En este ensayo, quisiera proponer una reflexión inicial sobre la significativa convergencia entre el iusfeminismo y el pacifismo jurídico en la crítica a la guerra. En primer lugar, mencionaré brevemente algunas consideraciones sobre el iusfeminismo como matriz constitutiva de las teorías críticas del derecho; posteriormente, intentaré analizar la naturaleza del pacifismo jurídico como una teoría crítica del Derecho. A continuación, tras precisar por qué el iusfeminismo y el pacifismo jurídico deben entenderse como “saberes inéditos”, me detendré, de forma esquemática, en el análisis de su convergencia metodológica, teórica y temática.
Il saggio si propone di offrire un contributo di discussione e di approfondimento allo studio svolto da Jacopo Della Torre relativo all’analisi comparativa dei differenti standard probatori adottati nel tempo per raggiungere la certezza della decisione penale. In ragione dell’ampiezza dei temi trattati, ci si soffermerà in particolare sul sistema di prove legali e sul passaggio all’intimo convincimento, con specifico riferimento alla realtà francese.
This monograph discusses dualities in physics: what dualities are, their main examples--from quantum mechanics and electrodynamics to statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and string theory--and the philosophical questions they raise. Part I first conceptualises dualities and discusses their main roles and themes, including how they are related to familiar notions like symmetry and interpretation. It also discusses the main simple examples of dualities: position-momentum, wave-particle, electric-magnetic, and Kramers-Wannier dualities. Part II discusses advanced examples and their inter-relations: particle-soliton dualities, electric-magnetic dualities in quantum field theories, dualities in string theory, and gauge-gravity duality. This Part ends with discussions of the hole argument, and how string theory counts the microstates of a black hole. Part III is an in-depth discussion of general philosophical issues on which dualities bear: theoretical equivalence (two theories 'saying the same thing, in different words'), scientific realism and the under-determination of theories by data, theory succession and the M-theory programme, explanation, and scientific understanding. It proposes a view of scientific theories that it dubs 'the geometric view of theories'. The book's treatment of the examples is at the advanced undergraduate and graduate level, starting from elementary and progressing to more advanced examples. The discussions of philosophical topics, such as referential semantics, theoretical equivalence, scientific realism and scientific understanding, are both self-contained and in-depth. Thus the book is aimed at students and researchers with an interest in the physical examples and philosophical questions about dualities, and also in how physics and philosophy can fruitfully interact with each other.
Modern physics proposals present deep tensions between seemingly contradictory descriptions of reality. Views of wave-particle duality, black hole complementarity, and the Unruh effect demand explanations that shift depending on how a system is observed. However, traditional models of scientific explanation impose a fixed structure that fails to account for varying observational contexts. This paper introduces context-dependent mapping, a framework that reorganizes physical laws into self-consistent subsets structured around what can actually be observed in a given context. By doing so, it provides a principled way to integrate complementarity into the philosophy of explanation.
The monograph is the first study of legal awareness in Russian jurisprudence as an ideological, factual and formal source of law. The subject area of the study is located at the junction of the general theory of law and the history of the philosophy of law. The genesis of legal awareness as an ideological source of law in the Western legal tradition is traced, its importance in overcoming gaps in law through the analogy of law. The reasons for lawyers' non-recognition of legal awareness as a source of law are revealed. Significant attention is paid to the revolutionary legal consciousness as a formal source of law in 1917-1922, its specific features and its effect in judicial practice. The political and legal doctrines of Western and domestic jurists that influenced the positivization of the revolutionary legal consciousness in Russia are considered. The article analyzes the regulatory properties of legal awareness, the dependence of its recognition as a formal source of law on the type of legal understanding and the consequences of positivization. It is addressed to the academic community of lawyers, primarily to specialists in the field of philosophy of law and general theory of law. It may be useful for graduate students of law schools.
Jurisprudence is the philosophy of the law, which delivers an interesting narrative by analyzing law from different perspectives. As far as positivism is concerned, this is one of the luminescent schools of jurisprudence among other ideologies. German Positivism ideas differ from the British Positivism since it neither considers ethics nor facts. Kelson is one of the frontline scholars who introduced the Pure Theory of Law by enriching the Jurisprudence widely, while influencing other scholars to contribute to the legal system. Even though this eminent philosophy fattened the Jurisprudence, still there are some existing conundrums which did not fathomed by the Kelson. This paper intends to discuss the nature of the pure theory while focusing on the effectiveness and validity of Kelson’s basic norm with the separability thesis to identify the practical issues for better application. Keywords: Effectiveness, Grundnorm, Jurisprudence, Pure Theory, Kelson
The article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the doctrinal justification of sources of law in the context of key contemporary philosophical-legal approaches: the theory of legal argumentation, hermeneutics, and the integrative jurisprudence of R. Dworkin. The relevance of the study is determined by the necessity to overcome the limitations of traditional positivist understandings of sources of law, which reduce them to a closed system of formal acts. The central theme of the work is the revision of the concept of sources of law proposed by alternative methodologies. It explores how the theory of argumentation, rooted in analytical philosophy, justifies the transition from a rigid hierarchy of formal sources to a model of "open rationality," where any rational argument that has undergone procedural verification serves as the legitimate basis for a decision. In contrast, the hermeneutic approach (A. Kaufmann, U. Neumann) interprets sources of law as the embodiment of historically evolved legal experience, whose meaning is revealed not through formal procedures, but through the dialectical unity of text and interpretation. The research methods employed are characteristic of theoretical-legal and philosophical-legal analysis: the comparative legal method, used to identify similarities and differences between analytical and hermeneutic approaches; the method of conceptual reconstruction, used to systematize the views of key authors; and historical-philosophical analysis, which allows for tracing the genesis and transformation of fundamental ideas. The novelty of the research lies in the systematic identification and analysis of fundamental ontological and epistemological divergences between the theory of argumentation and hermeneutics concerning the doctrine of sources of law. It is argued that while the theory of argumentation, rooted in the analytical tradition, views sources of law as a resource for procedurally organized discussion within a procedural ontology, hermeneutics understands them as the embodiment of historical legal experience that requires deep meaningful comprehension. The work also reconsiders R. Dworkin's contribution through the lens of his polemics with the continental tradition (K. Larenz), which allows for the identification of common methodological issues related to the normative force of principles and the idea of "the one correct solution." Ultimately, it substantiates that contemporary theory of argumentation, through dialectical interaction with hermeneutics, contributes to the formation of a pluralistic and coherent model of sources of law, complementing the limitations of traditional paradigms.
This essay revisits the early methodology of Rudolph von Jhering. It has often been dismissed due to its heavy metaphysics, unwieldy presentation, and alleged neglect of teleology. But a charitable reconstruction in contemporary terms reveals a coherence theory of jurisprudence that is in many ways superior to current coherence accounts. It emphasises simplicity as a guiding principle in doctrinal construction. I argue that contemporary philosophy of science vindicates its main points. Particularly, simpler theories are not only cognitively economical but also tend to be closer to the truth. Understood as outlining a coherence or unification theory of legal reasoning, Jhering’s Spirit of Roman Law has much in store for contemporary coherentists. It stands out in terms of sophistication, practical usability, and sensitivity to the philosophical and technical difficulties of legal coherentism. It also avoids problems of linguistic indeterminacy that trivialise numerous current coherence theories of law.
One persistent question in jurisprudence relates to the role of morality in the concept of law. For instance, consider the question of whether unjust statutes are laws. Legal positivists say that they’re laws in every relevant sense, while natural lawyers say that they’re not. This article considers a different answer inspired by recent findings in experimental philosophy: there is one relevant sense in which unjust statutes are laws, but also a different relevant sense in which they aren’t. After considering the ways in which this alternative differs from some of the mainstream theories in general jurisprudence, the article argues that it provides more elegant solutions to two problems that have puzzled legal philosophers in the past: the paradox of customary international law and the shifts in legal discourse over history.
This paper addresses three sets of issues. Considering the universal importance of categorization in the human world, it first highlights differences between the processes of concept-formation of items belonging to the natural and human-made world. Second, proceeding from experiments in cognitive psychology, which have persistently demonstrated the relevance of typicality judgments, it tries to elucidate their scope and significance for an underlying theory of concepts. In the final step, the paper shows in what sense the ensuing prototype theory of concepts is germane for an attempt to conceptualize law in the tradition of analytic philosophy. Namely, if nothing else, cognitive science experiments demonstrated that the metaphysical inclination of analytical jurisprudence is grounded in scientifically unfounded psychological assumptions about the nature of our cognitive system and categorization.
In this article, I shall focus on the legal consequences of one of the most obvious features of populisms: identity politics. In particular, I shall explore how populists in power use constitutional law to identify and fight the alleged enemy, thus confirming their Schmittian flavour. In Schmitt, public law becomes part of a constitutional narrative that represents the people as forged by a static identity that goes back to the mythological origin of the legal system. This reconstruction is based on an organicistic reading of the concept of the people. This identitarian public law makes instrumental use of the moral argument, the historical argument and the religious argument. Populists in government tend to militarise constitutional law in many ways and in this article I will focus on two strategies: one that looks backwards, consisting of the instrumentalisation of the argument of constituent power; and one that looks forward and leverages the use of constitutional amendment.
Political science, Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law
I argue that research in physics operates under an implicit community philosophy, and I offer a definition I think physicists would accept, by and large. I compare this definition to what philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science, with physicists, say we are doing.
This volume presents an important collection of newly commissioned work on central issues in general and specific jurisprudence, covering the nature of law and legal reasoning, the jurisprudence of the late Eugenio Bulygin, the legal realist tradition in France, and the philosophy of tort, criminal, and international law, among other topics. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law is a forum for some of the best new philosophical work on law, by both senior and junior scholars from around the world. The essays range widely over issues in general jurisprudence (the nature of law, adjudication, and legal reasoning), the philosophical foundations of specific areas of law (from criminal law to evidence to international law), the history of legal philosophy, and related philosophical topics that illuminate the problems of legal theory. OSPL will be essential reading for philosophers, academic lawyers, political scientists, and historians of law who wish to keep up with the latest developments in this flourishing field.
The article focuses on the paradoxes of constitutional identity and the impact of constitutional sovereignty on post-sovereign European society and politics. It uses post-1989 constitutional and social transformations in Central European countries, the rise of constitutional populism and identitarian politics to argue that the nation state continues to operate through the principle of constitutional sovereignty even in the EU’s post-sovereign constitutional constellation. It thus proves that democratic politics is identity politics even in post-sovereign and post-national politics and the EU’s supranational organisation has to respond to the constitutional and political identity question through its own structures and semantics. The central argument, therefore, revisits classic notions of social and constitutional theory such as the distinctions between community and society, ethnos and demos or authenticity and alienation to outline the persistence of nationalism and its varieties in contemporary constitutional populism in Central Europe. While recognising that the nation state continues to be the only organisation to successfully combine rational efficiency and communal bonds constituted by the national identity, the EU’s response to the challenges of constitutional populism and nationalism needs to enhance its democratic legitimation and constitutionally integrate the imaginaries of European public spheres and demoicracy to promote an anti-explosive alternative to the explosive nationalist imaginaries.
An axiology as a theory of values takes an important place not only in general philosophy but in legal philosophy as well. Jurisprudence and law cannot ultimately be axiologically neutralised since the relationship between law and values is of a primary, eternal, necessary and immanent character. The author discusses this phenomenon on the example of Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy. In his opinion when one writes about Radbruch as a philosopher of law, one should make five very important reservations: firstly, Radbruch was a representative of Neo-Kantianism; secondly, it was not Neo-Kantianism ‘in general’, but a specific variant called Baden Neo-Kantianism (south-German, Heidelberg-based); thirdly, Radbruch was not a philosopher ‘in general’, as he was interested in Neo-Kantianism transplanted to the philosophy of law; fourthly, we may currently notice a great comeback of the philosophy of Kant (e.g. J. Habermas, J. Rawls, O. Höffe), but this phenomenon should be precisely distinguished from Neo-Kantianism as the temporally and spatially determined philosophical direction of the fin de siècle period; fifthly, if one can even speak of some kind of axiological turning point in the evolution of Radbruch’s philosophical views, it is 1933 rather than 1945.
The article discusses the theory of law in terms of the extent to which it is part of jurisprudence, on the one hand, and a philosophical pursuit, on the other. The question is explored considering the historical development of the legal sciences and the situation of Polish theory of law in the latter half of the twentieth century. Also, the author relies on the analysis of selected theoreticallegal concepts, notably the so-called multiplane theory of law and the views thought of Zygmunt Ziembiński. The conclusions suggest that philosophy is inevitable in jurisprudence.
La atención a la literatura como instrumento de educación del jurista, como lenguaje que permite transmitir lo que está en el núcleo del derecho es uno de los rasgos característicos de la obra del profesor Javier de Lucas. En este trabajo se identifican cuatro novelas evocadas en sus clases y en sus escritos para iluminar problemas tales como la desobediencia al derecho, la movilidad humana, la ciudadanía y el reconocimiento del otro. A modo de cláusula de cierre la referencia a un poema condensa el compromiso del profesor De Lucas en la lucha contra la exclusión social.
Andrii Voshchepynets, Oleksiy Agapitov, Lynn Wilson
et al.
We present the results of processing the effects of the powerful Gamma Ray Burst GRB221009A captured by the charged particle detectors (electrostatic analyzers and solid-state detectors) onboard spacecraft at different points in the heliosphere on October 9, 2022. To follow the GRB221009A propagation through the heliosphere we used the electron and proton flux measurements from solar missions Solar Orbiter and STEREO-A; Earth magnetosphere and the solar wind missions THEMIS and Wind; meteorological satellites POES15, POES19, MetOp3; and MAVEN - a NASA mission orbiting Mars. GRB221009A had a structure of four bursts: less intense Pulse 1 - the triggering impulse - was detected by gamma-ray observatories at 131659 UT (near the Earth); the most intense Pulses 2 and 3 were detected on board all the spacecraft from the list, and Pulse 4 detected in more than 500 s after Pulse 1. Due to their different scientific objectives, the spacecraft, which data was used in this study, were separated by more than 1 AU (Solar Orbiter and MAVEN). This enabled tracking GRB221009A as it was propagating across the heliosphere. STEREO-A was the first to register Pulse 2 and 3 of the GRB, almost 100 seconds before their detection by spacecraft in the vicinity of Earth. MAVEN detected GRB221009A Pulses 2, 3, and 4 at the orbit of Mars about 237 seconds after their detection near Earth. By processing the time delays observed we show that the source location of the GRB221009A was at RA 288.5 degrees, Dec 18.5 degrees (J2000) with an error cone of 2 degrees