Agents act to bring about a state of the world that is more compatible with their personal or institutional values. To formalise this intuition, the paper proposes an action framework based on the STRIPS formalisation. Technically, the contribution expresses actions in terms of Value-based Formal Reasoning (VFR), which provides a set of propositions derived from an Agent's value profile and the Agent's assessment of propositions with respect to the profile. Conceptually, the contribution provides a computational framework for a form of consequentialist ethics which is satisficing, luralistic, act-based, and preferential.
We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular, the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian and thus, fit into the framework of stochastic games.
Łukasz Mikulski, Wojciech Jamroga, Damian Kurpiewski
Model checking of strategic abilities is a notoriously hard problem, even more so in the realistic case of agents with imperfect information. Assume-guarantee reasoning can be of great help here, providing a way to decompose the complex problem into a small set of exponentially easier subproblems. In this paper, we propose two schemes for assume-guarantee verification of alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information. We prove the soundness of both schemes, and discuss their completeness. We illustrate the method by examples based on known benchmarks, and show experimental results that demonstrate the practical benefits of the approach.
The coordination of autonomous vehicles is an open field that is addressed by different researches comprising many different techniques. In this paper we focus on decentralized approaches able to provide adaptability to different infrastructural and traffic conditions. We formalize an Emergent Behavior Approach that, as per our knowledge, has never been performed for this purpose, and a Decentralized Auction approach. We compare them against existing centralized negotiation approaches based on auctions and we determine under which conditions each approach is preferable to the others.
We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for fairness for drivers: FEQ1 and FEF1. FEQ1 encodes driver pairwise bounded equitability. FEF1 encodes driver pairwise bounded envy freeness. We compare FEQ1 and FEF1 with popular fair division notions such as EQ1 and EF1. We also give algorithms for guaranteeing FEQ1 and FEF1, respectively.
Distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) studies artificial intelligence entities working together to reason, plan, solve problems, organize behaviors and strategies, make collective decisions and learn. This Ph.D. research proposes a principled Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) cooperation framework -- Self-Adaptive Swarm System (SASS) -- to bridge the fourth level automation gap between perception, communication, planning, execution, decision-making, and learning.
Our contribution concerns interactive decision support systems for group decision support. Through this study, we apply to implement a decisional process aiming to represent the multiplicity of actors, their diversity, their behaviors and their interactions. In this context, we contribute to the design and development of a group decision support system. The system is modeled by a multi agents system while exploiting a negotiation protocol based on mediation and concession. This protocol allows decision-makers to express their preferences using multicriteria analysis methods, mainly the method by total aggregation AHP (Hierarchical Process Analysis) and the method by partial aggregation PROMETHEE II .
In the Approval Participatory Budgeting problem an agent prefers a set of projects $W'$ over $W$ if she approves strictly more projects in $W'$. A set of projects $W$ is in the core, if there is no other set of projects $W'$ and set of agents $K$ that both prefer $W'$ over $W$ and can fund $W'$. It is an open problem whether the core can be empty, even when project costs are uniform. the latter case is known as the multiwinner voting core. We show that in any instance with uniform costs or with at most four projects (and any number of agents), the core is nonempty.
In many problems that involve multiple decision making agents, optimal choices for each agent depend on the choices of others. Differential game theory provides a principled formalism for expressing these coupled interactions and recent work offers efficient approximations to solve these problems to non-cooperative equilibria. iLQGames.jl is a framework for designing and solving differential games, built around the iterative linear-quadratic method. It is written in the Julia programming language to allow flexible prototyping and integration with other research software, while leveraging the high-performance nature of the language to allow real-time execution. The open-source software package can be found at https://github.com/lassepe/iLQGames.jl.
During our participation in MAPC 2019, we have developed two multi-agent systems that have been designed specifically for this competition. The first of the systems is pro-active system that works with pre-specified scenarios and tasks agents with generated goals designed for individual agents according to assigned role. The second system is designed as more reactive and employs layered architecture with highly dynamic behaviour, where agents select their own action based on their perception of usefulness of said action.
Spatial constraint systems (scs) are semantic structures for reasoning about spatial and epistemic information in concurrent systems. They have been used to reason about beliefs, lies, and group epistemic behaviour inspired by social networks. They have also been used for proving new results about modal logics and giving semantics to process calculi. In this paper we will discuss the theory and main results about scs.
In this paper we are considering a scenario where a team of robot bodyguards are providing physical protection to a VIP in a crowded public space. We show that the problem involves a complex mesh of interactions between the VIP and the robots, between the robots themselves and the robots and the bystanders respectively. We show how recently proposed multi-agent policy gradient reinforcement learning algorithms such as MADDPG can be successfully adapted to learn collaborative robot behaviors that provide protection to the VIP.
Yu-Lin Huang, Gildas Morvan, Frédéric Pichon
et al.
In this paper, we introduce a new method called SPSC (Simulation, Partitioning, Selection, Cloning) to estimate efficiently the probability of possible solutions in stochastic simulations. This method can be applied to any type of simulation, however it is particularly suitable for multi-agent-based simulations (MABS). Therefore, its performance is evaluated on a well-known MABS and compared to the classical approach, i.e., Monte Carlo.
This paper is intended to explain, in simple terms, some of the mechanisms and agents common to multiagent financial market simulations. We first discuss the necessity to include an exogenous price time series ("the fundamental value") for each asset and three methods for generating that series. We then illustrate one process by which a Bayesian agent may receive limited observations of the fundamental series and estimate its current and future values. Finally, we present two such agents widely examined in the literature, the Zero Intelligence agent and the Heuristic Belief Learning agent, which implement different approaches to order placement.
Simona Caramihai, Ioan Dumitrache, Aurelian Stanescu
et al.
The paper proposes a hierarchical, agent-based, DES supported, distributed architecture for networked organization control. Taking into account enterprise integration engineering frameworks and business process management techniques, the paper intends to apply control engineering approaches for solving some problems of coordinating networked organizations, such as performance evaluation and optimization of workflows.
Hedonic games are meant to model how coalitions of people form and break apart in the real world. However, it is difficult to run simulations when everything must be done by hand on paper. We present an online software that allows fast and visual simulation of several types of hedonic games. http://lukemiles.org/hedonic-games/
The paper provides an analysis of the voting method known as delegable proxy voting, or liquid democracy. The analysis first positions liquid democracy within the theory of binary aggregation. It then focuses on two issues of the system: the occurrence of delegation cycles; and the effect of delegations on individual rationality when voting on logically interdependent propositions. It finally points to proposals on how the system may be modified in order to address the above issues.