This article explores Maurice Blondel’s (1861–1949) later notion of the “cycloid” of thought, particularly as this helps us to understand his earlier work <em>L’Action</em> (1893). The aim is to demonstrate how Blondel incorporates aspects of the Christian faith, particularly the Eucharist, into his philosophy without abrogating his “method of immanence”. In particular, the article shows how Blondel saw attention to the Christian spirit as essential to the development of a metaphysics that attends both to finite actions and to the action of God, <i>actus purus</i>.
While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional characterhood. I claim that fictional characters are fictional intentional systems, a thesis that I label as FIST. After introducing FIST, I compare it to some rival definitions of fictional characters found in the literature, explaining why FIST is preferable. Finally, I briefly delve into the implications of FIST for other issues related to the nature of fictional characters.
Towards the end of the 1960s, in the well-known Enrico Castelli (1900-1977) colloquia, while intensively discussing the topic of demythologization, scholars concluded that theological language is fundamental in exploring it. Thus, the topic of the analysis of theological language: the Name of God, became prevalent for them and they began to think that a distinction between the terms religious and theological would be desirable, avoiding scandalous formulas for the field of theology. According to Karl Jasper, God is just a chest of something indicible. André Scrima presents himself in the debate with an original proposal, namely to think of theological language, in the broadest sense of this concept, as enclosing religious discourse. In the beginning, speaking theologically should happen in the Name of God, Scrima asserts; at Jasper’s antipodes, he places the Name of God as the origin and mystery that generates speaking theologically. This article aims first of all to bring the question of theological language back into the academic space that is more interested in the phenomenological issues promoted in Enrico Castelli’s thought laboratory in Rome.
This historical paper aims to present the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) as one of the Philosophy of Mind forerunners in Spanish language.
The Spanish philosopher studied in Germany, among other teachers, with Wilhelm Wundt, author of the first laboratory of experimental psychology, and the neo-Kantian philosophers, Paul Natorp and Hermann Cohen. This experience helped him to get his professorship in Psychology, Logic and Ethics of the Escuela Superior de Educación de Madrid in 1908 and the Metaphysics tenure post at the Central University of Madrid in 1910.
It is also the introducer of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the freudian psychoanalysis in Spain and the Hispanic world, although his reception of these intellectual currents was critical. This paper aims to describe all these influences in the work of Ortega y Gasset, especially in those writings devoted to psychology and human perception, from which it can be deduced a conception of mind and a possible theory of knowledge, forerunners of his vital reason, circumstance and perspectivism’s theory.
A major concern for scholars in the fields of systemics and cybernetics is promoting rigorous interdisciplinary communication. The Canadian philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan, SJ, and the American physicist and theologian, Ian G. Barbour, have made significant contributions in this space. While their approaches are clearly distinct, both Lonergan and Barbour are philosophical realists. Each in their own way, they propose a shared epistemology and an inclusive metaphysical system for diverse fields, hence facilitating interdisciplinary communication. In this article, we concisely explicate their unique approaches as well as critique particular aspects. These rigorous approaches to interdisciplinary communication show promise for cybernetics and systems theory.
Se trata de evidenciar los presupuestos de la lectura heideggeriana de Hegel. Hegelianos y antihegelianos asumen estos presupuestos como algo incontestable; unos movidos por la necesidad de combatir el retorno del espectro hegeliano, otros por la necesidad de liberarlo de su estigma ontoteológico. El resultado es una interpretación reduccionista de la filosofía de Hegel, que regala la mayoría de sus conceptos fundamentales a la crítica heideggeriana, al considerarlos contaminados por el totalitarismo de la clausura y de la identidad. Una interpretación como ésta descansa, sin embargo, en presupuestos muy cuestionables que conviene explicitar, y entre los que cabe destacar la interpretación heideggeriana de la Aufhebung como superación de la diferencia. El propósito de este artículo es perseguir las aventuras de la diferencia en algunos puntos clave de la dialéctica hegeliana (fundamentalmente: la figura de la Conciencia desdichada y la categoría lógica de la Reflexión) que Heidegger trata insatisfactoriamente en su comentario, sirviéndose de maniobras sospechosas que pueden leerse como síntomas de una inhibición.
Temporality, as a narrative device, was a central element in Alban Berg’s operas both textually and musically. The systematic form of creating circular structures with palindromes via large-scale retrogrades was meant to turn narrative time back onto itself as an expression of fatalistic negation. This conceptualization held metaphysical implications for Berg that coalesced with his notions of time and space. In his operas, and among other ploys, Berg would appropriate the libretti to textually traverse between the two temporal realms of the empirical world and the metaphysical plane in order to obfuscate the perceptions of reality for his characters, and ultimately put them on paths of predetermined doom through a perpetual repetition of fate, as in the case of Wozzeck. Berg would do this at his own discretion, superseding the authority of the playwrights whose texts he chose to set to music, in order to achieve his desired philosophical and autobiographical outcomes, which were his primary concerns. It will become evident, therefore, that the temporal implications were just as viable textually for Berg as they were musically, but that the metaphysical dimension of those implications were reserved solely for the libretti. Lastly, a comprehensive understanding of these Bergian aesthetics will be brought full circle by making explicit the essential associations of textual metaphysical temporality that Berg shared with and derived from Richard Wagner.
The doctrine of bodily resurrection is a core tenet of Christian faith, yet it is a doctrine fraught with several philosophical problems, the most significant of which concerns the persistence of personal identity. This is especially true for physicalist accounts of human nature. Here I put forth a possible solution to the problem of resurrection identity. Turning to the theology of the 18th century American colonial theologian, Jonathan Edwards, as a resource, I argue for what I am calling “Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism.” This is a form of anti-criterialism in which pre- and post-resurrection bodies are identical because God treats these bodies a metaphysically one. After providing a sketch of this view I defend Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism from two objections and provide three reasons why Christians might be inclined to accept this proposal.
The term ‘the intermediate world’ is a key concept in Den skønne tænkning (Beautiful Thinking) and the metaphysics of experience presented by this book. The metaphysics of experience is about the experiences of transcendence and beautiful thinking that take place in the intermediate world. In the article “The Intermediate World,” this subject is introduced through a discussion of thoughts and concepts formulated by Paul Klee (Zwischenwelt), Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (beautiful thinking), Aristotle (phantasia), Immanuel Kant (expanded thinking), Mark C. Taylor (imagination), and Eugenio Trías (the limit). The text depicts the intermediate world as the level of experience at which the understanding does not yet distinguish between subject and object. The intermediate world is thus not a realm between human and world, nor is it something outside the world we know. The intermediate world is rather the present world in its most original state: the ‘place’ where we find the source of all experience and cognition, a source called ‘basic experience’ characterized by sensation, faith, and comprehension. In this realm, imagination is active and takes the form of an objective force rather than a subjective mental power. Imagination opens mind and world, thus allowing not-yetactualized possibilities to become perceivable.
The article is an attempt to read the Letter of humanismin the light of the project Beyng. First of all I say that the figure of Da-sein is crucial for understanding the Letter. My considerations focus in particular on the position which a man occupies in the structure of Da-sein. I show that there is an analogy between this structure and the considerations of the Letter. I say also that this letter made transposition of the term „humanism” into the other beginning. The project of humanism, which emerges from this text does not coincide neither with today’s varieties of humanism, nor the post-humanism, because both of these forms of thought are inscribed in metaphysics. In this context „no homeland” of which Heidegger says in the Letter, takes on special significance, which I wanted to show.
Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law, Political science (General)
This article intends to briefly analyze the characteristics that the form of the essay assumes in György Lukács, Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno’s thought. I focused on one single point: the central function that the essay acquires within the relations between particulars and system. The results are particularly interesting since, in the face of a substantial agreement on initial diagnosis, the three autors propose very different solutions: Lukács intends the form of the essay as the only possible way to overcome the fracture between world and totality; on the contrary, Adorno intends that same form as the only form adequate to express the insurmountability of the fracture; finally, Benjamin tries to keep both sides togheter: the autonomy of the trascendent and the salvation of the immanent.
This article aims to demonstrate the centrality of Kant’s and Fichte’s ethics to the development of Schopenhauer’s ideas of 1811—1813. The author proves the following theses based on the philosopher’s manuscripts and the first edition of his dissertation. Firstly, for a long time, Kant’s ‘moral law’ was a major element of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, whereas the regulatory power of ethics supported its claim as a means to cognise the supersensible. Secondly, the dichotomy between the noumenal and the phenomenal encouraged him to develop a dualistic ontology. Thirdly, the emergence of the central concept of his early works — the ‘better consciousness’ — was strongly influenced by Fichte’s lectures attended by Schopenhauer. Fourthly, Schopenhauer’s doctrine of liberating the better consciousness from all the individual and earthly is also rooted in Fichte’s practical philosophy. Fifthly, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and Fichte’s System of Ethnics contributed to Schopenhauer’s understanding of will as the primary essence of all things and the idea of its absolute and unconditional nature and its primacy over cognition. Sixthly, some of the key aspects of Schopenhauer’s pessimism are rooted in Fichte’s philosophy. Seventhly, in the first edition of his dissertation, Schopenhauer advocated Kant’s ethics and formulated the supremacy of the better consciousness over the empirical as noumenal freedom and truly moral behavior and defined the category of negation as its opposite. Later, these ideas, altered and expanded u
<p>En este artículo se trata de explicitar, a partir de la clásica<br />problemática de la relación entre Estado y sociedad civil y del<br />diagnóstico sobre el problema que Hegel ofrece en las <em>Grundlinien</em><br /><em>der Philosophie des Rechts</em> de 1820/21, algunos desarrollos de la<br />teoría crítica de la sociedad (Lukács, Adorno, Pollock, Benjamin y<br />Postone).</p>
Agha Ali and Jelveh ,two of outstanding of Tehran philosophy school, have reconsidered Sandra's opinions in two opposite sides. Agha Ali is the claimant of negation and ambiguity in most of Sandra's opinions while emphasizing on transcendent theosophy foundations ,and he tries to make these ambiguities clear .However , Jelveh follows Avicenna's way and has the idea of criticizing Sandra .This article has chosen the problem Of immortality of subject in substantial movement between all debates of these two philosophers of the same age.in this essay we are going to survey Agha Ali's claims in his new explantation in one hand ,and survey and criticize the new explanation of Jelveh in negation Of substantial movement .One of the consequences of surveying and criticizing these two philosophers is that we recognize Agha Ali has succeeded in making Sadra's opinions clear by presenting a new explanation of substantial movement subject. However ,Jelveh has merged Sadra's opinions with Avicenna's instead of debilitating Sadra's opinions and stabilizing Avicenna's opinions.
This essay aims to correct a prevalent misconception about Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, which understands it to support a conception of human understanding as finite as Heidegger did, but in a more “conceptuallyconservative” way. The result is that Ricoeur’s work is viewed as incapable of addressing the most pressingproblems in contemporary Continental metaphysics. In response, it is argued that Ricoeur is in fact the firstto develop an infinite hermeneutics, which departs significantly from Heideggerian finitude. This positionis demonstrated by tracing the itinerary from Heidegger’s account of aletheia to Ricoeur’s account ofattestation. The conclusion, then, not only clears Ricoeur of the stated charges, but also presents a moreviable path for the future of hermeneutics.
As referências a Nietzsche proliferam de tal forma ao longo dos quase trinta anos de produçáo teórica de Foucault que fica evidente o forte elo que há entre ambos. Além disso, um exame atento das análises foucaultianas sobre a emergência de um saber sobre o indivíduo na modernidade revela que existem, do ponto de vista programático, afinidades consistentes. No entanto, deixar de levar em conta eventuais dissonâncias ou mesmo antagonismos resulta, ao mesmo tempo, numa abordagem superficial e incompleta. É justamente o que se buscará evitar neste ensaio.
Palavras-chave
: Afinidades, Arqueologia, Dissonâncias, Genealogia
The Doxa commonly accepted by the society and the university states that philosophy practiced in Univestity Departments is a socially useless activity. This belief tranquilizes the society and provides to the professionals of philosophy the distinction marks of which they extract his symbolic prestige, but hides an inadvertent reality: the multiple extra-academic informal connections that take place between philosophy and society, and that have fed the birth of hybrid literary-intellectual territories with a strong practical implantation. The reforms that are to undergo in the next years the Spanish educative space demand with increasing insistence the adaptation of university Departments to the necessities of the society and, therefore, the taking in consideration of that inadvertent connection. If, by virtue of the old corporative prejudices, the professional philosophy does not accept the work of critical control of that informal periphery, is possible that it cannot reflectively direct his process of transformation in agreement with the requirements of a democratic society.