Divine infinity in the Cartesian corpus can be diffracted into an infinity of distance, proper to the creation of eternal truths (1630), and an infinity of substance, identifiable in Meditatio III (1641). This distinction reveals the structure of Cartesian metaphysics: the conquest by rationality (accomplished by infinity of substance) of the foundation of rationality (manifested by infinity of distance). Hence the duality of infinity: infinity is a Janus bifrons, both founding and founded. To unfold this paradox, we first need to show that infinity fits into the tradition of metaphysics established by Duns Scotus, according to whom being obeys the primacy of concept, intelligibility and therefore univocity. As a result, the Cartesian idea of infinity paradoxically inherits the Scotian tradition, as further demonstrated by its determination of idea maxime vera, against any suspicion of material falsity. Thus, the metaphysical extraterritoriality of infinity may constitute a paradox at the very heart of the idea of infinity itself.
This essay argues that comparative and transcultural philosophy are interdependent, and so opting for only one of the two is an impossibility. The comparative approach persists as long as we distinguish identities and make differences. As long as people do not speak only one language, the need to move between different languages and to translate, and thus the need to relate and compare different possibilities of philosophical articulation, will remain. Any attempt to free oneself from the problem of cultural identity is doomed to failure, as it leads to further entrapment in the very same problem. Comparative philosophy works with more or less fixed identities, transcultural philosophy transforms them and thereby creates new identities. Those two approaches combined constitute what I call intercultural philosophy.
In this essay I try to explain the relation between comparative and transcultural philosophy by connecting François Jullien’s “comparative” and Martin Heidegger’s “transcultural” understanding of “Being” (Sein) and “Between” (Zwischen). In part 1 I argue that by turning Between and Being into opposing paradigms of Chinese and Greek thinking, respectively, Jullien causes both to become more or less fixed representatives of different cultural identities within a comparative framework: Greek thinking ossifies into traditional metaphysics, and Chinese thinking ossifies into the non-metaphysical thinking of immanence. Part 2 argues that Heidegger takes a decisively different direction. He explores the Between in Being, and even makes an attempt to think of Being as Between. Heidegger’s invocation of “Greekdom” is undoubtedly Eurocentric. But, ironically, Heidegger’s “Greek thinking” is less Eurocentric than Jullien’s “Chinese thinking”, because he discovers the “Chinese” Between in the midst of “Greek” Being. Part 3 touches upon the task of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. While modern Chinese philosophers frequently speak about Chinese philosophy in European terms, Heidegger’s work points to the possibility of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. Because Jullien and Heidegger both connect Greek and Chinese thought, it seems to me that the discussion of their different approaches is helpful in clarifying perspectives for intercultural philosophy between China and Europe.
Social sciences and state - Asia (Asian studies only)
The research program of Agamben, the famous philosopher of neo-marxism, exposes the anarchic nature of law as an apparatus for gaining power. This apparatus is used in State of exception through the suspension of the law. Contrary to the government's claim, what provides the ontological basis for the suspension of the law is not the violation of the law, but the originality of the law. Agamben attacks it. It even negates the national state in implicit implications. This negation expresses the ideal of the universal unity of communism. However the historical coordinates of contemporary Iran are: lack of national state, lack of law, projection (conspiracy theory), and political-economic populism. Given these coordinates, a reflexivity of Agamben's theoretical apparatus from a local perspective is necessary. In a statement, Agamben called health protocols in the age of the corona pandemic useless and conspiratorial, in other words, he called us to violate the relevant laws. His remarks confirm the need to consciously confront the views of neo-Marxism in Iran. Accordingly, the present article, with a brief essay on juridical identity, typical identity, and the playing identity of the modern state in Iran, reminds us of the need for indigenous attention to the theories of neo-Marxism. The findings of this analytical article show that the identity of the modern state in Iran is bureaucratic, undemocratic, and antagonistic. Therefore, what has provided the ontological origin of the suspension of law in Iran is not the originality and legitimacy of the law. origin of the suspension of the law in Iran are: the political metaphysics of illegality, the originality of the charisma of the ruling person, the originality of anti-colonialism, the originality of anti-imperialism and global capitalism, the originality of a particular reading from religion.
A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.
Frederick C. Beiser, autor de El im- perativo romántico (2003), es doctor en filosofía por el Wolfson College de Oxford, grado que obtuvo al pre- sentar la tesis intitulada “The Spirit of the Phenomenology: Hegel’s Re- surrection of Metaphysics in the Phä- nomenologie des Geistes”, dirigida por Charles Taylor. Ha sido merece- dor de las afamadas becas Thyssen y Humboldt, con las cuales pudo rea- lizar dos estancias de investigación en la Free University of Berlin.
Metaphysics is generally claimed to have been in decline since Kant. Recent debates on the feasibility of metaphysics have introduced renewed readings into metaphysics and theorizations of the object. Speculative realism on the possibility of metaphysics is the target of this article, and Graham Harman is the essential figure for approaching this issue. With a critique on Harman’s speculative realism, Peter Wolfendale triggered a separation within speculative realists. Both Harman and Wolfendale defended the feasibility of metaphysics. Harman’s metaphysics is shaped by a special rendering of Heidegger’s views on objects. Object being the central concept, this theory is also named OOP (Object-oriented philosophy). Wolfendale argues that Harman’s object theory offers such a vague definition of object that it eventually makes the object unknowable. This, according to Wolfendale, creates an incoherent stance for Harman, as this vague definition of object creates a return to Kant’s unknowable noumenon. The first stage of this article will focus on the concept of object as explained by Harman. The second stage will summarize Wolfendale’s criticism that Harman’s objects are neo-Kantian noumena reframed. Eventually, we reach a conclusion that leads to a discussion of the theory of objects and their epistemic value in relation to a defense of metaphysics without discussing the details.
A standard interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics holds that sensible particulars are images of Forms. Such particulars are fairly independent, like Aristotelian substances. I argue that this is incorrect: Platonic particulars are not Form images but aggregates of Form images, which are property-instances (tropes). Timaeus 49e-50a focuses on “this-suches” (toiauta) and even goes so far as to claim that they compose other things. I argue that Form images are this-suches, which are tropes. I also examine the geometrical account, showing that the geometrical constituents of the elements are also Form images. Thus everything in the sensible world is composed of tropes.
The paper proposes to grasp handwritten signature as a metaphysical invention of the so-called “Western” civilization, where the signature is supposed to make possible juridical identification of the person who wrote it. However, despite this expectation of reliability, the Western handwritten signature is an aporetic sign, which is considered to be authentic (unrepeatable) and conventional (repeatable) at the same time. Because the signature is a sign of juridical identification and its authenticity can always be forged, Jacques Derrida tries to deconstruct the contradictory functioning of Western metaphysics, which leads to confusion in our expectations of authenticity and identity in our uses of signatures. By proposing a new reading of Derridean texts concerning writing, the paper focuses on the pragmatical paradox that grounds our contradictory legal politics of signing: because the exact manual reproduction of a line is impossible, no one can satisfy the legislative obligation to sign conformably to the model signature. That’s the aporia of trace’s recognition, which establishes the signature as a sign: on the one hand, the signature is supposed to represent the juridical identity of the person who traced it; on the other hand, the signature, which constantly changes its graphical form, makes every certain identification impossible. In order to question the juridical identity traditionally guaranteed by the signature, this paper invites to grasp the legal practice of signing as a subversive performativity, which is produced during the passage between recognition of juridical identity requested by the law and its simultaneous and inevitable transgression. Finally, the paper proposes a new approach to the signature as a visual performance of the self, based on a reevaluation of the altercation between Jacques Derrida and John Searle concerning the iterative character of traces and performatives.
Many ordinary things are made up of material things. For example, the statue of Ferdousi in the University of Tehran is made up of a particular piece of bronze. Calling the relation between the statue of Ferdousi and that piece of bronze material constitution, many philosophers have claimed that this relation between a material thing and the thing that it constitutes is identity. Baker, in contrast, believes that these things have genuine unity without necessary identity. In this article, I first illustrate the principles of Baker’s theory and his explanation of this relation. Then I will assess the theory against objections. I will conclude that this theory can successfully explain relation between many of material things, but concerning things belonging to human beings, the theory fails to introduce a criterion for constitution.
Marechal´s aesthetic-metaphysical horizon provides critical coordinates for addressing of his work, once that place us in a dialogic relationship between the poet and the world. Thus their aesthetic horizon looks after the role that throws the man in his community, as pontiff between the manifestations of the material world and those with the intelligible plane. The main features of this relational schema, can be traced along the Marechal´s literary corpus.<br /><strong>Keywords</strong>: Aesthetics, Metaphysics, Leopoldo Marechal, Theology and Literature.<br /><br />
This paper relies primarily on criticism of Husserl of the European nations to which he looks inside the main context and the history of Western metaphysics and philosophy through the lens of European culture in general. The main deposited tradition of science, according to Husserl, has its core in theory inaugurated by Galileo, which becomes explicit with Descartes philosophy and affirmed the works of Newton, Leibniz, and Kant. This tradition of science Husserl calls 'Galilean science' while his critique of Cartesian spirit is derived from perceptions of philosophical centrality of the concept of 'world - life' as a valid basis and source of all knowledge of reality. Implicit in this criticism turning to Husserl experience with intuitive-reflective method seeks its evidence within the contours of the human experience, i.e. activities of the entity as a living body, which is a cognitive dualism overcome.
History of scholarship and learning. The humanities
Taking as reference a popular saying, this article aims to defend the thesis that Hobbes’ State bases itself on force and in reason. On that perspective, it will analyse the notion of disobedience and, in conclusion shows that the saying can be true according to Hobbes’ philosophy, but it has to be added of some explanation.
Imagination and death are two mysterious areas of the truth that serve as a buffer zone between sense and reason, world and afterworld. By imagination, we mean imaginary forms, the world of imagination and faculty of imagination. With faculty of imagination, man in the world is able to imagine the transcendental truths and meaning in guise of appropriate imaginary forms, given that imagination relates itself to higher foundation of Being, not to the common sense.
Death, which is a buffer zone between the world and afterworld, enables man to observe ideal truths. Abundance of paradise graces is realized through imagination according to the will of paradise people in the ideal world which is the field of spiritualization of bodies and corporealization of spirits.
Death and imagination are transcendence from the sensual and entering the abstraction of limbo, from a lower to a higher stage. Then, man reaches an openness in the realm of death and imagination which can never be grasped in sensual stage. Art , the field of imagination , is a death toward divine Beauty. Sadra, in the 7th volume of Asfar Arbae, believes that chaste love of artists helps them gain a clear mind, compassionate spirit and fine view that develop a beauty which is manifestation of divine Beauty.
In fact, the artist’s imaginary forms are medium of transcendence to the name of Allah. Then, art, in its original sense, is the death of whatever than God and the manifestation of God’s beauty.
O presente trabalho analisa a perspectiva indeterminista da epistemologia de Karl Popper. A partir da compreensáo unitária do Racionalismo Crítico, como epistemologia e filosofia política, ao mesmo tempo, o artigo mostra em que sentido se pode afirmar que a proposta de Popper revela uma questáo ética de largo alcance e interesse na filosofia contemporânea, sobretudo no que se refere à análise da crise da cientificidade moderna.
Palavras-chave:
Ética, Indeterminismo, Popper, Racionalismo Crítico