Hasil untuk "Political Science"

B. Larkin

Diana H Coole, S. Frost

N. Rose, Peter Miller

D. Kahan, E. Peters, E. Dawson et al.

Karen Barad

G. Brady

In 1985, the National Academy of Sciences sponsored a conference in Annapolis, Maryland, to discuss common property resource management. This conference was a watershed in the development of the theoretical underpinning of institutional design for successful common pool resource (CPR) management. Since then, an international network of over 2,000 researchers has developed, and the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), formed in 1989, has held two successful international conferences. Dominating the intellectual evolution of the field has been the work of Elinor Ostrom, co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. Her book, Governing the Commons, presents a lucid exposition of the current state of institutional analysis of common property problems. Part of the Cam-bridge series on Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, the book addresses how common pool resources may be managed successfully without falling prey to the "tragedy of the commons." Common pool resources are characterized by subtractability (i.e., withdrawal by one user reduces the amount of the resource left for other users) and joint use by a group of appropriators. Thus, a common village grazing field has forage for a limited number of beasts, and all the villagers are entitled to pasture their animals on the field. Community rules of access and management are required to sustain the field from season to season. Problems in managing CPRs arise when the rational individual determines that he will still have access to the resource even if he does not fully contribute to its maintenance (the "free rider" problem). An extensive literature discusses the effect of free riders, concluding that common pool resources will inevitably fall into ruin. One of two solutions is usually offered to avoid this problem: centralized governmental regulation or privatization. Noting the numerous occasions in which common pool resources are managed successfully with neither centralized governmental control nor privatization, Ostrom argues for a third approach to resolving the problem of the commons: the design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users. In Governing the Commons she examines small-scale common-pool resources. Resource user groups examined range in size from 50-15,000 people who rely substantially on the common pool resource for their economic well-being. She has further

Y. Engeström

M. Douglas

J. Clifford, G. Marcus

J. Elliott

G. Rand

K. Thelen

A. Escobar

G. Esping-Andersen

E. Babbie

A. Schmid, A. Jongman

Bruno Latour

K. Wilber

Csaba Varga

Authority is a fundamental tool of social integration. By selecting the most laudable and exemplary patterns, behaviours, actions or events – whether real or merely imagined – from the entire range of potentialities, it creates a community capable of communal action, by transforming an undifferentiated mass of independent individuals into a somewhat cohesive social group able to find common ground on matters vital for their shared existence, thus turning mere quantity into quality. It is thus evident that the existence of a certain degree of authority is also the basis for the viability of public administration, public policy and public management – to name but a few – in any given society. This paper will examine the conditions, manifestations and correlations of authority in the various domains of its social context, in order to provide a comprehensive account of its existence, its inevitability, but also the dangers inherent in its weakening.

Kirill Solovev, Chiara Drolsbach, Emma Demirel et al.

Short-form video platforms like TikTok reshape how politicians communicate and have become important tools for electoral campaigning. Yet it remains unclear what kinds of political messages gain traction in these fast-paced, algorithmically curated environments, which are particularly popular among younger audiences. In this study, we use computational content analysis to analyze a comprehensive dataset of N=25,292 TikTok videos posted by German politicians in the run-up to the 2025 German federal election. Our empirical analysis shows that videos expressing negative emotions (e.g., anger, disgust) and outgroup animosity were significantly more likely to generate engagement than those emphasizing positive emotion, relatability, or identity. Furthermore, ideologically extreme parties (on both sides of the political spectrum) were both more likely to post this type of content and more successful in generating engagement than centrist parties. Taken together, these findings suggest that TikTok's platform dynamics systematically reward divisive over unifying political communication, thereby potentially benefiting extreme actors more inclined to capitalize on this logic.