Riccardo Vasellini, Riccardo Vasellini, Gilda Ferrandino
et al.
IntroductionThis study intends to test the hypothesis that, contrary to traditional interpretation, the social structure of the polity of Aksum–especially in its early stages–was not characterized by a vertical hierarchy with highly centralized administrative power, and that the leaders mentioned in the few available inscriptions were predominantly ritual leaders with religious rather than coercive political authority. This hypothesis, suggested by the available archaeological evidence, is grounded in Charles Stanish's model, which posits that pre-state societies could achieve cooperative behavior without the presence of coercive authority.MethodsUsing agent-based modeling applied to data inspired by the Aksum civilization, we examine the dynamics of cooperation in the presence and absence of a Public Goods Game.ResultsResults show that while cooperative behavior can emerge in the short term without coercive power, it may not be sustainable over the long term, suggesting a need for centralized authority to foster stable, complex societies.DiscussionThese findings provide insights into the evolutionary pathways that lead to state formation and complex social structures.
Understanding how cooperation evolves in structured populations remains a fundamental question across diverse disciplines. The problem of cooperation typically involves pairwise or group interactions among individuals. While prior studies have extensively investigated the role of networks in shaping cooperative dynamics, the influence of tie or connection strengths between individuals has not been fully understood. Here, we introduce a quenched mean-field based framework for analyzing both pairwise and group dilemmas on any weighted network, providing interpretable conditions required for favoring cooperation. Our theoretical advances further motivate us to find that the degree-inverse weighted social ties -- reinforcing tie strengths between peripheral nodes while weakening those between hubs -- robustly promote cooperation in both pairwise and group dilemmas. Importantly, this configuration enables heterogeneous networks to outperform homogeneous ones in fixation of cooperation, thereby adding to the conventional view that degree heterogeneity inhibits cooperative behavior under the local stochastic strategy update. We further test the generality of degree-inverse weighted social ties in promoting cooperation on 30,000 random networks and 13 empirical networks drawn from real-world systems. Finally, we unveil the underlying mechanism by examining the formation and evolution of cooperative ties under social ties with degree-inverse weights. Our systematic analyses provide new insights into how the network adjustment of tie strengths can effectively steer structured populations toward cooperative outcomes in biological and social systems.
Alfonso de Miguel-Arribas, Chengbin Sun, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
et al.
Cooperation and competition are fundamental forces shaping both natural and human systems, yet their interplay remains poorly understood. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) has long served as a foundational framework in Game Theory for studying cooperation and defection, yet it overlooks explicit competitive interactions. Contest Theory, in turn, provides tools to model competitive dynamics, where success depends on the investment of resources. In this work, we bridge these perspectives by extending the PDG to include a third strategy, fighting, governed by the Tullock contest success function, where success depends on relative resource investments. This model, implemented on a square lattice, examines the dynamics of cooperation, defection, and competition under resource accumulation and depletion scenarios. Our results reveal a rich phase diagram in which cooperative and competitive strategies coexist under certain critical resource investments, expanding the parameter space for cooperation beyond classical limits. Fighters delay the dominance of defectors by mediating interactions, expanding the conditions under which cooperation persists. This work offers new insights into the evolution of social behaviors in structured populations, bridging cooperation and competition dynamics.
Studying the impact of cooperation in strategic settings is one of the cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. Intuitively, allowing more cooperation yields equilibria that are more beneficial for the society of agents. However, for many games it is still an open question how much cooperation is actually needed to ensure socially good equilibria. We contribute to this research endeavor by analyzing the benefits of cooperation in a network formation game that models the creation of communication networks via the interaction of selfish agents. In our game, agents that correspond to nodes of a network can buy incident edges of a given weighted host graph to increase their centrality in the formed network. The cost of an edge is proportional to its length, and both endpoints must agree and pay for an edge to be created. This setting is known for having a high price of anarchy. To uncover the impact of cooperation, we investigate the price of anarchy of our network formation game with respect to multiple solution concepts that allow for varying amounts of cooperation. On the negative side, we show that on host graphs with arbitrary edge weights even the strongest form of cooperation cannot improve the price of anarchy. In contrast to this, as our main result, we show that cooperation has a significant positive impact if the given host graph has metric edge weights. For this, we prove asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy via a novel proof technique that might be of independent interest and can be applied in other models with metric weights.
IntroductionIran as a developing country needs to address its immediate societal needs in line with its national and religious values and reduce its gap with other societies. National productivity studies and comparisons of Iran with similar countries also indicate the need to pay attention to management structures (Mohammadzadeh Sultanmoradi et al., 2019: 3). On the other hand, social inequality and the issue of poverty in Iranian society have turned into a socio-economic crisis (Ahmadi et al., 2023: 243), and governments have been active in the economic field with the main goal of eliminating this poverty and deprivation (Abbasi et al., 2023: 270). To eliminate these inequalities, the use and structuring of cooperative institutions with a semi-look at charity and endowment can be a solution (Ahmadi et al., 2023: 243). The cooperative institution in Iran has legal status because Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution explicitly refer to the provision of employment through cooperatives and the division of the national economy into three government, cooperative, and private sectors, and consequently, the law of the cooperative sector of the Islamic Republic of Iran was approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in 1991 (Oghabayi Jazni et al., 2018). An endowment can be considered a model for exiting the crisis, as the political system governing the endowment has been a mediator of changes in the performance of this socio-religious institution (Ahmadi et al., 2023: 243). In most countries, the cooperative management system has centralized planning, but in terms of implementation, it follows a decentralized system. Apart from that, in terms of the complexity of the organizational structure, this system is simple and small in volume. Given the aforementioned, this study aims to revise and construct a new structure and propose a suitable model for the cooperative management structure of the country, following the specific cultural, social, and political conditions of the country.MethodologyGiven the exploratory nature of the research topic, a mixed-method research design was used to design a model for the cooperative structure in Iran with an endowment and charity approach and to deeply explain the effective components. The research was conducted in two qualitative and quantitative phases. In terms of research orientation, the qualitative phase is part of basic research and the quantitative phase is part of developmental research. The research was conducted in four stages. In the first step of the first stage, the cooperative structure in Iran was studied using a qualitative method, based on upstream documents, library study method, and organizational structure (form) review. This step answers the question, "What is the cooperative structure in Iran?" Then, in the second step, a content analysis method was used to extract the content indices of cooperation from semi-structured interviews with 15 experts, including managers and employees of the Deputy of Cooperation in the Ministry of Cooperation, Labor and Social Welfare, and the university professors in the field of public management. The purpose of this step is to answer the question, "What are the components and indices related to the structure (content) of the cooperative sector?" In the third step, using the available sampling method and the fuzzy Delphi method, ten university experts and managers in the field of cooperation were screened for dimensions, components, and indicators of cooperation with an endowment and charity approach.Research FindingsThe findings of the current study indicate that reducing government intervention in charity affairs is one of the most important principles under consideration for reforming the structure of the country's cooperative organizations. This reform should create the prerequisites for the optimal functioning of the cooperative sector in charity and endowment affairs, in areas such as transparency of legal procedures and practices, and the possibility of coordination between different sectors and multiple trustees. The functions of the model and its innovation compared to previous models are that each of the responsible administrations for cooperation, after approval and ratification by the National Cooperation Council, implement their cooperative programs, and all the actions of these administrations are based on the policies determined by this council. The presence of the President as the head of the National Cooperation Council guarantees the implementation of adopted strategies and policies and obliges the administrations to implement and follow up on the approved programs of the council. The experts believe that considering that a small part of the duties of other administrations is related to the cooperative matter and that the Ministry of Cooperation, Labor and Social Welfare has an important role in the cooperative due to the aforementioned duties., the secretariat of the National Cooperation Council should be established in this ministry. The Cooperation Chamber, as a non-governmental public institution, should also be present in the National Council as a representative of the unions of cooperative companies. Also, the presence of the head of the country’s Management and Planning Organization is useful in providing financial and human resources and accelerating the administrative process of cooperatives. Also, considering the important role of the village councils in creating the context and attracting people towards cooperatives, the Ministry of Interior, representing the organization of municipalities and village councils of the country, should be present in the National Cooperation Council. Also, based on the opinion of experts, the Minister of Jihad Agriculture, representing the Iran Rural Cooperation Organization, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development, representing Mehr Housing Cooperatives, the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance for facilitating economic and commercial affairs of cooperatives, the head of the Cooperative Development Bank, the head of the Iran Cooperative Investment Guarantee Fund and the head of the Central Bank should be present in the National Council to allocate financial and credit resources to cooperatives. The presence of the Minister of Education and the Minister of Science is necessary for the culturalization of the cooperative matter at all educational levels.Discussion and ConclusionIn light of the research findings, to cooperate in formulating the country's cooperative policies in charity affairs, and to ensure the coherence and coordination of all agencies, align activities with goals and policies, and oversee their proper implementation, it is proposed to establish a National Cooperative Council. The secretariat of this council would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Cooperation, Labor, and Social Welfare. It is also suggested that in drafting government bills and administrative reform programs, actions should be taken to review the structure of the country’s cooperation, minimize the size of the volume of formations, and reduce the role of the government. Unified laws and transparent and specific indicators in the three areas of cooperatives should be legislated. The cooperative sector structure should be independent, which while having enough cohesion to help implement cross-sectoral policies related to the cooperative sector, also has enough operational independence to help implement sectoral policies.
Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
Rocio Botta, Gerardo Blanco, Christian E. Schaerer
Abstract In Public Goods Games (PGG), the temptation to free-ride on others’ contributions poses a significant threat to the sustainability of cooperative societies. Therefore, societies strive to mitigate this through incentive systems, employing rewards and punishments to foster cooperative behavior. Thus, peer punishment, in which cooperators sanction defectors, as well as pool punishment, where a centralized punishment institution executes the punishment, is deeply analyzed in previous works. Although the literature indicates that these methods may enhance cooperation on social dilemmas under particular contexts, there are still open questions, for instance, the structural connection between graduated punishment and the monitoring of public goods games. Our investigation proposes a compulsory PGG framework under Panoptical surveillance. Inspired by Foucault’s theories on disciplinary mechanisms and biopower, we present a novel mathematical model that scrutinizes the balance between the severity and scope of punishment to catalyze cooperative behavior. By integrating perspectives from evolutionary game theory and Foucault’s theories of power and discipline, this research uncovers the theoretical foundations of mathematical frameworks involved in punishment and discipline structures. We show that well-calibrated punishment and discipline schemes, leveraging the panoptical effect for universal oversight, can effectively mitigate the free-rider dilemma, fostering enhanced cooperation. This interdisciplinary approach not only elucidates the dynamics of cooperation in societal constructs but also underscores the importance of integrating diverse methodologies to address the complexities of fostering cooperative evolution.
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs to each coalition under some non-cooperative solution concept coincide with their value in the cooperative game, the cooperative game is said to be implementable and the non-cooperative game its implementation. This paper proves that all strictly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium; and that all weakly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Discussion then proceeds on the appropriate choice of non-cooperative solution concept for the implementation.
With an evolutionary approach, the basis of morality can be explained as adaptations to problems of cooperation. With 'evolution' taken in a broad sense, AIs that satisfy the conditions for evolution to apply will be subject to the same cooperative evolutionary pressure as biological entities. Here the adaptiveness of increased cooperation as material safety and wealth increase is discussed -- for humans, for other societies, and for AIs. Diminishing beneficial returns from increased access to material resources also suggests the possibility that, on the whole, there will be no incentive to for instance colonize entire galaxies, thus providing a possible explanation of the Fermi paradox, wondering where everybody is. It is further argued that old societies could engender, give way to, super-AIs, since it is likely that super-AIs are feasible, and fitter. Closing is an aside on effective ways for morals and goals to affect life and society, emphasizing environments, cultures, and laws, and exemplified by how to eat. 'Diminishing returns' is defined, as less than roots, the inverse of infeasibility. It is also noted that there can be no exponential colonization or reproduction, for mathematical reasons, as each entity takes up a certain amount of space. Appended are an algorithm for colonizing for example a galaxy quickly, models of the evolution of cooperation and fairness under diminishing returns, and software for simulating signaling development.
Amir Zablotsky, Marcelo N Kuperman, Sebastián Bouzat
We analyze the dynamics of room evacuation for mixed populations that include both competitive and cooperative individuals through numerical simulations using the social force model. Cooperative agents represent well-trained individuals who know how to behave in order to reduce risks within high-density crowds. We consider that competitive agents can imitate cooperative behavior when they are in close proximity to cooperators. We study the effects of the imitation of cooperative behavior on the duration and safety of evacuations, analyzing evacuation time and other quantities of interest for varying parameters such as the proportions of mixing, the aspect ratio of the room, and the parameters characterizing individual behaviors. Our main findings reveal that the addition of a relatively small number of cooperative agents into a crowd can reduce evacuation time and the density near the exit door, making the evacuation faster and safer despite an increase in the total number of agents. In particular, for long spaces such as corridors, a small number of added cooperative agents can significantly facilitate the evacuation process. We compare our results with those of systems without imitation and also study the general role of cooperation, providing further analysis for homogeneous populations. Our main conclusions emphasize the potential relevance of training people how to behave in high-density crowds
Context and purpose. Competition could have succeeded in performance and profitability through competitive advantages formerly, due to product/service performance, but today the competitive advantage has become a necessity and businesses are using of the collaboration network as an advantage. Therefore, the research seeks to investigate collaboration networks at the level of SME's companies located in Ahvaz.Methodology/approach. The social network analysis method is used. Cooperation data of companies, organizations and research centers is collected through conducting semi-structured interviews with 41 CEO. Cooperation analysis has done in detailed at distribution, marketing, R&D, production, and finance level to understand network opportunities better than usual.Findings and conclusions. The results show that despite the need to pay attention to cooperation between SME's, does not have a favorable situation. Collaboration network members are dependent on prominent actors who influence how firms interact. This situation threatens businesses weather in the short term or in the medium term. Therefore, it is better to examine and study scenarios and strategies to reduce dependence according to the dimensions of the collaboration network.Originality. Despite the importance of Social Network Analysis (SNA) method, studies conducted with this method are not significant. There is some studies which assessed the factors affecting collaboration network development. Therefore, the study seeks to expand its scope to the business level using this approach.
madineh khosrowjerdi, Mehdi Nooripoor, Saeid Salehi
The current research conducted with the aim of identifying the effective structures on the success of nomadic cooperatives in Fars province. This research used a quantitative approach, which conducted using a survey method. The data obtained via a questionnaire from 380 nomadic cooperatives members in Fars province, who selected using Krejcie and Morgan table with proportional assignment. The results showed that the relationships between internal factors such as relationship between socio-cultural, economic and management structures as well as external factors i.e. socio-cultural, economic, policy and educational structures with the success of nomadic cooperatives was positive and significant at 1% level. In addition, the results of multiple regression in a step-by-step method showed that internal factors such as economic, socio-cultural, educational and managerial structures as well as external economic, political and socio-cultural structures totaled 79.1% of the changes in the dependent variable. Therefore, internal and external factors are effective and have a role in the activities of cooperative companies, which directly and indirectly influence the way cooperatives operate. According to the results, for nomadic cooperatives to be more successful, holding empowerment meetings and workshops related to the principles and goals of the cooperative and the duties of the members and the board of directors recommended. Moreover, providing suitable and easily accessible banking facilities and communicating with other cooperatives by holding meetings to introduce the best cooperatives in the field of production, marketing, and performance, high profitability and waste reduction are also recommended.
We study how to train personalized models for different tasks on decentralized devices with limited local data. We propose "Structured Cooperative Learning (SCooL)", in which a cooperation graph across devices is generated by a graphical model prior to automatically coordinate mutual learning between devices. By choosing graphical models enforcing different structures, we can derive a rich class of existing and novel decentralized learning algorithms via variational inference. In particular, we show three instantiations of SCooL that adopt Dirac distribution, stochastic block model (SBM), and attention as the prior generating cooperation graphs. These EM-type algorithms alternate between updating the cooperation graph and cooperative learning of local models. They can automatically capture the cross-task correlations among devices by only monitoring their model updating in order to optimize the cooperation graph. We evaluate SCooL and compare it with existing decentralized learning methods on an extensive set of benchmarks, on which SCooL always achieves the highest accuracy of personalized models and significantly outperforms other baselines on communication efficiency. Our code is available at https://github.com/ShuangtongLi/SCooL.
Significance Cooperation between allied individuals is ubiquitous in human societies. Our capacity to build strategic cooperative relationships across multiple social levels, such as trade or military alliances both nationally and internationally, is thought to be unique to our species. Here, however, we show that male bottlenose dolphins form the largest known multilevel alliance network outside humans, where the cooperative relationships between groups, rather than alliance size, increases male access to a contested resource. These results reveal that both dolphins and humans form strategic intergroup alliances between unrelated individuals, likely selecting for enhanced social cognition. This surprising case of convergence suggests that dolphin societies, as well as those of nonhuman primates, are valuable model systems for understanding human social and cognitive evolution.
Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is only one kind of a more general class of behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes reciprocity, respecting others' property, honesty, equity, efficiency, as well as many others. Inspired by these experimental works, we here open up the path toward studying other forms of moral behavior with methods of statistical physics. We argue that this is a far-reaching direction for future research that can help us answer fundamental questions about human sociality. Why did our societies evolve as they did? What moral principles are more likely to emerge? What happens when different moral principles clash? Can we predict the break out of moral conflicts in advance and contribute to their solution? These are amongst the most important questions of our time, and methods of statistical physics could lead to new insights and contribute toward finding answers.