Abstract This research aims to explore Al-Ghazali's theory of real knowledge and elucidate the concept of knowledge and its integration features in grounding Islamic knowledge according to the contemporary theories of epistemology. The study delves into Al-Ghazali's perspectives on knowledge, analyzing and interpreting them in light of modern knowledge theories. The research finds that the cognitive integration features in Al-Ghazali's philosophy lie in the integration of knowledge sources, methods, sciences, and scholars. This is achieved through a comprehensive review of some of Al-Ghazali's works, as well as relevant studies, books, and research about his contributions to Islamic epistemology. Al-Ghazali encourages scholars to collaborate and integrate their knowledge to attain true understanding, a principle evident in this research through the exploration of modern epistemological concepts. The research utilized both inductive and descriptive methods to identify the characteristics of knowledge and demonstrate its integration aspects in Al-Ghazali's teachings. The research is structured into an introduction and three main sections: the first section introduces Al-Ghazali and his era, the second section explores the concept of knowledge and its integration in Islamic epistemology according to Al-Ghazali, and the third section examines knowledge sources, methods, types of knowledge, and scholars in Al-Ghazali's philosophy.
The article discusses the properties of the pandemic strain XBB.1.5 S protein in comparison with the 1918 and 2009 pandemic strains hemagglutinin H1. The S-protein XBB.1.5 already contains more than 40 mutations realized by substituting different amino acids through single and dinucleotide substitutions, deletions and the use of predominantly transversions. The variability of H1N1 influenza virus hemagglutinin is associated with single nucleotide substitutions at a constant length. Conditional extrapolation of influenza virus hemagglutinin variability data on coronavirus S-protein sizes suggests that new pandemic strains will emerge in the next 2-3 years, avoiding the immune defense formed by vaccination against the strains preceding them. The inability to create through the adaptive immune system a long-term immunity to pandemic coronaviruses, as well as to other respiratory viruses with a short incubation cycle, puts on the agenda the need to find new vaccine designs that provide a combination of long-term adaptive and trained immunity. The problem in the search for such vaccines is associated with the regulation of the activity of the innate immune system and ensuring the stability of trained immunity.
AMODIO, PAOLO, LO SAPIO, LUCA, SALOTTOLO, DELIO
et al.
What is dead may never die (?). Removal and Re-signification of death in the contemporary world
What Is Dead May Never Die, the motto of the House of Greyjoy in "Game of Thrones", takes us back to a time when death did not represent the dissolution of human existence, but the fulfillment of a destiny. At least, ritualized and celebrated, it implied the promise of remembrance and allowed one’s placement within a collective narrative. The same cannot be said of today's conception of death, no longer considered within a community dimension, but increasingly individualized. Its rites of passage, whether secular or religious, are increasingly stripped of sacredness. Death, today, does not represent, in common feeling, a completion, but only the end.The purpose of this Issue is to investigate the multiple philosophical, ethical and anthropological paths within which the theme of death is addressed.
This article makes a case for wide reflective equilibrium in doing African epistemology. It argues that on the issue of formulating a viable theory of knowledge, such an approach is more promising than the extant dominant approaches, namely the method of ethno-epistemology and the method of particularistic studies. More specifically, wide reflective equilibrium articulates a proper balance between philosophy and culture and endows a theory of knowledge with multiple sources of normativity.
Relevance. According to the scientific literature in the Russian Federation (RF), over recent years there has been a decrease in the incidence of acute bacterial intestinal infections (AII) and, conversely, an increase in the incidence of AII of viral etiology. The reasons for these trends remain unclear in many respects. Goal. To study the trends in the long-term dynamics of the incidence of AII of bacterial and viral etiology among the population of the RF. Materials and methods. The work uses the materials of state reports of the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being for 2000 - 2018. The incidence rates of bacterial AII (dysentery, salmonellosis, intestinal yersiniosis, Escherichiosis and intestinal infections caused by opportunistic bacteria) and viral AII (rota-, noro-, enterovirus infections), as well as the results of microbiological control of food and drinking water were studied compliance with sanitary regulations. Results. A tendency towards an increase in the incidence of acute intestinal infections with an average annual rate of 1,7% in population of the Russian Federation was revealed. At the same time, there was a decrease in the incidence of bacterial AII with an average annual rate of 3,8% and, conversely, an increase in the incidence of viral AII with an average annual rate of 384,1%. These changes were observed on the back of a decrease of samples` percent of food and drinking water that did not meet sanitary standards for bacteriological indicators, and an expansion of the range of virological methods for diagnosing viral AII. Conclusion. During 2000–2018 revealed a decrease in the incidence of bacterial OCI in the Russian Federation against the background of improved quality of food and drinking water according to microbiological indicators and, on the contrary, a sharp increase in the incidence of viral OCI associated with the expansion of the spectrum and scope of diagnostic virological studies.
In alignment with the challenges of knowledge-based economies of today, teachers are compelled to constantly revise traditional notions of learning in order to motivate students to find delight in the active creation, exploration, and discovery of disciplinary knowledge. In examining innovative philosophies of education, constructivism stands out as one much heralded alternative that has been widely promoted in recent times in attempts at moving away from old ways of instruction and their attendant limitations. By empowering learners to be self-directed, in theory, a learning model underpinned by constructivist principles undoubtedly offers an array of attractive pedagogical benefits. However, the real-time implementation of such a model within the constraints of classroom contexts could potentially be problematic. In this paper, some of the conundrums associated with the application of constructivist ideas in learning environments are discussed. A constructivism oriented instructional framework that tries to bridge the chasm between theory and practice is also elucidated in this paper. This framework suggests a repertoire of heuristic instructional strategies that facilitate students' independent construction of various classes of scientific knowledge.
Support is canvassed for a new approach to epistemology called anti-risk epistemology . It is argued that this proposal is rooted in the motivations for an existing account, known as anti-luck epistemology , but is superior on a number of fronts. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is better placed than anti-luck epistemology to supply the motivation for certain theoretical moves with regard to safety-based approaches to knowledge. Moreover, anti-risk epistemology is more easily extendable to epistemological questions beyond that in play in the theory of knowledge specifically. A key advantage of the view, however, is that anti-risk epistemology fares much better than anti-luck epistemology when it comes to accounting for the phenomenon of negative epistemic dependence . In particular, anti-risk epistemology is ideally placed to explain why such epistemic dependence is incompatible with knowledge, even when the negative epistemic dependence in play is of a purely modal variety (as one finds in epistemic twin earth cases ).
Me proponho traçar, em linhas gerais, um recorte mínimo da coletânea Merleau-Ponty and the art of perception, publicada pela Suny Press, em 2016, sob a organização de Duane H. Davis e William S. Hamrick. A obra traz para a primeira cena de debate, a figura de Merleau-Ponty, ao retratar alguns de seus temas mais capilares tendo como fio condutor as noções de “percepção” e “arte”.
[I propose to outline, in general, a minimal profile of the compilation Merleau-Ponty and the art of perception, published by Suny Press, in 2016, edited by Duane H. Davis and William S. Hamrick. The work brings to the first scene of debate the figure of Merleau-Ponty portraying some of its most capillary themes having the notions of “perception” and “art” as a guide.]
Science,“strategy of Sight” and Abduction
With the Sidereus Nuncius of Galilei (1610) begins not only modern science but also “the strategy of sight” of scientific research. This method involves the use of mathematics to show scientific discoveries to the eyes of each one, as well as philosophers and astronomy specialists. The strategy of sight offers, through highly accurate drawings and images, the statement of things literally never seen before, enhancing and extending man's view for the first time in a possibly infinite space, certainly much larger than the enclosed area of the Aristotelian- Ptolemaic system. The truth, in fact, can be seen, not only deduced by abstract logic. The beginning of Einstein's theory of relativity is therefore the extraordinary ability to imagine how the world can be made, namely the strategy of sight from which sprang a hypothesis produced by abductive method rather than inductive method. In hypothetical reasoning or abduction the scientist leads to the conclusion that there is a fact completely different from any other observed, a fact unprecedented, whose strength and whose power of conviction are able to make natural and understandable a dark and impenetrable puzzle of data.
In transcendental philosophy "knowledge" is deemed to be existence. Although analysis of Knowledge in the light of existential interpretation, can provide the specific features of two types of Propositional and intuitive knowledge in epistemology of transcendental philosophy. This issue of the current study is to analyze the relation of these two types of knowledge under "epistemic justification" and to determine the scope of the epistemic justification of these two types as well. The analytical-logical approach in terms of Sadrolmote'allehin has brought proof for the requirement (due to the duality of scientific and its objective existence) of propositional knowledge to Justification theory and its monopoly in "proof". Since intuitive knowledge is gained by objective witnesses, in its different types (sensory and extra sensory), it is needless of epistemic justification.Since intuitive knowledge is gained by objective witnesses, in its different types (sensory and extra sensory), it is needless of epistemic justification.
Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law
Personal epistemology is a research area that concerns beliefs about knowledge and knowing. We attempt to clarify what researchers mean by this phenomenon and what the coherent forms of use of this description are. We outline the current state of personal epistemology in terms of theoretical perspectives and argue that conceptual analysis is necessary in order for researchers to clarify the conceptualization of the phenomenon under study. We then analyze beliefs about knowledge and knowing through grammatical investigations, i.e., their standard everyday uses, in order to determine the sense of current conceptualizations of personal epistemology. Drawing primarily on the work of Bennett and Hacker, we examine the issue of whether epistemological beliefs should be thought of as mental states, dispositions, theories, or bodies of knowledge. We discuss the implications of these analyses for the study of personal epistemology.