemingly experimental and difficult to comprehend, represents Ó Cadhain’s effort to establish democracy (lacking in the real post-independence Irish state), through the multiplicity of voice polyphony implies, at least at literary level.

Mehran Najafi, Abdolrasoul Kashfi

Avicenna has aimed to establisha harmonized philosophical system that incorporates logic, epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and other types of knowledge. Although he has not directly written anything about the metaphysical foundations of science, we believe that there are some implications in his philosophy that could be considered astruthmakers of scientific propositions. As natural law is significantly correlated to “experiment”, we will first discuss the epistemological aspect of experiments in Avicennian philosophy. He believes that the observation of a repeated event could lead us to a causal relationship due to the fact that accidental events are neither permanent nor frequent. Following that, the logical approach which corresponds to this epistemology will be introduced. As Avicenna’s logic does not directly consider such an approach, we are to derive it from apparently disconnected chapters and then formulate them. It will be indicated that Avicenna has been aware of the differences between propositions that merely refer to existent instances and ones that consider the nature of instances. The latter obviously could refer to both existent instances and hypothetical instances. Finally, we present some points in his metaphysics that could establisha metaphysical basis for propositions concerning natural law. In addition, we will indicate that Avicenna’s system is able to justify the counterfactual conditionals that relate to laws of nature.

Emily Adlam, Niels Linnemann, James Read

The Ehlers-Pirani-Schild (EPS) constructive axiomatisation of general relativity, published in 1972, purports to build up the kinematical structure of that theory from only axioms which have indubitable empirical content. It is, therefore, of profound significance both to the epistemology and to the metaphysics of spacetime theories. In this article, we consider extensions of the EPS axiomatisation towards quantum general relativity based upon quantum mechanical inputs (Part III). There are two companion papers, in which we provide a pedagogical walkthrough to the EPS axiomatisation (Part I), and discuss the significance of constructive approaches to spacetime structure more generally (Part II).

Francois-Igor Pris

The article suggests that quantum mechanics is a science of a new type, which refutes the classical metaphysical concept of reality. The notion of a quantum concept is introduced. The possibility of a Wittgensteinian 'dissolution' of the measurement problem with the help of the notion of a language game and the possibility of a metaphysical solution of this problem with the help of the Heideggerian notion of Dasein are considered.

Christoph Benzmüller

A simplified variant of Gödel's ontological argument is presented. The simplified argument is valid already in basic modal logics K or KT, it does not suffer from modal collapse, and it avoids the rather complex predicates of essence (Ess.) and necessary existence (NE) as used by Gödel. The variant presented has been obtained as a side result of a series of theory simplification experiments conducted in interaction with a modern proof assistant system. The starting point for these experiments was the computer encoding of Gödel's argument, and then automated reasoning techniques were systematically applied to arrive at the simplified variant presented. The presented work thus exemplifies a fruitful human-computer interaction in computational metaphysics. Whether the presented result increases or decreases the attractiveness and persuasiveness of the ontological argument is a question I would like to pass on to philosophy and theology.

Eddy Keming Chen

A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), ''it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.'' Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and discuss its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory -- the Everettian Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined.

Timothy Y. Chow

Some Christian apologists, notably William Lane Craig, have championed something called the kalam cosmological argument for the existence of God. One version of the argument leans heavily on the claim that the existence of an actual infinite in the physical world is a metaphysical impossibility. We strongly criticize this claim, showing that it involves dogmatically insisting that certain metaphysical premises are absolutely inviolable, when in fact said premises are not only optional, but are far flimsier than other metaphysical claims (eventually shown to be untenable) that great thinkers of the past, including Einstein, have misguidedly clung to. While our criticisms strike most mathematicians and physicists as straightforward and uncontroversial, they have encountered resistance from philosophers, suggesting that there is a communication gap between the scientific and philosophical communities. We hope this paper will help bridge that gap.