All For A Realist Defense of Metaphysics: Graham Harman vs. Peter Wolfendale

Metaphysics is generally claimed to have been in decline since Kant. Recent debates on the feasibility of metaphysics have introduced renewed readings into metaphysics and theorizations of the object. Speculative realism on the possibility of metaphysics is the target of this article, and Graham Harman is the essential figure for approaching this issue. With a critique on Harman’s speculative realism, Peter Wolfendale triggered a separation within speculative realists. Both Harman and Wolfendale defended the feasibility of metaphysics. Harman’s metaphysics is shaped by a special rendering of Heidegger’s views on objects. Object being the central concept, this theory is also named OOP (Object-oriented philosophy). Wolfendale argues that Harman’s object theory offers such a vague definition of object that it eventually makes the object unknowable. This, according to Wolfendale, creates an incoherent stance for Harman, as this vague definition of object creates a return to Kant’s unknowable noumenon. The first stage of this article will focus on the concept of object as explained by Harman. The second stage will summarize Wolfendale’s criticism that Harman’s objects are neo-Kantian noumena reframed. Eventually, we reach a conclusion that leads to a discussion of the theory of objects and their epistemic value in relation to a defense of metaphysics without discussing the details.