Hasil untuk "Philosophy"

R. Descartes, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff et al.

David. Lamp

W. H. F. Barnes

Lorraine Code

Jane Flax

I. Holloway, S. Wheeler

E. Anderson, R. Oliver

Jaegwon Kim, E. Sosa

P. Thagard

M. Heidegger

K. Kawashima

The 1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge and 1995 Hyogo-ken nanbu earthquakes caused major damage to bridges and these events together with the research triggered as a consequence of the earthquakes has led to significant advances in bridge seismic design and retrofitting. This paper presents how this has affected design philosophies and design codes in EC, New Zealand, Japan and USA in recent years, with emphasis on the Japanese experience in the aftermath of the 1995 H-k-n carthquake. Near field ground motion, linear/nonlinear static/dynamic response analyses, treatment of liquefaction-induced lateral ground movement are described. Comparison of design philosophy, design force and ductility requirements are compared among the EC-8, New Zealand, Japanese, AASHTO and Caltrans/ATC-32 codes. Seismic retrofitting which was conducted in Japan after the Hyogo-ken nanhu earthquake over 29,000 reinforced concrete columns is described.

N. Shanks, R. Greek, J. Greek

It is one of the central aims of the philosophy of science to elucidate the meanings of scientific terms and also to think critically about their application. The focus of this essay is the scientific term predict and whether there is credible evidence that animal models, especially in toxicology and pathophysiology, can be used to predict human outcomes. Whether animals can be used to predict human response to drugs and other chemicals is apparently a contentious issue. However, when one empirically analyzes animal models using scientific tools they fall far short of being able to predict human responses. This is not surprising considering what we have learned from fields such evolutionary and developmental biology, gene regulation and expression, epigenetics, complexity theory, and comparative genomics.

P. Godfrey‐Smith

What makes science different from other ways of investigating the world? In "Theory and Reality" Peter Godfrey-Smith uses debates - such as the problem of confirmation, the new riddle of induction, and the problem of scientific realism - as a way to introduce, in a completely accessible way, the main themes in the philosophy of science. Intended for undergraduates and general readers with no prior background in philosophy, "Theory and Reality" starts by surveying the last hundred years of work in the field. It covers logical positivism; induction and confirmation; Karl Popper's theory of science; Thomas Kuhn and "scientific revolutions"; the radical views of Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Paul Feyerabend; and challenges to the field from sociology of science, feminism and science studies. The book then looks in detail at some of the broader philosophical issues at stake, such as philosophical naturalism, scientific realism, theories of explanation in science, Bayesianism, and other modern theories of explanation in science. Throughout the text he points out connections between philosophical debates and wider discussions about science in recent decades, such as the infamous "science wars". Examples and asides engage the beginning student, a glossary of terms explains key concepts, and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. Like no other text in this field, "Theory and Reality" combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates in language that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow.

E. Apter

J. Moses, T. Knutsen

Victor-Xavier Tadros

Diana H Coole, S. Frost

Book synopsis: New Materialisms rethinks the relevance of materialist philosophy in the midst of a world shaped by forces such as digital and biotechnologies, global warming, global capital, and population flows. Moving away from modes of inquiry that have prioritized the study of consciousness and subjectivity over matter, the essays in this collection show that any account of experience, agency, and political action demands renewed attention to the urgent issues of our own material existence and our environment. The editors propose “new materialisms” as a way to take matter seriously without falling into the conceptual dualism that posits an opposition between matter and thought, materialism and idealism, and body and mind. They locate new materialisms within post-humanist discourses, explaining that new materialist philosophies do not privilege human bodies, but rather view human bodies as one of many bodies, or agential materialities, in the world. By revealing how emerging accounts of matter, materiality, and corporeality are combining with developments in science and technology to demand radically new conceptions of nature, agency, and social and political relationships, New Materialisms makes a significant contribution to the recent resurgence of interest in phenomenology and materialist philosophy in the humanities.

M. Power, T. Dalgleish

Maxime Ramzi

The chromatic redshift philosophy, introduced by Ausoni and Rognes, suggests that algebraic $K$-theory raises chromatic height by $1$. We show that the analogue of this philosophy fails in the case of rigid symmetric monoidal stable $\infty$-categories. More precisely, we construct examples of rigid $T(n)$-local categories $C$ where a refinement $\mathrm{Dim}$ of the dimension morphism induces an equivalence $$K(C)\to \mathrm{End}(\mathbf{1}_C)^{BS^1}$$ and for which $K(C)$ therefore vanishes $T(n+1)$-locally. In fact, we prove that this equivalence always holds for $\aleph_1$-Nullstellensatzian rigid $T(n)$-local categories in the sense of Burklund, Schlank and Yuan. We study more in depth the rational version of these results to find a rigid rational additive $1$-category witnessing the failure of redshift at height $0$. Finally, we use our methods to prove and generalize a conjecture of Levy about categorification of ordinary rings.

Ruward Mulder

Weatherall and Manchak (2014) show that, under reasonable assumptions, Reichenbachean universal effects, constrained to a rank-2 tensor field representation in the geodesic equation, always exist in non-relativistic gravity but not so for relativistic spacetimes. Thus general relativity is less susceptible to underdetermination than its Newtonian predecessor. Dürr and Ben-Menahem (2022) argue these assumptions are exploitable as loopholes, effectively establishing a (rich) no-go theorem. I disambiguate between two targets of the proof, which have previously been conflated: the existence claim of at least one alternative geometry to a given one and Reichenbach's (in)famous ``theorem theta", which amounts to a universality claim that any geometry can function as an alternative to any other. I show there is no (rich) no-go theorem to save theorem theta. I illustrate this by explicitly breaking one of the assumptions and generalising the proof to torsionful spacetimes. Finally, I suggest a programmatic attitude: rather than undermining the proof one can use it to systematically and rigorously articulate stronger propositions to be proved, thereby systematically exploring the space of alternative spacetime theories.