Hasil untuk "Cooperation. Cooperative societies"

M. Nowak, K. Sigmund

George Dewey, Hiroyasu Ando, Ryo Ikesu et al.

Abstract Punishment serves as a balancing force that dissuades people from acting selfishly, which complements cooperation as an essential characteristic for the prosperity of human societies. Past studies using economic games with two options (cooperation and defection) reported that cooperation decisions are generally faster than defection decisions and that time pressure possibly induces human players to be more intuitive and thus cooperative. However, it is unclear where punishment decisions sit on this time spectrum. Therefore, we recruited human players and implemented two series of online network games with cooperation, defection, and punishment options. First, we find that punishment decisions are slower than cooperation or defection decisions across both game series. Second, we find that imposing experimental time pressure on in-game decisions neither reduces nor increases the frequency of punishment decisions, suggesting that time pressure may not directly interact with the mechanisms that drive players to choose to punish.

Naser Seifollahi, Mohammadreza Keshavarz

Context and purpose: Agricultural cooperatives are an important tool for promoting agricultural modernization, which plays an important role in organizing the production of agricultural products. Therefore, there is a need to investigate effective ways to improve the quality of cooperative management for agricultural managers. The purpose of this research is to provide a model for improving the performance and competencies of agricultural cooperative managers with the theory approach.Methodology/approach: This research is a descriptive study in terms of purpose, application, and in terms of data collection. The statistical population of the research were experts and managers of agricultural cooperatives. The data collection tool was a semi-structured interview. To investigate the validity of the qualitative part, the content validity and intra-coder and inter-coder reliability models were used. The method of data analysis was the grounded theoretical approach, which was compiled with MAXQDA software and used the coding method.Findings and conclusions: The research results showed that the competence model of agricultural cooperative managers consists of seven dimensions abilities, which include: entrepreneurship, awareness, thinking, career orientation, personality traits, knowledge and technology, and personal abilities.Originality: Based on the perspective of competence, the results of this research enrich the management occupational competence by analyzing the combined effect of different competences of agricultural managers on the performance of cooperatives and provide ideas for building general industry competence models. The results of this study help to improve the performance and competencies of managers of agricultural cooperatives as an important influencing factor in cooperative performance.

Bailey R. House, J. Silk, J. Henrich et al.

shahram mohammadzadeh, Jabbar Talebi

Context and purpose. One of the important issues in the agricultural production cooperatives sustainability is its role in creating and strengthening social capital. The pourpose was to measure and compare social capital between members and non-members farmers of production cooperatives.Methodology/approach. The research was applied and quasi-experimental. The statistical population consisted of 460 farmers of Araz 1 and 2 production cooperatives (as experimental group) and Qiqaj Plain (as control group) in the the margin of Aras River in Poldasht Township. According to Krejcie and Morgan table and using proportional stratified random sampling, 142 and 68 people from the experimental group and control group were selected respectively. The research tool was a researcher-made questionnaire whose validity was confirmed by university faculty members and its reliability by Cronbach's alpha coefficient (0.73 to 85).Findings and conclusions. Overall, the extent of social capital was lower than average. According to Mann-Whitney test, the rank average of social capital and components of social trust, trust in government institutions, participation and relationships network were significantly lower among production cooperative members than non-members. However, no significant difference was observed between the components of social cohesion and trust in civic institutions between these two groups. Therefore, these production cooperatives have been established by the government in a top-down manner, which has caused the destruction of rural subculture and reduce social trust.Originality. Previous studies have investigated social capital only form members viewpoint. Therefore, the use of experimental research method provides useful results for establishing and management of cooperatives.

Noelia Morales Romo, Beatriz Morales Romo

This study presents the results of an analysis of teaching practices within the Master’s Programme in Teacher Training and Development, a collaborative Master’s coordinated by the University of Salamanca (Spain) for the Ecuadorian Teacher’s professional development. The objective is to reflect upon and analyse the Practicum processes from the multicultural model based on cultural pluralism complemented with a socio-critical approach, paying special attention to the dimensions of cultural and educational diversity framed in cooperative processes. In addition to documentary analysis, two Delphi studies were conducted, one involving administrators of educational centres hosting student teachers, and the other involving personnel responsible for Practicum management. The findings emphasise the importance of cooperative and collaborative processes involving all professionals from both countries, for binational teaching practices to respond constructively to the educational challenges of cultural diversity arising from globalization. The evidence of the elements from the cultural pluralism model provides an excellent reference point for this. The educational challenges of diverse and multicultural societies require responses from a socio-critical approach that analyses reality from broad perspectives such as cultural pluralism that permeates educational interventions, including teaching practices. This is a multidimensional process that requires continuous communication and cooperation processes.

taimor naseri, Mohammad Bagher Arayesh, marjan vahedi

Despite the rich literature on entrepreneurial marketing in various texts, the nature of research in the field of cooperative businesses with different cultural and economic burden has undergone major changes and the existing patterns and models of entrepreneurial marketing do not explain well the entrepreneurial marketing methods of these businesses. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to identify the implementation model of strategic entrepreneurial marketing in production cooperatives. This study, in terms of purpose, is considered as an applied research and it is a qualitative research in terms of data collection method. To identify the pattern of strategic entrepreneurial marketing implementation in production cooperatives, 124 articles were reviewed, of which 26 articles were selected for the final analysis using the Critical Assessment Skills Program. In this study, first 298 indicators of strategic entrepreneurial marketing were identified and classified into 46 concepts and 12 categories. Shannon entropy method was used to determine the weight of the indices. On the basis of the research findings, the main dimensions of entrepreneurial marketing implementation include strategic marketing thinking, intra-organizational factors, strategic planning, target market selection, network of communication-organizational capabilities, entrepreneur-centered marketing strategies, strategic requirements, entrepreneurial requirements, Systematic support for cooperatives management, market entry methods, market research and consumer behavior analysis, and market control and evaluation. Finally, it can be concluded that managers of production cooperatives can use the results of this study to identify new customers and their diverse needs, increase market share and create a competitive advantage.

R. Suleiman, Yuval Samid

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Camilo Garcia, Patricia M. Greenfield, Axel M. Navarro-Hernández et al.

Greenfield's theory of social change and human development is based on the distinction between Gemeinschaft (low-income agricultural communities with low levels of formal education and technology) and Gesellschaft (wealthier commerce-based societies with high levels of formal education and technology). Cooperation is more adaptive in a Gemeischaft environment; in contrast, competition is more adaptive in a Gesellschaft environment. As Mexican ecologies moved in the Gesellschaft direction over recent decades, children's cooperative behavior declined, as predicted by the theory. The current quasi-experiment extends this finding from a two-person game, the marble pull, to a new situation, Madsen's cooperation board, a game that requires cooperation among four children. Based on a sample of 57 groups of four children each tested in 2017 and 70 groups of four children each tested in 1967, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (p < 0.001) showed that the decline of cooperation and the rise of competition generalizes across middle-class urban, low-income urban, and rural children in Mexico and that it applies to male, female, and mixed groups. In conclusion, we provide continuing evidence that child behavior is responsive to ecological conditions and shifts over time in order to adapt to them. Given that cooperation is a fundamental human trait that binds social units together, our study also contributes to the conclusion that globalized social change in the Gesellschaft direction entails human loss as well as gain.

Rute Mendonça, Philippe Vullioud, N. Katlein et al.

Within cooperatively breeding societies, individuals adjust cooperative contributions to maximize indirect fitness and minimize direct fitness costs. Yet, little is known about the physiological costs of cooperation, which may be detrimental to direct fitness. Oxidative stress, the imbalance between reactive oxygen species (by-products of energy production) and antioxidant protection, may represent such a cost when cooperative behaviours are energetically demanding. Oxidative stress can lead to the accumulation of cellular damage, compromising survival and reproduction, thus mediating the trade-off between these competing life-history traits. Here, we experimentally increased energetically demanding cooperative contributions in captive Damaraland mole-rats (Fukomys damarensis). We quantified oxidative stress-related effects of increased cooperation on somatic and germline tissues, and the trade-off between them. Increased cooperative contributions induced oxidative stress in females and males, without increasing somatic damage. Males accumulated oxidative damage in their germline despite an increase in antioxidant defences. Finally, oxidative damage accumulation became biased towards the germline, while antioxidant protection remained biased towards the soma, suggesting that males favour the maintenance of somatic tissues (i.e. survival over reproduction). Our results show that heightened cooperative contributions can ultimately affect direct fitness through oxidative stress costs, which may represent a key selective pressure for the evolution of cooperation.

B. Battu, N. Srinivasan

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige. These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.

Elisa Bertino, F. Doshi-Velez, M. Gini et al.

The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will bring with it an ever-increasing willingness to cede decision-making to machines. But rather than just giving machines the power to make decisions that affect us, we need ways to work cooperatively with AI systems. There is a vital need for research in"AI and Cooperation"that seeks to understand the ways in which systems of AIs and systems of AIs with people can engender cooperative behavior. Trust in AI is also key: trust that is intrinsic and trust that can only be earned over time. Here we use the term"AI"in its broadest sense, as employed by the recent 20-Year Community Roadmap for AI Research (Gil and Selman, 2019), including but certainly not limited to, recent advances in deep learning. With success, cooperation between humans and AIs can build society just as human-human cooperation has. Whether coming from an intrinsic willingness to be helpful, or driven through self-interest, human societies have grown strong and the human species has found success through cooperation. We cooperate"in the small"-- as family units, with neighbors, with co-workers, with strangers -- and"in the large"as a global community that seeks cooperative outcomes around questions of commerce, climate change, and disarmament. Cooperation has evolved in nature also, in cells and among animals. While many cases involving cooperation between humans and AIs will be asymmetric, with the human ultimately in control, AI systems are growing so complex that, even today, it is impossible for the human to fully comprehend their reasoning, recommendations, and actions when functioning simply as passive observers.

morteza feizollahzadeh, shahram mohammadzadeh, Samad Karrari

Although the export of agricultural products in Iran has an important role in the national economy, but agricultural production cooperatives have failed in marketing and exporting products. The aim of this study was to determine the appropriative strategies for marketing and exporting of agricultural products in agricultural production cooperatives of Maku Industrial and Trade Free Zone. An applied research was conducted by using a survey method and a questionnaire. The statistical population included directors and members of the board of directors of the two production cooperatives and experts who were 40 people in overall that were studied by the census method. Using internal and external matrices and SWOT analytical matrix, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing cooperatives were prioritized and then appropriate strategies were identified. Based on the results, a total of 12 strength versus 20 weaknesses and 13 opportunities against 13 threats were identified. Based on the results, a conservative- revision strategy was identified to use opportunities and eliminate weaknesses. The proposed strategies were: using investors to create processing and complementary industries; Utilization of new production technologies; Employing specialized staff and managers in production cooperatives; Granting banking facilities with special conditions to exporters of agricultural products; Conduct marketing research; Quantitative and qualitative improvement of agricultural products; And timely provision of production inputs.

Maryam امیدی نجف آبادی, Amir Teimour Payandeh

The main issue of this research is to design a model for the development of micro insurance in rural areas in the form of cooperatives. This research has been done in 2 steps as follows. In the first stage, using qualitative study and in-depth interviews in the form of grounded theory approach, the requirements for the development of cooperative micro-insurance were categorized into three levels: micro, meso and macro. Micro level requirements include insurer, policy holder and distribution channel; Intermediate level requirements include actuary and macro level requirements include legislation and reinsurance. In the second stage, using quantitative study and structural equation modelling, micro-insurance cooperative model was designed in rural areas and then the challenges of micro-insurance development were identified. The statistical population includes three groups of insurance experts in the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare, the Central Insurance Research Institute and the Agricultural Products Insurance Fund. The results are summarized as follows: (1) Trust in micro-insurance through appropriate training programs among low-income groups is one of the first priorities at the micro level in order to develop micro-insurance. (2) Data collection items in relation to micro insurance customers, suppliers, products and prices of micro insurance, are among the first priority at the middle level (meso) to develop micro insurance. (3) The formulation of supportive policies (tax exemptions and subsidies) for the development of micro insurance is one of the first priorities at the macro level for the development of micro insurance. In economic challenges the variable “lack of savings" in poor people as an essential component to buy insurance; In socio-cultural challenges, the variable "lack of rural participation in cooperative insurance schemes" and "lack of trust among local community networks"; In educational-extension challenges, the variables "lack of mass media attention to micro-insurance issues" and "lack of education of low-income groups through custom cases"; In technical challenges, the variable "lack of information about micro-insurance marketing among the poor"; and In the policy challenges, the variable “lack of Agricultural Products Fund attention to the micro-insurance issues" has the highest priority of developing cooperative rural micro-insurance.

T. Grossmann, Manuela Missana, Amrisha Vaish

Cooperative behavior is central to human societies. Human adults who reach their cooperative decisions more rapidly and independently of cognitive control display greater levels of prosocial behavior. This is taken to show that cooperation is guided by intuitive processes rather than by active control of selfish impulses. The current study investigated the emergence of intuitive cooperation in early human ontogeny. We measured helping behavior (latency and frequency) in a longitudinal sample of infants at ages 14 and 18 months. Between 14 and 18 months, the frequency of helping significantly increased and latency to help significantly decreased, suggesting advances in helping behavior during this period of development. Moreover, at 18 months and to some extent, even at 14 months, infants who helped more rapidly (as indexed by a shorter latency) acted more prosocially (as indexed by a greater frequency of helping) than infants who were slower to help. This link between latency and frequency of prosocial behavior was independent of infants' ability for inhibitory control and general sociability levels. Prosocial behavior thus begins to be governed by intuitive processes that operate independently of cognitive control early in human ontogeny. This informs our understanding of the nature and emergence of cooperative behavior by supporting accounts that assign a central role to intuition in the evolution of human cooperation.

Xuzhen Zhu, Xin Su, Jinming Ma et al.

Either in microlevel organizations or macrolevel societies, the individuals acquire benefits or payoffs by forming interdependency groups linked by common interests. Conducting research on the effects of interdependency groups on the evolution of cooperation could have a better understanding of the social dilemma problem. In this paper, we studied a spatial public goods game with nonlocal interdependency groups where each of participants is located in a two-dimensional square lattice or Watts–Strogatz small-world network with payoffs obtaining from the interactions with nearest neighbors. In terms of the enhancement factor, the effects of group density on the evolutionary cooperation can be quite different. For a low enhancement factor, the cooperation level is a nonmonotonic function with the varying density of interdependency groups in the system, which means a proper density of interdependency groups can best promote the cooperative level. For a moderate enhancement factor, a higher density of interdependency groups can always correspond to a higher cooperative level. However, if the enhancement factor is too high, a high density of interdependency groups can impede the evolutionary cooperation. We give the explanations for the different roles of group density of interdependency by using the transition probabilities of C players into D players as well as the reverse. Our findings are very helpful for the understanding of emergence cooperation as well as the cooperation regulation in the selfish individuals.

E. Gallo, Chang Yan

R. Bird, E. Power

B. Battu, V. Pammi, N. Srinivasan

Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooperation is commonly observed in human societies. Hence, we propose a novel evolutionary agent-based model where agents rely on social information. Each agent interacts only once either as a donor or as a receiver. In our model, the population consists of either non-ideal or ideal heterogeneous conditional agents. Their donation decisions are stochastically based on the comparison between the number of donations in the group and their conditional cooperative criterion value. Non-ideal agents occasionally cooperate even if the conditional rule of the agent is not satisfied. The stochastic decision and selection rules are controlled with decision intensity and selection intensity, respectively. The simulations show that high levels of cooperation (more than 90%) are established in the population with non-ideal agents for a particular range of parameter values. The emergence of cooperation needs non-ideal agents and a heterogeneous population. The current model differs from existing models by relying on social information and not on individual agent’s prior history of cooperation.

Flávio L. Pinheiro, F. Santos

Designing mechanisms that leverage cooperation between agents has been a long-lasting goal in Multiagent Systems. The task is especially challenging when agents are selfish, lack common goals and face social dilemmas, i.e., situations in which individual interest conflicts with social welfare. Past works explored mechanisms that explain cooperation in biological and social systems, providing important clues for the aim of designing cooperative artificial societies. In particular, several works show that cooperation is able to emerge when specific network structures underlie agents' interactions. Notwithstanding, social dilemmas in which defection is highly tempting still pose challenges concerning the effective sustainability of cooperation. Here we propose a new redistribution mechanism that can be applied in structured populations of agents. Importantly, we show that, when implemented locally (\textiti.e., agents share a fraction of their wealth surplus with their nearest neighbors), redistribution excels in promoting cooperation under regimes where, before, defection prevailed.