Hasil untuk "Metaphysics"

Seyma Yaman Kayadibi

This paper develops a mathematically rigorous, philosophically grounded framework for evaluating artificial memory systems, rooted in the metaphysical structure of Leibniz's Monadology. Building on a previously formalized metric, the Artificial Age Score (AAS), the study maps twenty core propositions from the Monadology to an information-theoretic architecture. In this design, each monad functions as a modular unit defined by a truth score, a redundancy parameter, and a weighted contribution to a global memory penalty function. Smooth logarithmic transformations operationalize these quantities and yield interpretable, bounded metrics for memory aging, representational stability, and salience. Classical metaphysical notions of perception, apperception, and appetition are reformulated as entropy, gradient dynamics, and internal representation fidelity. Logical principles, including the laws of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, are encoded as regularization constraints guiding memory evolution. A central contribution is a set of first principles proofs establishing refinement invariance, structural decomposability, and monotonicity under scale transformation, aligned with the metaphysical structure of monads. The framework's formal organization is structured into six thematic bundles derived from Monadology, aligning each mathematical proof with its corresponding philosophical domain. Beyond evaluation, the framework offers a principled blueprint for building Al memory architectures that are modular, interpretable, and provably sound.

Alice Ragni

This essay investigates the way in which Wolff takes an interest in the hypothesis of an emendatio of the prima philosophia from Leibniz’s incitement in De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae (1694) to re-found metaphysics. This makes it possible, secondly, to examine the way in which Wolff takes Johannes Clauberg’s ontology as a model, even though it represents in his view only a failed attempt at that same emendatio. Through the analysis of the texts, this article considers the possibility of a new reading of the ‘failure’ attributed by Wolff to Clauberg, which would consist in his having ‘emended’ first philosophy by expelling it from the domain of ontology and finally identifying it with Cartesian prima philosophia.

Bikram Keshari Behera, Surendra Kumar Gour, Shyamal Biswas

We have analytically determined the refractive index for the mechanical refraction of a relativistic particle for its all possible speeds. We have critically analysed the importance of Descartes' metaphysical theory and extended it in this regard. We have considered the conservation of the tangential component of the relativistic momentum and the relativistic energy of the particle in the process of the mechanical refraction within the optical-mechanical analogy. Our result for the mechanical refractive index exactly matches with the forms of both the Fermat's result on Snell's law of optical refraction at the ultra-relativistic limit and the Descartes' metaphysical result on the pseudo-Snell law of optical refraction at the non-relativistic limit.

Amanda Gefter

This paper began as a set of notes introducing quantum physicists of the QBist persuasion to enactive theory. Unlike mainstream cognitive science, which views cognition as computations on internal representations of the external world (and thus the mind as in the head), the enactive approach sees cognition as adaptive, embodied action. Enaction can ground concepts of experience, agency, knowledge, and normativity - which play key roles in QBist quantum mechanics - in terms consistent with QBism's participatory approach. That's because QBism and enaction both reject an absolute, pregiven subject-object split: for QBism, quantum measurement is the enactment of the subject-object divide; for enaction, cognition is the enactment of that divide. Indeed, each appears to be half of the same story. QBism is a theory of how the world is created and recreated through interactions with an agent, while enaction is a theory of how agents are created and recreated through interactions with the world. Through conversations with QBists and enactivists, these notes evolved into a larger project aimed at unifying QBist physics with enactive cognitive science. Taken together, they offer the possibility of a unified metaphysics - one that brings subject and object, mind and world, back together again.

Raoni Arroyo, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.

Xerxes D. Arsiwalla

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Anna I. Klimovich

The movement for the revival of the Scholastic tradition (Neo-Scholasticism) was a reaction to devastating criticism by the representatives of Enlightenment which led to the destruction of traditional metaphysics and of epistemological optimism, the two pillars of European religious philosophy. Reception of Kantian ideas in Neo-Scholasticism varied from total rejection to its use in renewing the philosophical foundation of religious philosophy. In this regard the legacy of the Polotsk Jesuit Academy was one of the first attempts to interpret Kant’s ideas and confront them in the framework of the Scholastic tradition. It is therefore not irrelevant to look at how Kant’s programmatic ideas were perceived at the Polotsk Jesuit Academy, one of the few centres of Jesuit philosophy that survived in the territory of the Russian Empire in the early nineteenth century. The object of this study is the attempt at a critical analysis of Kant made in the Philosophical Instructions for Students at the Polotsk Academy by the Academy’s professor, Giuseppe Angiolini. Angiolini constantly refers to Kant in his reasoning and sees him as his main ideological rival. The ideas articulated in the Philosophical Instructions influenced the philosophical positions of the Academy’s graduates who in turn made a tangible contribution to the development of the Belarusian intellectual tradition. The relationship between Kant’s ideas and the ideas Angiolini drew from the Scholastic tradition is analysed through the use of the concepts that are common to both trends, such as the transcendental, the empirical and the sensible, self-evident truths and common sense.

Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Hatem Elshatlawy, Dean Rickles

How does one formalize the structure of structures necessary for the foundations of physics? This work is an attempt at conceptualizing the metaphysics of pregeometric structures, upon which new and existing notions of quantum geometry may find a foundation. We discuss the philosophy of pregeometric structures due to Wheeler, Leibniz as well as modern manifestations in topos theory. We draw attention to evidence suggesting that the framework of formal language, in particular, homotopy type theory, provides the conceptual building blocks for a theory of pregeometry. This work is largely a synthesis of ideas that serve as a precursor for conceptualizing the notion of space in physical theories. In particular, the approach we espouse is based on a constructivist philosophy, wherein ``structureless structures'' are syntactic types realizing formal proofs and programs. Spaces and algebras relevant to physical theories are modeled as type-theoretic routines constructed from compositional rules of a formal language. This offers the remarkable possibility of taxonomizing distinct notions of geometry using a common theoretical framework. In particular, this perspective addresses the crucial issue of how spatiality may be realized in models that link formal computation to physics, such as the Wolfram model.

Jean-Pierre Luminet

Alexander Friedmann and Georges Lemaître are undoubtedly the real fathers of Big Bang cosmologies. In this article I study the influences their work underwent due to some religious as well as anti-religious ideas. During his career Lemaître faced criticisms coming from non-believing scientists, who reproached him (wrongly) to have developed his primeval atom cosmology for conciliatory reasons. In the former case of Friedmann, we know that his 1922 proposal of a "creation of the world out of nothing" was criticized by Einstein for metaphysical reasons. The essence of such hostile reactions is the fact that presumably "good" scientific contents should not be influenced by religious ideas. Nevertheless, metaphysical and theological ideas can play an important role inside the science research processes, as an epistemological tool helping to clarify the use of some fundamental notions.

Emily Adlam, Niels Linnemann, James Read

The Ehlers-Pirani-Schild (EPS) constructive axiomatisation of general relativity, published in 1972, purports to build up the kinematical structure of that theory from only axioms which have indubitable empirical content. It is, therefore, of profound significance both to the epistemology and to the metaphysics of spacetime theories. In this article, we set the EPS approach in its proper context, by (a) discussing the history of constructive approaches to spacetime theories in the lead-up to EPS; (b) addressing some of the major concerns raised against EPS; (c) considering how EPS compares with 'chronometric' approaches to affording the metric field of general relativity its operational significance; (d) distinguishing quite generally between different kinds of constructive approach, and fitting EPS into this classification; (e) discussing how constructivism bears on a number of other issues in the foundations of physics; and (f) assessing the merits of constructivism qua local foundationalist project. There are two companion papers, in which we provide a pedagogical walkthrough to the EPS axiomatisation (Part I), and discuss/develop versions of EPS with quantum mechanical inputs (Part III).

Ayşe Betül Tekin

Vincent Conitzer

A-theorists and B-theorists debate whether the "Now" is metaphysically distinguished from other time slices. Analogously, one may ask whether the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives. Few philosophers would answer the second question in the affirmative. An exception is Caspar Hare, who has devoted two papers and a book to arguing for such a positive answer. In this paper, I argue that those who answer the first question in the affirmative -- A-theorists -- should also answer the second question in the affirmative. This is because key arguments in favor of the A-theory are more effective as arguments in favor of the resulting combined position, and key arguments against the A-theory are ineffective against the combined position.

Paolo Valore, Maria Giovanna Dainotti, Oskar Kopczyński

One of the innovative approaches in contemporary philosophical ontology consists in the assumption of a plurality of ontologies based on different metaphysical presuppositions. Such presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the mere effect of selection preferences based on objective or subjective criteria. A remarkable example of the application of a background metaphysical theory in astrophysics is the problem of selection biases in detecting cosmological objects, such as supernovae, galaxies and gamma-ray bursts. We will show that it is valuable to be aware of the importance of uncovering this type of background theory to better understand selection effects and to promote a novel approach in scientific research.

Markus P. Mueller

It is a widespread belief that results like Gödel's incompleteness theorems or the intrinsic randomness of quantum mechanics represent fundamental limitations to humanity's strive for scientific knowledge. As the argument goes, there are truths that we can never uncover with our scientific methods, hence we should be humble and acknowledge a reality beyond our scientific grasp. Here, I argue that this view is wrong. It originates in a naive form of metaphysics that sees the physical and Platonic worlds as a collection of things with definite properties such that all answers to all possible questions exist ontologically somehow, but are epistemically inaccessible. This view is not only a priori philosophically questionable, but also at odds with modern physics. Hence, I argue to replace this perspective by a worldview in which a structural notion of `real patterns', not `things' are regarded as fundamental. Instead of a limitation of what we can know, undecidability and unpredictability then become mere statements of undifferentiation of structure. This gives us a notion of realism that is better informed by modern physics, and an optimistic outlook on what we can achieve: we can know what there is to know, despite the apparent barriers of undecidability results.

Wyman Kwok

An indeterministic interpretation of classical physics has been proposed recently, in which the argument relies on attacking an alleged unwarranted metaphysical hidden assumption of the standard deterministic interpretation. This short paper aims at showing that it is arguably a strawman attack.

C. Baumgarten

When compared to quantum mechanics, classical mechanics is often depicted in a specific metaphysical flavour: spatio-temporal realism or a Newtonian "background" is presented as an intrinsic fundamental classical presumption. However, the Hamiltonian formulation of classical analytical mechanics is based on abstract generalized coordinates and momenta: It is a mathematical rather than a philosophical framework. If the metaphysical assumptions ascribed to classical mechanics are dropped, then there exists a presentation in which little of the purported difference between quantum and classical mechanics remains. This presentation allows to derive the mathematics of relativistic quantum mechanics on the basis of a purely classical Hamiltonian phase space picture. It is shown that a spatio-temporal description is not a condition for but a consequence of objectivity. It requires no postulates. This is achieved by evading spatial notions and assuming nothing but time translation invariance.

Claudinei Aparecido de Freitas da Silva

Me proponho traçar, em linhas gerais, um recorte mínimo da coletânea Merleau-Ponty and the art of perception, publicada pela Suny Press, em 2016, sob a organização de Duane H. Davis e William S. Hamrick. A obra traz para a primeira cena de debate, a figura de Merleau-Ponty, ao retratar alguns de seus temas mais capilares tendo como fio condutor as noções de “percepção” e “arte”.   [I propose to outline, in general, a minimal profile of the compilation Merleau-Ponty and the art of perception, published by Suny Press, in 2016, edited by Duane H. Davis and William S. Hamrick. The work brings to the first scene of debate the figure of Merleau-Ponty portraying some of its most capillary themes having the notions of “perception” and “art” as a guide.]

Rodrigo Nunes

O artigo discute como interpretar a dimensão política da obra de Michel Foucault e Gilles Deleuze (com ou sem seu parceiro de escritura Félix Guattari), contrapondo-se a tendências e clichês interpretativos que são comuns tanto a alguns críticos quanto a alguns partidários destes autores. Em particular, questiona a ideia de que, para ambos, haveria uma relação de exclusividade mútua entre “micro” e “macropolítica”, tema que desenvolve em direções conexas – no tocante, por exemplo, a forma como ética e política se articulam no pensamento dos dois.

Hans Christian Öttinger

"All men by nature desire to know," states Aristotle in the famous first sentence of his Metaphysics. Knowledge about fundamental particles and interactions, that is, knowledge about the deepest aspects of matter, is certainly high if not top on the priority list, not only for physicists and philosophers. The goal of the present book is to contribute to this knowledge by going beyond the usual presentations of quantum field theory in physics textbooks, both in mathematical approach and by critical reflections inspired by epistemology, that is, by the branch of philosophy also referred to as the theory of knowledge. Hopefully, the present book motivates physicists to appreciate philosophical ideas. Epistemology and the philosophy of the evolution of science often seem to lag behind science and to describe the developments a posteriori. As philosophy here has a profound influence on the actual shaping of an image of fundamental particles and their interactions, our development should stimulate the curiosity and imagination of physicists. This book can be used as a textbook on quantum field theory for students of physics or as a monograph for philosophers and physicists interested in the epistemological foundations of particle physics. The benefits of an approach resting on philosophical foundations is twofold: the reader is stimulated to critical thinking and the entire story flows very naturally, thus removing all the mysteries from quantum field theory.

Stathis Psillos

<p> </p><p>The goal of this paper is to sketch an empiricist metaphysics of laws of nature. The key idea is that there are regularities without regularity-enforcers. Differently put, there are natural laws without law-makers <em>of a distinct metaphysical kind</em>. This sketch will rely on the concept of a natural pattern and more significantly on the existence of a network of natural patterns in nature. The relation between a regularity and a pattern will be analysed in terms of mereology.  Here is the road map. In section 2, I will briefly discuss the relation between empiricism and metaphysics, aiming to show that an empiricist metaphysics is possible. In section 3, I will offer arguments against stronger metaphysical views of laws. Then, in section 4 I will motivate nomic objectivism. In section 5, I will address the question ‘what is a regularity?’ and will develop a novel answer to it, based on the notion of a natural pattern. In section 6, I will raise the question: ‘what is a law of nature?’, the answer to which will be: a law of nature is a regularity that is characterised by the unity of a <em>natural</em> pattern.</p>