This part of the section History of Ontology includes of the following pages: Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: the Theology of Aristotle (under construction) Al-Kindi's Metaphysics: First Philosophy as the Study of God (under construction) Al-Farabi on the Scopes of the Aristotelian Metaphysics (under construction) Ibn Sina (Avicenna) on the Subject and the Object of Metaphysics Translations of the Philosophical Works of Avicenna (Current page) Selected bibliography on Avicenna's Logic and Metaphysics: Avicenna A G Avicenna H Z Averroes (Ibn Rushd) on the Divine as the Subject of Metaphysics (under construction) Index of the Pages on Medieval Philosophy
A brief response is given here by Arthur Petersen to four commentaries on his book Climate, God and Uncertainty: A Transcendental Naturalistic Approach beyond Bruno Latour (2023). First, he situates transcendental naturalism in the context of metamodernism before proceeding to address each commentator in turn. Josh Reeves challenges the need to expand the concept of “nature” to include transcendental values. Petersen responds that his metamodern expansion of the concept of “nature” (standing for “world”) is philosophically warranted while also advising natural scientists to largely stick with a modern notion of “nature” (not including values) to do their science. Whitney Bauman asks about the links between transcendental naturalism and critical theories (criticism) on the one hand and emergence theory on the other. Petersen responds that the links to criticism and emergence are in the book but largely left implicit. Gijsbert van den Brink is afraid Petersen takes it as “unscientific” (in the sense of not being part of Wissenschaft) to theorize about God, which would make transcendental naturalism inaccessible to theists. Petersen responds that he ultimately does not want to exclude metaphysics from philosophy and acknowledges that all philosophy starts from metaphysical assumptions. Finally, Lisa Sideris points out that the way the book engages with wonder is skewed towards wonder in science, including where Petersen discusses poetics and ecological conservation. Petersen agrees there is more to wonder than he addresses in the book and that building a ritual around Gaia based on science may suffer from exactly the same problem as the one Sideris identifies more generally for mythopoeticized science.
AbstractSince the last decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the use of metaphysics by philosophers when approaching conceptual problems in biology has increased. Some philosophers call this tendency in philosophy of biology ‘Metaphysics of Biology’ (Guay and Pradeu in Synthese 1–20, 2017). In this paper, I aim at characterizing Metaphysics of Biology by paying attention to the diverse ways philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual problems in biology. I will claim that there are two different modes of doing Metaphysics of Biology, namely MetaphysicsforBiology and MetaphysicsinBiology.
My task is to demonstrate substantial differences in the views of Kant and Heidegger on being. To this end I analyse Heidegger’s work Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics which Heidegger was writing intermittently during the period from 1927 to 1964. It deals not only with the ideas of the Critique of Pure Reason but also with Kant’s pre-critical work, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763), in which Kant explicitly addressed the question of being for the first time. Heidegger focuses on the transcendental power of imagination not only as the “common root” of sensibility and understanding, but also as the fundamental faculty of ontological cognition. He links it with the phenomenon of time, arguing that the object of knowledge as such is also linked with this phenomenon. True, for Heidegger what matters is not a singular empirical object, but the universal noumenal object, including being. Consequently, Heidegger draws a distinction between empirics and sensibility: all empirics is sensible, but not all sensibility is empirical. A triangle in general, a dog in general, etc. have an image, but it is not a singular image, but a schema. Heidegger argues that time as pure intuition is the “field” in which the imagination faculty draws its image schemas. This field is the horizon of objectness, i.e. the possibility of emergence of non-empirical objects, including being. Being, then, is not a Kantian noumenon, not an X, but a sensible, albeit non-empirical, object created by the power of imagination, a correlate of everything cognisable. So understood, being is created by the human, therefore it is not transcendent but immanent to him/her. I also note that in characterising being Heidegger gradually moves from “time” to “work of art” in the frame of which the power of imagination does not simply reflect reality, but creates multiple diverse worlds.
ABSTRACT – Anthropophagic-Perspectivistic Poetics for a Re-Vision of the Brazilian Theater: the scene of origin – This text presents a plan of construction of a Poetics, whose purpose is to effect a Re-Vision, in five key moments, of the Brazilian Theater. To do this, we seek to establish a scene of origin, outlined after the meeting – impregnated with attraction and repulsion – that takes place in Brazil, from the sixteenth century, between Amerindian and European civilizations. Two metaphysics and forms of expression thus form the intensive and pantheatrical basis of a Poetics that projects a notion of Brazilian theater in a constant state of struggles of perspectives, symbolized, in its origins, by two anthropophagic mouths interdevouring: the mercantilist Christian Eucharist and the Amerindian cosmopolitical.
There have been tantalizing indications from many quarters of physical
cosmology that we are living in the multiverse - a huge set of cosmological
domains ("universes"). What is the structure of this larger whole is an
entirely open problem on the interface between physics and metaphysics. A
goal of the present paper is to draw attention to the connection between
this problem and an old and celebrated puzzle in mathematical physics. Among
the unresolved problems David Hilbert posed in 1900 as a challenge for the
dawning century, none is more philosophically controversial than the Sixth
Problem, requiring the axiomatization of physical theories. In the new
century and the new millennium, this problem has remained a challenge,
usually swept under the rug as "not belonging to mathematics" (as if that
impacts its epistemical status) or simply "unresolved". Recent radical
ontological/cosmological hypothesis of Max Tegmark, identifying mathematical
and physical structures, might shed some new light onto this allegedly
antiquated subject: it might be the case that the problem has already been
solved, insofar we have formalized mathematical structures! While this can
be seen as "cutting the Gordian knot" rather than patiently resolving the
issue, we suggest that there are several advantages to taking Tegmark's
solution seriously, notably in the domain of (future) physics of the
observer. [Project of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Grant no. ON176021: Visible and Invisible Matter in Nearby Galaxies:
Theory and Observations and Grant no. ON179048: The Theory and Practice of
Science in Society: Multidisciplinary, Educational, and Intergenerational
Perspectives]
Essentialists claim that at least some individuals or kinds have essences. This raises an important but little-discussed question: how do we come to know what the essence of something is? This paper examines Aristotle’s answer to this question. One influential interpretation (viz., the Explanationist Interpretation) is carefully expounded, criticized, and then refined. Particular attention is given to what Aristotle says about this issue in 'DA' I.1, 'APo' II.2, and 'APo' II.8. It is argued that the epistemological claim put forward in 'DA' I.1 differs from that put forward in 'APo' II.2 and II.8, contrary to what has been claimed by Explanationists, and that each of these distinct epistemological claims rests on a distinct non-epistemological thesis about essence. Consequently, an ‘Enriched Explanationist Interpretation’ is developed which takes into account both of the aforementioned elements in Aristotle’s epistemology of essence. The paper concludes by highlighting an insight the preceding exegetical discussion offers to contemporary essentialists seeking to explain how we come to know what something’s essence is.
Algunos autores han intentado considerar los delirios como certezas –entendidas en el sentido de Wittgenstein– debido a las similitudes que parecen existir entre sus respectivos estatus epistemológicos. Sin embargo, dicho intento ha sido criticado con agudeza, entre otras razones, porque el contenido de los delirios choca frontalmente con el contenido de las certezas, por lo que los delirios no pueden ser comprendidos debido a los cambios en las relaciones de significado. Pero es evidente que, aunque los delirios no se puedan contemplar como certezas, muchos delirios afectan de un modo u otro al sistema de certezas del paciente. Partiendo de esta base, no es descabellado pensar que dicha influencia pudiera ser también recíproca: en otras palabras, parece sumamente recomendable analizar si algunos delirios se podrían contemplar como el resultado de variaciones en certezas. En este artículo llevo a cabo dicho análisis al intentar mostrar que el origen de algunos delirios pedestres y severos puede ser hallado en lo que llamaré “ceguera a posibilidades” e “incertidumbre”, términos que he desarrollado teniendo en cuenta la obra del filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein.
In this article, I discuss Alain Badiou’s 2008 address titled “The Three Negations.” Though the text was originally presented in a symposium concerning the relationship of law to Badiou’s theory of the event, I discuss the way this brief address offers an introduction to the broad sweep of Badiou’s metaphysics, outlining his accounts of being, appearing, and transformation. To do so, Badiou calls on the resources of three paradigms of negation: from classical Aristotelian logic, from Brouwer’s intuitionist logic, and in paraconsistent logics developed by DaCosta. I explain Badiou’s use of negation in the three primary areas of his metaphysics, as well as to diagnose the degrees of transformation that may have occurred in a situation. My analysis of Badiou’s use of negation in this text is aided by examples from his broader ontological oeuvre. I also explain the underlying requirement in Badiou’s work that formal considerations - mathematical or logical - get their sense by being tethered to readily-identifiable political, aesthetic, scientific, or interpersonal concerns. I conclude by addressing the foundation Badiou’s work establishes for pursuing a new metaphysics, and by discussing certain of the liabilities that remain in the wake of his account.
Identifying the end of a science is one of the criteria for knowing that science. In philosophy, philosophers seek to define science based on the end they determine for it. This article represents Wittgenstein’s view on the end of philosophy in Hutto’s words. Hutto begins his argument with the issue of ‘logic’. Afterwards, he challenges the former interpretations on this issue: First, a theoretical interpretation - smacked of metaphysics - is rejected and then, a therapeutic interpretation - upon which many Tractatus remarks are meaningless - is denied. In the end, Hutto’s new interpretation, which is based on description and activism in daily life, is presented. This article discusses that there are also criticisms on Hutto’ new interpretation and a close scrutiny on the components of this new interpretation is required.
Indo-Iranian languages and literature, General Works
Moritz Geiger (1880–1937) in Phänomenologische Ästhetik paper postulates aesthetics to become an autonomous science. The new science is intended to analyze aesthetic values and to discover the rules of their regulations. It tends to be separated from aesthetics as the subdiscipline of philosophy (especially under the influence of metaphysics) and aesthetics as a field of applying other sciences (mainly psychology). It may be achieved by the usage of a phenomenological method.
Viso neste artigo formular argumentos a partir do Primeiro Wittgenstein sobre a indizibilidade dos valores éticos tal qual exposto no Tractatus Logico-philosophicus e em sua Lecture On Ethics. Para tanto, far-se-á necessário remontar à defesa da autonomia da lógica e da linguagem frente aos fatos do mundo assim como à distinção, fundamental à filosofia do autor, entre dizer e mostrar com o objetivo de esclarecer, ao fim deste estudo, em que medida os valores absolutos residem no “Místico” e às tentativas de teorização quer morais ou éticas é denunciado o completo nonsense e prescrito o silêncio absoluto.
In order to discuss the aesthetics of sport I shall start with some metaphysical considerations: instead of using the notion of essence (definition) of sport, understood as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, I shall try to base these considerations on the notion of the nature of sport. In my understanding, the nature of sport is a very basic phenomenon that lies at the origin and shapes the history of sport. It is a technology of training and mastering physical skills valued for themselves. Now, the aesthetic dimension of sport is based on the technically valuable qualities of sports, which are the consecutive properties of sport. Such qualities are present in all types of sport, not only in the so-called ‘aesthetic sports’ (Best) or ‘performances’ (Suits). Finally, I advance a thesis that although sport is not a form of art, its aesthetic dimension is closer to the nature of sport than its ethical dimension.
Nelle diverse sezioni che compongono Inizio, Carlo Sini affronta in vari modi, a partire da spunti differenti, la crisi attuale dei saperi nel loro senso complessivo e la necessità per la filosofia di ritornare alla sua vocazione pedagogica.
Secondo Klemperer la lingua pensa per noi. Ma anche le istituzioni pensano per noi. Col risultato che le prassi determinano spesso un pensiero diffuso che viene condiviso e fatto proprio senza rendersene conto. Quale pensiero ci comunica l’organizzazione attuale della prassi didattica delle scuole italiane? La relazione risponde a questa domanda mostrando come occorre rendersi consapevoli del preciso significato di tutte queste prassi didattiche.
Thought of progress has been considered as one of the presuppositions of the West modernity. Having accepted this idea, we should regard it as one of the bases and foundations of early modern philosophy, and consider Descartes, known as the father of modern philosophy, as having a major role in its formation. There is a strong relationship between the West philosophical thought and the change of the idea of progress to one of the undisputed facts of the west civilization, and this issue can be seen clearly in Descartes thought system better than anywhere else. The present paper intends to show the leading position of Descartes’ thought system in the institutionalization of the concept of progress in the West philosophical system in three main parts: 1. Authority fighting and its relation with Cartesian’s Doubt, 2. The genuineness of the worldly life in Descartes’ thought system, and 3. Establishing the foundation of modern science. This article is based on the modern forerunners’ change of opinion about the philosophy mission in the world. It makes attempt to demonstrate in order to achieve the thought of progress, some prerequisites are necessary; and these prerequisite, though not exclusively, in their best and most complete form are generally achieved in the West philosophical thought and are particularly accomplished in Descartes’ philosophy.
The article attempts to clarify an important aspect of St. Thomas Aquinas’s theory of human action, namely to show these acts of man which are immediately caused by the will. According to some contemporary philosophers, the acts of the will are limited to those of trying or of intending. Do they exhaust the whole possibility of the will to act? The author seeks to answer this question basing his considerations on the analysis of the Summa Theologiae by St. Thomas Aquinas.