arXiv Open Access 2022

Symmetric reduced form voting

Xu Lang Debasis Mishra

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Abstrak

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex-ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH

Penulis (2)

Xu Lang

Debasis Mishra

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APA MLA BibTeX

Lang, X., Mishra, D. (2022). Symmetric reduced form voting. https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.09253

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2022
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓