From Objectification to Aesthetic Refusal: Ibrahim Rugova’s Contribution to the Ontology of Literature
Albanë Mehmetaj, Kosovar Berisha
This paper examines Ibrahim Rugova’s philosophical and theoretical contributions to literary studies, focusing on three central categories that define his aesthetics: objectification, the strategy of meaning, and aesthetic refusal. Through the reworking of phenomenological and ontological concepts, Rugova reformulates objectification as the process by which the inner world of personality becomes externalized in the literary work, thereby affirming the autonomy of art as a mode of being. His notion of the strategy of meaning, developed in dialogue with semiotics and structuralism, explains how literature generates both denotative meanings internal to the work and connotative meanings arising from interpretation. Finally, the concept of aesthetic refusal highlights the tension between literature and politics, showing how literature resists ideological and institutional pressures by affirming its autonomy. The study seeks to analyze and synthesize these concepts by examining Rugova’s theoretical–philosophical works, such as <i>Kah teoria Strategjia e kuptimit</i>, and <i>Refuzimi estetik</i>. <i>letrare</i>, through an interdisciplinary methodology that combines philosophical analysis, literary theory, and cultural critique. Taken together, the categories under discussion form a coherent ontology of the literary work that situates Rugova within multiple intellectual traditions that influenced him—including phenomenology, hermeneutics, information theory, structuralism, and dialectical philosophy—while simultaneously underscoring his originality in adapting these ideas to the Albanian intellectual context. The paper concludes that Rugova’s theoretical legacy, often overshadowed by his political role, offers a significant contribution to modern literary theory by defending the autonomy of literature and reaffirming its function as a distinctive mode of truth and human realization.
History of scholarship and learning. The humanities
Managers' Ability and Debt Structure: Evidence from Iran's Financial Reporting Environment
Aqil al hasoon, Seyed Abbas Hashemi, Narges Hamidian
The financing policies implemented by managers play a pivotal role in risk management and shareholder wealth creation. Consequently, identifying the factors that influence managerial financing decisions is critically important. This study examines the impact of managerial ability on short-term debt usage, incorporating the moderating effects of financial constraints and financial reporting quality. The sample includes 100 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, selected through systematic elimination for the period 2012–2023. A multivariate regression model based on panel data analysis was employed to test the hypotheses. The findings demonstrate that managerial ability has a positive effect on debt maturity. Additionally, while financial constraints do not significantly moderate this relationship, financial reporting quality strengthens the influence of managerial ability on short-term debt utilization. Specifically, high-ability managers—equipped with superior business acumen and strong incentives to signal their competence—tend to employ greater short-term debt to mitigate information asymmetry and enhance their reputational capital.Keywords: Debt Structure, Managers' Ability, Financial Constraints, Financial Reporting QualityJEL Classification: M40, H63, D04, M41 IntroductionDebt financing is a fundamental component of corporate capital structure, playing a crucial role in firm sustainability and growth. The composition of debt—particularly its maturity structure—serves as a key determinant of financial stability and long-term success. Consequently, decisions regarding debt structure are critical, as misjudgments can expose firms to financial distress or even bankruptcy. Prior research has examined various determinants of debt maturity structure, including macroeconomic and institutional factors such as financial and political environments, legal and tax systems, information asymmetry, and capital provider characteristics. Another stream of literature focuses on firm-specific influences, particularly managerial traits, given their significance in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Among these traits, managerial ability stands out as a pivotal factor shaping debt maturity decisions. Aligned with theoretical foundations, this study proposes the following hypotheses:H₁: Managerial ability positively influences debt maturity.H₂: Financial constraints attenuate the effect of managerial ability on debt maturity.H₃: Financial reporting quality amplifies the impact of managerial ability on debt maturity.Materials & Methods and dataThe study examines firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 2012–2023. The sample was selected through systematic elimination to ensure data integrity and representativeness. To test the hypotheses, we employed panel regression analysis using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the data. Managerial ability was operationalized following Demerjian et al. (2012), while financial reporting quality was measured using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality model. FindingThe empirical results demonstrate several key insights. As presented in Table 2, managerial ability exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with firms' utilization of short-term debt. This finding aligns with theoretical expectations, as short-term debt instruments can serve as effective mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and investors. Moreover, the preferential use of short-term debt may function as a positive market signal, conveying managers' confidence in the firm's near-term financial prospects. Table 3 reveals that financial constraints do not significantly moderate the relationship between managerial ability and debt maturity structure. This suggests that capable managers maintain their influence over financing decisions regardless of external financial limitations. Finally, Table 4 presents evidence that financial reporting quality strengthens the positive association between managerial ability and short-term debt usage. This amplification effect likely occurs because high-quality financial reporting enhances transparency, thereby increasing the credibility of managers' financing decisions. Discussion and ConclusionCorporate financing decisions are predominantly shaped by managerial discretion, with short-term debt instruments gaining increasing prominence over the past three decades. Our findings align with signaling theory, which posits that short-term debt issuance serves dual purposes: it reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously functioning as a positive market signal of managerial competence. Conversely, agency theory would predict an inverse relationship, suggesting that higher managerial ability might correlate with reduced short-term debt due to inherent agency conflicts in firms where managerial capabilities are less observable. The empirical evidence supports the signaling perspective, demonstrating that high-ability managers strategically utilize short-term debt to distinguish themselves from their less competent counterparts. This behavior stems from their superior capacity to assess market conditions and capitalize on favorable financing opportunities. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that managerial ability plays a particularly significant role in firms with higher reporting quality. In such organizations, which typically possess more robust project portfolios, short-term debt issuance serves as an additional quality indicator. High-ability managers in these firms are more inclined to employ short-term debt instruments, thereby reinforcing their reputation for financial acumen and strengthening market confidence. These findings contribute to the ongoing theoretical discourse by reconciling competing perspectives from signaling and agency theories. They also offer practical implications for corporate governance, suggesting that boards should consider managerial ability as a key factor in financing policy decisions, particularly in firms with transparent financial reporting environments.
Local Information-Theoretic Security via Euclidean Geometry
Emmanouil M. Athanasakos, Nicholas Kalouptsidis, Hariprasad Manjunath
This paper introduces a methodology based on Euclidean information theory to investigate local properties of secure communication over discrete memoryless wiretap channels. We formulate a constrained optimization problem that maximizes a legitimate user's information rate while imposing explicit upper bounds on both the information leakage to an eavesdropper and the informational cost of encoding the secret message. By leveraging local geometric approximations, this inherently non-convex problem is transformed into a tractable quadratic programming structure. It is demonstrated that the optimal Lagrange multipliers governing this approximated problem can be found by solving a linear program. The constraints of this linear program are derived from Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and are expressed in terms of the generalized eigenvalues of channel-derived matrices. This framework facilitates the derivation of an analytical formula for an approximate local secrecy capacity. Furthermore, we define and analyze a new class of secret local contraction coefficients. These coefficients, characterized as the largest generalized eigenvalues of a matrix pencil, quantify the maximum achievable ratio of approximate utility to approximate leakage, thus measuring the intrinsic local leakage efficiency of the channel. We establish bounds connecting these local coefficients to their global counterparts defined over true mutual information measures. The efficacy of the proposed framework is demonstrated through detailed analysis and numerical illustrations for both general multi-mode channels and the canonical binary symmetric wiretap channel.