Hasil untuk "Metaphysics"

Atilla Akalın

Teknolojik ilerlemelerin günümüzdeki hızlı seyri, insanın kendi tasarımı olan eserlerle ilişkisini derinlemesine anlamak adına önemli bir araştırma alanı sunmaktadır. İnsanlar tarafından tasarlanan eserler, kullanıcıları üzerinde çeşitli zihinsel ve fiziksel etkilere sahip olabilir. İnsanın eserle etkileşimi, pasif bir rolde değil; aksine insanın içsel eğilimlerini ortaya çıkararak onu yeni yaratımlara açık hale getiren bir potansiyel sergilemektedir. Bu makalede teknolojinin insan yaşamına etkisi, çağdaş felsefeci Kadri Vihvelin'in eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık perspektifi üzerinden incelenecek ve özelliklerin eğilimlere bağlı olduğu bir metafizik sistemin savunusu yapılacaktır. Bu bağlamda, ortaya çıkan eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık olgusu, bağdaşırcılık ve özgürlük kavramlarını teknoloji bağlamında değerlendirmek için yeni felsefi düşüncelerin gelişmesine kapı aralamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, teknolojik aygıtların insan yaşamını şekillendirmesine rağmen, insan-eser etkileşimi sonucunda beklenmeyen ve yeni güçlerin ortaya çıkabileceği vurgulanmaktadır. Makalede, eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık fikri özellikle metin tabanlı yapay zekâ uygulamalarıyla insan etkileşimini ele alarak incelenecektir. Yapay zekânın insanların düşünce örüntüleriyle ortak çalışabilmesi eğilimsel bağdaşırcılığın gözlemlenebilmesi için anlamlı bir örnektir. Sonuç olarak makalenin amacı, insan-eser ilişkisine eğilimsel bir perspektifle yaklaşarak, teknolojinin insan özgürlüğü üzerindeki etkilerini ele almaktır. Ayrıca eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık perspektifi üzerinden teknolojik eserlerin insan özgürlüğüne olumlu bir katkı sağlayabileceği iddiasını savunmaktır.

Egor V. Falev

The research deals with the concept of “epistemologically different worlds” introduced by Gabriel Vacariu and its background in European science and philosophy, since the beginning of the twentieth century. It is shown that the accusation of plagiarism made by Vacariu against Marcus Gabriel is groundless, firstly, because Gabriel’s concept of “semantic fields” ( Sinnfeld ) is not identical to the concept of epistemologically different worlds, and secondly, because in the twentieth century, similar concepts appeared, starting with the concept of “Umwelt” by Jakob Uexküll (1909). Paying tribute to the revolutionary shift produced by this concept of Uexküll, the author traces the direct and indirect philosophical references and modifications that the concept of umwelt produced in the phenomenology of the late E. Husserl, the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger and the neurophenomenology of F. Varela. It is shown that both Husserl’s concept of “lifeworld,” Heidegger’s “world-formation,” and Varela’s “structural coupling,” on the one hand, go back to Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt, on the other hand, can be summarized under the general notion of “epistemologically different worlds.” Thus, while refusing to recognize Vacariu’s priority in the creation of this concept, the conclusion is made about the productivity and heuristic value of the term introduced by Vacariu. We also propose a conventional classification of 5 stages of overcoming representativism, in which different variations of the concept of epistemologically different worlds correspond to the last three stages. However, the interpretation of the “phenomenon of the world” developed by M. Heidegger in the second part of his lectures, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, is considered logically superior. In these lectures, Heidegger draws from J. Uexküll’s concept of the Umwelt and develops an original project of “philosophy of nature,” embedded as a part of his “fundamental ontology.” Here, he not only analyzes the difference between the animal world and the human phenomenon of the world but, on this basis, rethinks the nature of life anew as such and the specificity of the human mode of being and relation to the existent things. Heidegger’s key conclusion for the concept of epistemologically different worlds is that the notion of “existence” applies only within the human world and is inapplicable to the animal umwelt.

Koji Suga

C. Healy

Mastaneh Kakaiy, Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari

<strong>Abstract</strong> <br />The discussion of "God" and "being," in Scholastic philosophy are tied. In metaphysics of Suarez, “being” has different meanings and divisions. And the study of the status of "being" in the theology of Suarez requires an examination of the meanings of being as a subject of metaphysics and the divisions of being in theology. Our question is being that is a subject of metaphysics of Suarez, what has relation to being of his Theology? Is there a relation between being in metaphysics (first volume of Disputations) with God (volume II)? <br />For Suarez the adequate object of metaphysics is being insofar as it is real being;" it deals with not only God and Aristotelian "Separate Substances") which are of themselves immaterial but also with everything else inasmuch as it falls under concepts like being, unity, truth, and goodness, but are common to these and to other things as well. <br />Suarez in second disputation in part of forth, expresses of meaning of being and distinct being in “participle of being” and “nominal being”. <br />What is mean of being? Being, is sometimes taken as a participle of the word ‘am’ and as such it signifies the act of being as exercised and is the same as existing actually. It signifies existence, for if someone says that Adam is, it signifies that he exists. <br />But noun ‘being’ signifies the essence of the thing and is divided into ten genera. Nominal being signifies real essence. Essence (essentia) is being (esse) and it is the source of the acts and attributes that are attributed to something. Real essence is what is defined and the first belongs to the mind, because the first thing belongs to that object. <br />The discussion of the existence of God in the second volume of the twenty- eight twenty-nine disputations is presented in both philosophical and theological terms. In the philosophical discussion, there are six divisions of Being that are: 1. Division of Being into into Infinite and Finite, 2. Division of Being into Being by Itself and Being from Another. 3. The Division of Being into Necessary and Contingent, 4. The Division of Being into Being by Essence and Being by Participation, 5. A Division of Being into Uncreated and Created, 6. A Division of Being into Pure Act and Potential Being. <br />If we want to find derivation between two meanings in metaphysics (participle and nominal). The derivation is the real being. In fact, the "being of participle" does not express everything that is real, hence the "nominal existence" also needs real being. To the collection of the being of participle that is real, and the being of a nominal term that expresses the potential being, together with the real being and the subject of metaphysics. And what is also the derivation of the divisions in the second part of the article is also "real being”; Because in these divisions, one side is God, and the other is the creatures’ contingent. In fact, you can say to Suarez The subject of metaphysics is "real being," but its use in metaphysics, including God. <br />The "real being" has been studied in relation to God with three approaches (metaphysical, theological, mystical). According to which the four ratios of being with God are given, two of which are metaphysical, one is mystical and the other is theological.1. In the first metaphysical approach, God is "self-being" or (ipsum esse) against the concrete being.2. In the mystical approach, God is " above being (supra ens) " in relation to the use of being in particular to the creatures, which are the concrete constituents. 3. In the second metaphysical approach, God is a special being, in the sense of the most complete and infallible being, in relation to the being of a general and abstract being that is common to all creatures and all beings; 4. In the theological sense of the being of the Bible and Exodus, which corresponds to the third most perfect and perfect being. <br />Therefore, in the first metaphysical approach of God, "self-being" lies in the contrary of a particular being. And in another metaphysical approach, God is the "most specific being" that stands in the contrary of an abstract being. In the mystical approach, Following the Platonists, God is "Over being. “in the theological approach God is the "most specific being" that is the same of God in Exodus (3: 14) “I am who am”. The first metaphysical approach relates to a mystical approach and the second metaphysical approach with the theological approach is one. In fact, Suarez is a Christian philosopher who both philosophy and theology that are not ignored.

Daniel Nolan

E. Castro, Peter Skafish

Pär Segerdahl

Friedrich Nietzsche associated philosophical asceticism with “hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more still of the material”: with aversion to life. Given the prevalent view that philosophy is anthropocentric and idealizes the human, Nietzsche’s remark about philosophical hatred of the human is unexpected. In this paper, I investigate what Nietzsche’s remark implies for philosophical claims of human uniqueness. What is the meaning of the opposition between human and animal, if the opposition somehow expresses hatred also of the human? The investigation leads to an inquiry into metaphysics as an intellectual kind of magic, and into the notion of “power over life” as it connects to intellectual asceticism. Finally, I relate Nietzsche’s remarks on ascetic ideals to Donna Haraway’s questioning of the Anthropocene as a story to think with. I propose that the dualism of the story, the idea of a conflict between Humanity and Nature, can be seen as a feature of the metaphysical attitude that life is to be mastered through escaping from it into the purity of thinking.

Gennadii Aliaiev, Svetlana Kutsepal

The paper focuses on cosmological ideas of a twentieth-century Russian philosopher Nikolay Lossky (1870-1965). It specifies the place of these ideas within the entire framework of his philosophical views, as well as in the context of his topology of philosophical systems, in particular ― the discrimination between organic and non-organic worldview. A historico-philosophical analysis of Lossky’s cosmology allows revealing the interaction of gnoseological and ontological principles of his system, e.g. explicating the difference of Lossky’s intuitionism from the one of Bergson. The key section of the organic worldview is the doctrine of the hierarchy of substantival agents: the hierarchical personalism, as well as the notions of transcreation, dynamic understanding of matter, and the doctrine of free will closely related to it. The paper specifies the peculiarities of Lossky’s interpretations of panvitalism and panpsychism, as well as the doctrine of reincarnation, which has a particular place in his system. The final stage of Lossky’s cosmological ideas development is his ontological aesthetics: on this stage he understands the world as an embodiment of beauty. The conclusion is drawn that Lossky’s cosmological doctrine is Christian and metaphysical in its nature.

Mohammad Mehdi Ardebili

Place and role of God in Hegel’s philosophy have become one of the most controversial problems in philosophy and interpretation for the past two centuries. The main distinction between the two Hegelian movements (the left and the right wings) depends on how we answer this issue. Contrary to the development of modern philosophy which has gradually diminished the place and role of God in the explanation of the world, Hegel brought this concept into the center of philosophy once again; he revived the arguments, and put it on the throne, although with a new name: Absolute Spirit.At the moment the most important question is the relationship between Hegelian Absolute Spirit and Christian God. Did Hegel make philosophy theological or theology philosophical? Did Hegel bring God into its high place or did he negate the common-theological concept of God?In Hegel’s Concept of God, Quentin Lauer attempts to deal with these questions. Although the reader cannot derive explicit answers for these questions, he or she can understand the approach of the writer about Hegelian analysis of the concept of God, and consequently grasp a brief impression of Hegelian metaphysics.

Edgar Straehle

This paper aims to tackle Arendt’s thinking in connection with our current knowledge on the history of Greece, in order to examine the philosopher’s interpretation of the Greek world – a special emphasis will be placed on the concepts of action, <em>nomos </em>and freedom, as well as on the importance of the agora’s political space. Furthermore, I intend to put into question those readings that attribute a kind of naïve hellenophilia to Arendt, also pointing out the limitations that she herself observed within the political approach of the polis. I argue that Arendt does not find, in Ancient Greece, any of the resorts that can counterbalance action and which she considers necessary in order for it to avoid falling into <em>hybris</em>, such as: forgiving, promise and authority. Finally, I claim that the Roman concept of <em>lex</em>, due to its relational dimension, is closer to her account of politics than the Greek concept of <em>nomos</em>.

Erik J. Wielenberg

Elizabeth Barnes

T. Sparrow

Lech Sokół

For a few decades now, various interpretations and readings of the To Damascus dramatic trilogy by Strindberg have been focusing either on the whole work or just on its first part; in this case, I side with the latter tactic. Firstly, I assume as obvious, though, at the same time, as profound and well argued, the proposition advanced by Egil Törnquist that the trilogy is a religious and metaphysical text as well. The character of the Invisible One (Den Osynlige), who is an imaginary representation of God, is essential for this line of thought, and for me, too, the character not making an appearance on stage is of paramount importance. I use the term “metaphysics” in its most widespread and predominant sense of the general theory of being, yet I reserve the right to make use of the specific sense described by the French philosopher Frédéric Nef, an author of a 2004 book on metaphysics, who writes under the entry for metaphysica specialis as follows: “it is divided into rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which is a study of kinds of being (psychic, cosmic, divine).” Törnquist locates the metaphysical problematics in the characters of the drama, and his method might be described a “metaphysics through reference to topos, or better yet: topoi.” As we know, Strindberg projected the psyche and emotional distress of his protagonists, which usually meant also: his own, onto such personages as: Saul (Paul), Cain, Lucifer, the old-Scandinavian god Loki, the devil, Adam, Jacob wrestling with the angel (God), and so on. Events, clearly, are important as well, like the Jacob’s wrestling just mentioned as well as the story of the temptation and fall of man, which is probably dealt with in most detail in the first part of the drama, etc. Törnquist usually refers to rich scholarship on the drama and to his own, usually very incisive, intuitions. My task is, therefore, not to delineate yet another path through the myriad of Biblical topoi that are present in the Western culture. I am, on the other hand, preoccupied with the presence of metaphysics in the world presented in the drama, with the way it makes its appearance—through a kind of invasion or aggression. Perhaps the most evocative and violent example of this is what happens at the end of Scene 1, on a street corner, in Act I. Strange things are happening, indeed, things radically contrary to reason, that fill with utter terror the characters deemed to be real and sound of mind. What they are experiencing is something called mysterium tremendum and mysterium fascinans. In my conclusion, I go back to the issue of metatheatricality as elaborated by Tadeusz Kowzan and express the opinion that metaphysics in drama and theatre may appear as metatheatricality.

Tommaso Manzon

Lo scopo di questo paper è quello di sviluppare una lettura e un’interpretazione di uno degli scritti “minori” di Ludwig Wittgenstein, la Conferenza sull’Etica. La mia comprensione della Conferenza è inspirata principalmente dall’interpretazione della filosofia di Wittgenstein sviluppata da Pierre Hadot e, di conseguenza, la mia tesi consisterà nel dimostrare che seguendo Hadot la Conferenza sull’Etica può essere vista come un ‘Esercizio Spirituale’. Pertanto sostengo che la finalità principale di questo scritto va vista nel tentativo di cambiare la nostra attitudine verso il mondo, e dunque la nostra disposizione etica verso di esso. Ritengo inoltre che questo non sia solo lo scopo di ogni Esercizio Spirituale, bensì in generale quello dell’attività del filosofo austriaco, ossia, la volontà di coinvolgere i propri destinatari provocando in loro una riflessione e possibilmente un cambiamento in merito al proprio modo di vivere, e a tutta la sfera che va sotto il nome di “Etica”.

Richard Campbell

Karolina Hübner

Eric Schwitzgebel

L. Beck, M. Heidegger, James S. Churchill