LiDAR-based Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) cooperative perception has demonstrated its impact on the safety and effectiveness of autonomous driving. Since current cooperative perception algorithms are trained and tested on the same dataset, the generalization ability of cooperative perception systems remains underexplored. This paper is the first work to study the Domain Generalization problem of LiDAR-based V2X cooperative perception (V2X-DG) for 3D detection based on four widely-used open source datasets: OPV2V, V2XSet, V2V4Real and DAIR-V2X. Our research seeks to sustain high performance not only within the source domain but also across other unseen domains, achieved solely through training on source domain. To this end, we propose Cooperative Mixup Augmentation based Generalization (CMAG) to improve the model generalization capability by simulating the unseen cooperation, which is designed compactly for the domain gaps in cooperative perception. Furthermore, we propose a constraint for the regularization of the robust generalized feature representation learning: Cooperation Feature Consistency (CFC), which aligns the intermediately fused features of the generalized cooperation by CMAG and the early fused features of the original cooperation in source domain. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves significant performance gains when generalizing to other unseen datasets while it also maintains strong performance on the source dataset.
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and the interaction structure among individuals profoundly shapes its emergence and evolution. In real-world scenarios, cooperation prevails in multi-group (higher-order) populations, beyond just dyadic behaviors. Despite recent studies on group dilemmas in higher-order networks, the exploration of cooperation driven by higher-order strategy updates remains limited due to the intricacy and indivisibility of group-wise interactions. Here we investigate four categories of higher-order mechanisms for strategy updates in public goods games and establish their mathematical conditions for the emergence of cooperation. Such conditions uncover the impact of both higher-order strategy updates and network properties on evolutionary outcomes, notably highlighting the enhancement of cooperation by overlaps between groups. Interestingly, we discover that the strategical mechanism alternating optimality and randomness -- selecting an outstanding group and then imitating a random individual within this group -- can prominently promote cooperation. Our analyses further unveil that, compared to pairwise interactions, higher-order strategy updates generally improve cooperation in most higher-order networks. These findings underscore the pivotal role of higher-order strategy updates in fostering collective cooperation in complex social systems.
Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but may also reflect the general state of a local community. Consequently, a person with a high reputation becomes attractive not just because we can expect cooperative acts with higher probability, but also because such a person is involved in a more efficient group venture. These observations highlight the cumulative and socially transmissible nature of reputation. Interestingly, these aspects were completely ignored by previous works. To reveal the possible consequences, we introduce a spatial public goods game in which we use an assimilated reputation simultaneously characterizing the individual and its neighbors' reputation. Furthermore, a reputation-dependent synergy factor is used to capture the high (or low) quality of a specific group. Through extensive numerical simulations, we investigate how cooperation and extended reputation co-evolve, thereby revealing the dynamic influence of the assimilated reputation mechanism on the emergence and persistence of cooperation. By fostering social learning from high-reputation individuals and granting payoff advantages to high-reputation groups via an adaptive multiplier, the assimilated reputation mechanism promotes cooperation, ultimately to the systemic level.
With the prospect of autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents, studying their tendency for cooperative behavior becomes an increasingly relevant topic. This study is inspired by the super-additive cooperation theory, where the combined effects of repeated interactions and inter-group rivalry have been argued to be the cause for cooperative tendencies found in humans. We devised a virtual tournament where language model agents, grouped into teams, face each other in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. By simulating both internal team dynamics and external competition, we discovered that this blend substantially boosts both overall and initial, one-shot cooperation levels (the tendency to cooperate in one-off interactions). This research provides a novel framework for large language models to strategize and act in complex social scenarios and offers evidence for how intergroup competition can, counter-intuitively, result in more cooperative behavior. These insights are crucial for designing future multi-agent AI systems that can effectively work together and better align with human values. Source code is available at https://github.com/pippot/Superadditive-cooperation-LLMs.
Altruistic punishment (or punishment) has been extensively shown as an important mechanism for promoting cooperation in human societies. In AI, the emergence of punishment has received much recent interest. In this paper, we contribute with a novel evolutionary game theoretic model to study the impacts of environmental feedback. Whereas a population of agents plays public goods games, there exists a third-party population whose payoffs depend not only on whether to punish or not, but also on the state of the environment (e.g., how cooperative the agents in a social dilemma are). Focusing on one-shot public goods games, we show that environmental feedback, by itself, can lead to the emergence of punishment. We analyze the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, and derive conditions for their co-presence, co-dominance and co-extinction. Moreover, we show that the system can exhibit bistability as well as cyclic dynamics. Our findings provide a new explanation for the emergence of punishment. On the other hand, our results also alert the need for careful design of implementing punishment in multi-agent systems, as the resulting evolutionary dynamics can be somewhat complex.
The evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity is a pivotal mechanism for sustaining large-scale societies. Because third parties return cooperative behaviour in indirect reciprocity, reputations that assess and share these third parties’ behaviour play an essential role. Studies on indirect reciprocity have predominantly focused on the costs associated with cooperative behaviour, overlooking the costs tied to the mechanisms underpinning reputation sharing. Here, we explore the robustness of social norms necessary to secure the stability of indirect reciprocity, considering both the costs of reputation and the resilience against perfect defectors. Firstly, our results replicate that only eight social norms, known as the ‘leading eight,’ can establish a cooperative regime. Secondly, we reveal the robustness of these norms against reputation costs and perfect defectors. Our analysis identifies four norms that exhibit resilience in the presence of defectors due to their neutral stance on justified defection and another four that demonstrate robustness against reputation costs through their negative evaluation of unjustified cooperation. The study underscores the need to further research how reputational information is shared within societies to promote cooperation in diverse and complex environments.
In Public Goods Games (PGG), the temptation to free-ride on others’ contributions poses a significant threat to the sustainability of cooperative societies. Therefore, societies strive to mitigate this through incentive systems, employing rewards and punishments to foster cooperative behavior. Thus, peer punishment, in which cooperators sanction defectors, as well as pool punishment, where a centralized punishment institution executes the punishment, is deeply analyzed in previous works. Although the literature indicates that these methods may enhance cooperation on social dilemmas under particular contexts, there are still open questions, for instance, the structural connection between graduated punishment and the monitoring of public goods games. Our investigation proposes a compulsory PGG framework under Panoptical surveillance. Inspired by Foucault’s theories on disciplinary mechanisms and biopower, we present a novel mathematical model that scrutinizes the balance between the severity and scope of punishment to catalyze cooperative behavior. By integrating perspectives from evolutionary game theory and Foucault’s theories of power and discipline, this research uncovers the theoretical foundations of mathematical frameworks involved in punishment and discipline structures. We show that well-calibrated punishment and discipline schemes, leveraging the panoptical effect for universal oversight, can effectively mitigate the free-rider dilemma, fostering enhanced cooperation. This interdisciplinary approach not only elucidates the dynamics of cooperation in societal constructs but also underscores the importance of integrating diverse methodologies to address the complexities of fostering cooperative evolution.
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how different styles of imitation quantitatively impact the evolution of cooperation. Here, we take a different perspective on the personal and external social information required by imitation. We develop a general model of imitation dynamics with incomplete information in networked systems, which unifies classical update rules including the death-birth and pairwise-comparison rule on complex networks. Under pairwise interactions, we find that collective cooperation is most promoted if individuals neglect personal information. If personal information is considered, cooperators evolve more readily with more external information. Intriguingly, when interactions take place in groups on networks with low degrees of clustering, using more personal and less external information better facilitates cooperation. Our unifying perspective uncovers intuition by examining the rate and range of competition induced by different information situations.
Ettore Camerlenghi, Sergio Nolazco, D. Farine
et al.
Multilevel societies are formed when stable groups of individuals spatially overlap and associate preferentially with other groups, producing a hierarchical social structure.1 Once thought to be exclusive to humans and large mammals, these complex societies have recently been described in birds.2,3 However, it remains largely unclear what benefits individuals gain by forming multilevel societies.1 One hypothesis-based on food sharing in hunter-gatherers4-is that multilevel societies facilitate access to a range of cooperative relationships, with individual investment varying across the hierarchical levels of the society. We tested experimentally whether such graded cooperation occurs in the multilevel society of a songbird, the superb fairy-wren (Malurus cyaneus). Specifically, we measured whether responses to playbacks of distress calls-used to recruit help when in extreme danger-varied according to the social level at which the focal individual is connected with the caller. We predicted that anti-predator responses should be highest within breeding groups (the core social unit), intermediate between groups from the same community, and lowest across groups from different communities. Our results confirm that birds exhibit the predicted hierarchical pattern of helping and that, within breeding groups, this pattern is independent of kinship. This pattern of graded helping responses supports the hypothesis that multilevel social structures can sustain stratified cooperative relationships and reveals similarity in cooperation in qualitatively different behaviors-anti-predator behavior and food sharing-in the multilevel societies of songbirds and humans.
Fairness norms and resulting behaviours are an important prerequisite for cooperation in human societies. At the same time, financial incentives are commonly used to motivate social behaviours, yet it remains unclear how financial incentives affect fairness-based behaviours. Combining a decision paradigm from behavioural economics with hierarchical drift-diffusion modelling, we investigated the effect of different financial incentives on two types of fairness-based decisions in four experimental groups. In two groups, participants divided points between themselves and a disadvantaged person, inciting fairness-based compensation behaviour, in two other groups they divided points between themselves and a fairness violator, inciting fairness-based punishment behaviour. In addition, each group received financial incentives that were either aligned or in conflict with the respective fairness-based behaviour. This design allowed us to directly investigate how different incentives shape the cognitive mechanism of fairness-based decisions and whether these effects are comparable across different fairness domains (fairness-based punishment versus fairness-based compensation). Results showed that offering conflicting incentives diminished fairness-congruent decision behaviour and rendered the fairness-congruent decision process less efficient. These findings demonstrate that financial incentives can undermine fairness-based behaviour, and thus are relevant for the development of incentive schemes aimed at fostering cooperative behaviour.
The research method of the present study is a combination (qualitative-quantitative) with an exploratory approach. In the quantitative part of the statistical society, there were 655 cooperative companies with 19,901 thousand cooperative members in Zahedan city, out of which 8 cooperative companies with 300 members were randomly selected as a sample. Then, based on Morgan's table, 169 questionnaires were completed randomly and with proportional assignment in all eight companies. In order to analyze the data in the qualitative part, the meta-combination method was used through the seven-step method of Sandelowski and Barroso. Based on this, 47 articles in the field of cooperatives were analyzed and research indicators were identified. In the second stage of the research, in order to validate the research model, structural equation modeling technique was used with Smart PLS software version 2, and AHP method was used with Expert Choice software version 11 to prioritize the identified indicators. In this research, the data collection tool is a researcher-made questionnaire. The validity of the questionnaire was confirmed through exploratory factor analysis. The reliability of the questionnaires was calculated using Cronbach's alpha test of 0.91, which indicates the appropriate reliability of the research tool. The results of the research data analysis indicated that the marketing index with a weight of 0.88 has the highest priority in the empowerment of cooperatives,
Cooperation is challenging in biological systems, human societies, and multi-agent systems in general. While a group can benefit when everyone cooperates, it is tempting for each agent to act selfishly instead. Prior human studies show that people can overcome such social dilemmas while choosing interaction partners, i.e., strategic network rewiring. However, little is known about how agents, including humans, can learn about cooperation from strategic rewiring and vice versa. Here, we perform multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations in which two agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma game iteratively. Each agent has two policies: one controls whether to cooperate or defect; the other controls whether to rewire connections with another agent. This setting enables us to disentangle complex causal dynamics between cooperation and network rewiring. We find that network rewiring facilitates mutual cooperation even when one agent always offers cooperation, which is vulnerable to free-riding. We then confirm that the network-rewiring effect is exerted through agents' learning of ostracism, that is, connecting to cooperators and disconnecting from defectors. However, we also find that ostracism alone is not sufficient to make cooperation emerge. Instead, ostracism emerges from the learning of cooperation, and existing cooperation is subsequently reinforced due to the presence of ostracism. Our findings provide insights into the conditions and mechanisms necessary for the emergence of cooperation with network rewiring.
Laurent Lehmann, Simon T. Powers, Carel P. van Schaik
This paper surveys five human societal types – mobile foragers, horticulturalists, pre-state agriculturalists, state-based agriculturalists and liberal democracies – from the perspective of three core social problems faced by interacting individuals: coordination problems, social dilemmas and contest problems. We characterise the occurrence of these problems in the different societal types and enquire into the main force keeping societies together given the prevalence of these. To address this, we consider the social problems in light of the theory of repeated games, and delineate the role of intertemporal incentives in sustaining cooperative behaviour through the reciprocity principle. We analyse the population, economic and political structural features of the five societal types, and show that intertemporal incentives have been adapted to the changes in scope and scale of the core social problems as societies have grown in size. In all societies, reciprocity mechanisms appear to solve the social problems by enabling lifetime direct benefits to individuals for cooperation. Our analysis leads us to predict that as societies increase in complexity, they need more of the following four features to enable the scalability and adaptability of the reciprocity principle: nested grouping, decentralised enforcement and local information, centralised enforcement and coercive power, and formal rules.
Despite the fact that student cooperatives are setup with the aim of promoting entrepreneurial competencies among students; however, due to not following the indigenous model, they have not been able to take appropriate action to promote entrepreneurial and business activities among students. In this way, the purpose of this study was to design a model for the extension of entrepreneurial activities in student’s cooperatives, for which the qualitative paradigm and grounded theory was used. The study participators consisted of all members of agricultural student cooperatives in the universities (Razi, Kurdistan, Bouali, Lorestan and Ilam universities) of the west of Iran. The studied samples were first selected purposefully and then theoretically. Theoretical saturation was obtained after 25 in-depth one-on-one interviews. In order to analyze the data, open, axial and selective coding was used. Findings showed that environmental support, social capital, psychological characteristics, human capital, economic motivations and role models as causal factors; Administrative bureaucracy, financial barriers, cultural barriers, structural barriers and environmental opportunities as underlying factors; and climate change, market fluctuations and environmental turbulence were identified as intervention factors that affect the extension of entrepreneurial activities in agricultural student cooperatives in the west of Iran. Strategies for promoting entrepreneurial activities in student cooperatives in the west of Iran included educational-extension, modeling, reducing administrative bureaucracy, support-motivation and financial facilities strategies, which ultimately resulted in entrepreneurial activities extension among agricultural students such as developing entrepreneurial competencies, development Social, agricultural development and economic development.
The article examines the impact of the agrarian reform of P. A. Stolypin on the development of agricultural cooperation in Russia in the conditions of market relations. Without pretending in one article to give answers to all the main questions of assessing the impact of the reform on agricultural cooperation, let us dwell on some factors that either were not taken into account by the authors or remain misunderstood, which diminishes the significance of the reform. Thus, the influence of the Stolypin agrarian reform on the development of various types of agricultural cooperation, namely, agricultural societies and artels, credit and savings and loan associations, consumer and industrial cooperation, remains insufficiently studied. To achieve this goal, an analysis of historiography was carried out, the activities of land-organized, cooperative farms were studied, indicators characterizing the level of their material well-being and agriculture were analyzed. The article is based on general scientific principles of cognition, such as historicism and objectivity. These principles helped to assess the essence of the problem under study, taking into account the different points of view, both scientists and contemporaries of the events under study. The dynamics of the processes that characterized the cooperative agricultural movement in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was studied using the statistical method.
Kelly Kirkland, Paul A. M. Van Lange, Niels J. Van Doesum
et al.
Abstract People cooperate every day in ways that range from largescale contributions that mitigate climate change to simple actions such as leaving another individual with choice – known as social mindfulness. It is not yet clear whether and how these complex and more simple forms of cooperation relate. Prior work has found that countries with individuals who made more socially mindful choices were linked to a higher country environmental performance – a proxy for complex cooperation. Here we replicated this initial finding in 41 samples around the world, demonstrating the robustness of the association between social mindfulness and environmental performance, and substantially built on it to show this relationship extended to a wide range of complex cooperative indices, tied closely to many current societal issues. We found that greater social mindfulness expressed by an individual was related to living in countries with more social capital, more community participation and reduced prejudice towards immigrants. Our findings speak to the symbiotic relationship between simple and more complex forms of cooperation in societies.
Muhammad Reza Mahboobi, Mona Sangnian, Ahmad Abedi Sarvestani
et al.
The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of environmental values, attitudes and ethics with environmental behaviors among ranchers’ members of rangeland cooperatives in Gonbad Kavous. The statistical population was 644 operators who were members of rangeland cooperatives in 17 conventional systems, of which 240 were selected by stratified random sampling using Krejcie and Morgan table. A questionnaire was used to collect information. The content and appearance validity of the questionnaire were confirmed by experts, and its reliability was confirmed using Cronbach's alpha method. Data were analyzed using mean comparison, correlation and regression tests. The results of the mean comparison test showed that there is a significant difference between different groups of respondents according to the level of education regarding the component of environmental ethics, based on the history of animal husbandry, regarding the component of environmental value, based on the second job, regarding the components of attitude, ethics and environmental behavior, and based on the frequency of participation in training courses on value components and environmental behavior. The results of correlation test showed that there is a positive and significant relationship between the variables of attitude, and environmental ethics, and the environmental behavior of the respondents. The results of regression analysis showed that having ethics and environmental attitude has a positive effect on environmental behavior, and ethics has a greater effect. This study recommended increasing the use of cooperative capacity of ranchers by creating and supporting environmental organizations of ranchers to protect the environment.
This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation because they reduce the expected length of mutual cooperation by triggering the conditional retaliation of the cooperators. However, this study shows that behavioral mistakes could have positive effects. Conditional cooperative strategies are either neutrally stable or are unstable in a mistake-free environment, but we show that behavioral mistakes can make \textit{all} of the conditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily stable. We show that behavioral mistakes stabilize the cooperative equilibrium based on the most intolerant cooperative strategy by eliminating the behavioral indistinguishability between conditional cooperators in the cooperative equilibrium. We also show that mistakes make the tolerant conditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily stable by preventing the defectors from accumulating the free-rider's advantages. Lastly, we show that the behavioral mistakes could serve as a criterion for the equilibrium selection among cooperative equilibria.
Cooperative governance mechanisms play an important role in the organization's strategic decisions. Post-crisis studies of any cooperative have shown that the board's inadequacy is one of the most important causes of the crisis, as the board can affect the quality of risk management and risk disclosure. This study examines the impact of cooperative governance mechanisms on cooperative risk-taking. This study is a survey and library research and is an applied, descriptive and correlational research that has been done by selecting information of agricultural production cooperatives in Guilan province. The model used in this study consisted of panel regression model and the tests used were Lemar test, Fisher test and t test. Eviews software was used to fit the model. Co-operative governance mechanisms include board size, board independence, and CEO duality, and risk indices include three indicators, including special risk, survival risk, and activity risk. The results showed that the specific risk was significantly correlated with the coefficients of board size, managerial dichotomy, and board independence. Survival risk was significantly correlated with board duality variables and board independence. There is a significant relationship between activity risk and board duality and board independence.