Hasil untuk "econ.TH"

Egor Bronnikov, Elias Tsakas

We introduce a robust belief-based measure of complexity. The idea is that task A is deemed more complex than task B if the probability of solving A correctly is smaller than the probability of solving B correctly regardless of the reward. We fully characterize the corresponding order over the set of tasks. The main characteristic of this relation is that it depends, not only on difficulty (like most complexity definitions in the literature) but also on ex ante uncertainty. Finally, we show that for every task for which information is optimally acquired, there exists a more complex task which always induces less effort regardless of the reward.

Lambert Dong

We examine how monetary shocks spread throughout an economic model characterized by sticky prices and general equilibrium, where the pricing strategies of firms are interlinked, fostering a mutually beneficial relationship. In this dynamic equilibrium, pricing choices of firms are influenced by overall economic factors, which are themselves affected by these decisions. We approach this situation using a path integral control method, yielding several important insights. We confirm the presence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and scrutinize the impulse response function (IRF) of output subsequent to a shock affecting the entire economy.

Maxim Senkov, Arseniy Samsonov

We compare two scenarios in a model where politicians offer local public goods to heterogeneous voters: one where politicians have access to data on voters and thus can target specific ones, and another where politicians only decide on the level of spending. When the budget is small, or the public good has a high value, access to voter information leads the winner to focus on poorer voters, enhancing voter welfare. With a larger budget or less crucial public goods, politicians target a narrow group of swing voters, which harms the voter welfare.

Han Wang

We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of Yoder (2022) from binary states to a general state space. The cost is private information of the researcher. When the experiment is observable, we find the optimal contract and show that higher types choose more costly experiments, but not necessarily more Blackwell informative ones. When only the experiment result is observable, the principal can still achieve the same optimal outcome if and only if a certain monotonicity condition with respect to types holds. Our analysis demonstrates that the general case is qualitatively different than the binary one, but that the contracting problem remains tractable.

Lotem Ikan, David Lagziel

The indoctrination game is a complete-information contest over public opinion. The players exert costly effort to manifest their private opinions in public in order to control the discussion, so that the governing opinion is similar to theirs. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for the silent majority and vocal minority phenomena, i.e., we show that all moderate opinions remain mute in equilibrium while allowing extremists full control of the discussion. Moreover, we prove that elevated exposure to others' opinions increases the observed polarization among individuals. Using these results, we formulate a new social-learning framework, referred to as an indoctrination process.

Julio Huato

This paper models a two-agent economy with production and appropriation as a noncooperative dynamic game, and determines its closed-form Markovian Nash equilibrium. The analysis highlights the para-metric conditions that tip the economy from a nonaggressive or "co-operative" equilibrium to outright distributional conflict. The model includes parameters that capture the role of appropriation technology and destructiveness. The full dynamic implications of the game are yet to be explored, but the model offers a promising general framework for thinking about different technological and economic conditions as more or less conducive to cooperation or distributional conflict.

Farzad Pourbabaee, Federico Echenique

We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly ``flipped,'' so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pursuing efficiency, and mitigating the effect of noise on revenue.

Sourish Dutta

Studying intra-industry trade involves theoretical explanations and empirical methods to measure the phenomenon. Indicators have been developed to measure the intensity of intra-industry trade, leading to theoretical models explaining its determinants. It is essential to distinguish between horizontal and vertical differentiation in empirical analyses. The determinants and consequences of intra-industry trade depend on whether the traded products differ in quality. A method for distinguishing between vertical and horizontal differentiation involves comparing exports' unit value to imports for each industry's intra-industry trade. This approach has limitations, leading to the need for an alternative method.

Ivan Conjeaud

We study a simple model of algorithmic collusion in which Q-learning algorithms are designed in a strategic fashion. We let players (\textit{designers}) choose their exploration policy simultaneously prior to letting their algorithms repeatedly play a prisoner's dilemma. We prove that, in equilibrium, collusive behavior is reached with positive probability. Our numerical simulations indicate symmetry of the equilibria and give insight for how they are affected by a parameter of interest. We also investigate general profiles of exploration policies. We characterize the behavior of the system for extreme profiles (fully greedy and fully explorative) and use numerical simulations and clustering methods to measure the likelihood of collusive behavior in general cases.

Yoshitaka Ogisu

It is well known that differences in the average number of friends among social groups can cause inequality in the average wage and/or unemployment rate. However, the impact of social network structure on inequality is not evident. In this paper, we show that not only the average number of friends but also the heterogeneity of degree distribution can affect inter-group inequality. A worker group with a scale-free network tends to be disadvantaged in the labor market compared to a group with an Erdős-Rényi network structure. This feature becomes strengthened as the skewness of the degree distribution increases in scale-free networks. We show that the government's policy of discouraging referral hiring worsens social welfare and can exacerbate inequality.

Shota Ichihashi, Alex Smolin

A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information based on the seller's report about her type. We establish the impossibility of screening for welfare purposes, i.e., the designer can attain any implementable combination of buyer surplus and seller profit by providing the same signal to all seller types. We use this result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes, study the seller's incentive to acquire third-party data, and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.

Xu Lang, Debasis Mishra

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex-ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.

Federico Echenique, Matías Núñez

We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice, paying the corresponding price: Price \& Choose. We extend our implementation result in three main directions: an arbitrary number of players, non-quasi linear utilities, and robustness to max-min behavior. Finally, we discuss how to reduce the payoff inequality between players while still achieving efficiency.

Francisco Rodríguez, Eduardo Zambrano

In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.

Atabek Atayev

In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a better idea about which rivals offer the product. Information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on product availability, rather than just prices, has not been scrutinized in the literature on consumer search. We propose a theoretical model that incorporates this kind of information asymmetry into a simultaneous search model. Our key finding is that greater product availability may harm buyers by mitigating their willingness to search and, thus, softening competition.

Georgy Artemov

I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to the applicant but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned using an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism, too few acquire information, generating a significant welfare loss. Affirmative action and other realistic policies may lead to a Pareto improvement. As incentives to acquire information differ across mechanisms, ignoring such incentives may lead to incorrect welfare assessments, for example, in comparing a popular Immediate Assignment and an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism.

Ulrich Faigle

These lecture notes attempt a mathematical treatment of game theory akin to mathematical physics. A game instance is defined as a sequence of states of an underlying system. This viewpoint unifies classical mathematical models for 2-person and, in particular, combinatorial and zero-sum games as well as models for investing and betting. n-person games are studied with emphasis on notions of utilities, potentials and equilibria, which allows to subsume cooperative games as special cases. The represenation of a game theoretic system in a Hilbert space furthermore establishes a link to the mathematical model of quantum mechancis and general interaction systems. The notes sketch an outline of the theory. Details are available as a textbook elsewhere.

Rafael P. Greminger

This paper studies a search problem where a consumer is initially aware of only a few products. At every point in time, the consumer then decides between searching among alternatives he is already aware of and discovering more products. I show that the optimal policy for this search and discovery problem is fully characterized by tractable reservation values. Moreover, I prove that a predetermined index fully specifies the purchase decision of a consumer following the optimal search policy. Finally, a comparison highlights differences to classical random and directed search.

Sander Heinsalu

This note strengthens the main result of Lagziel and Lehrer (2019) (LL) "A bias in screening" using Chambers Healy (2011) (CH) "Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity for any bounded prior". LL show that the conditional expectation of an unobserved variable of interest, given that a noisy signal of it exceeds a cutoff, may decrease in the cutoff. CH prove that the distribution of a variable conditional on a lower signal may first order stochastically dominate the distribution conditional on a higher signal. The nonmonotonicity result is also extended to the empirically relevant exponential and Pareto distributions, and to a wide range of signals.

Daniel Chen, Weijie Zhong

An agent acquires information dynamically until her belief about a binary state reaches an upper or lower threshold. She can choose any signal process subject to a constraint on the rate of entropy reduction. Strategies are ordered by "time risk"-the dispersion of the distribution of threshold-hitting times. We construct a strategy maximizing time risk (Greedy Exploitation) and one minimizing it (Pure Accumulation). Under either strategy, beliefs follow a compensated Poisson process. In the former, beliefs jump to the threshold that is closer in Bregman divergence. In the latter, beliefs jump to the unique point with the same entropy as the current belief.