Hasil untuk "Metaphysics"

Muhammad Ali Khalidi

Katharine Jenkins’s Ontology and Oppression helps bridge the chasm between discussions of social ontology in analytic metaphysics and treatments of injustice and oppression in social and political philosophy. In this commentary on Jenkins’s book, I address three main issues. First, I question a central innovation of the book—its espousal of a new form of pluralism about race and gender kinds, which posits that race and gender are not unitary kinds but can have three different types of manifestation in the social world. Second, I consider how Jenkins’s central notion of “ontic injustice” interacts with a prominent distinction between social kinds that have to be explicitly represented (“transparent”) and those that need not be represented (“opaque”). Third, I take up the issue of evaluative or normative considerations in social theorizing and their place in taxonomizing the social world. I ask whether, in rejecting what she calls the “ontology first” approach to theorizing about trans people, Jenkins stakes a position that opposes scientific categorization on the basis of nonepistemic values.

Bruno Borge, Dalila Serebrinsky

This paper bridges the epistemology of disagreement and metaphysics of science by advancing the idea that disagreements in scientific ontology can be understood as instances of deep disagreement exhibiting varying degrees of depth. We first establish the core features of deep disagreements and argue that standard accounts fail to accommodate their gradable nature. Taking the debate between empiricist and metaphysical stances in scientific ontology as a paradigmatic case, we show how this disagreement satisfies all criteria for deep disagreement. We then develop a framework, building on recent work in the epistemology of disagreement, showing how the depth of disagreements correlates with the generality of principles in conflict. Through a detailed case study of debates about modality in scientific ontology, we demonstrate three levels of depth: disagreements between perspectives (deepest), disagreements within perspectives about specific domains (intermediate), and disagreements within sub-positions (shallowest). This analysis reveals that deep disagreements in metaphysics of science are not monolithic but exhibit a rich structure that explains both their persistence and the differential progress possible across different debates. Our framework provides both theoretical insight into the nature of philosophical disagreement and practical guidance for understanding the limits and prospects of metaphysics of science.

Nurbay Irmak

Artifacts are often characterized as intentional products of human activities, suggesting that they must have authors. However, contrary to this common characterization, I argue that there exist novel examples of artifacts that lack authors. This novelty arises directly from the emergence of generative artificial intelligence applications. I provide several examples of such authorless artifacts and address potential objections to their existence.

Abolfazl Sabramiz

IntroductionThe frame problem was first introduced by McCarthy and Hayes (1969). In short, the initial issue was that there are no clear principles indicating what an action changes and what remains unchanged at a given time. This interpretation is called the frame problem. Over time, other interpretations have emerged, such as epistemological readings categorized under "updating beliefs" and issues of relevance. Philosophers like Fodor have also examined the metaphysical aspect of the frame problem, questioning the metaphysical basis of conventional understanding.Research Question(s): A key question in understanding the frame problem is how we access our cognitive background of the world. More precisely, it asks how our cognitive background is present within and operates alongside our current knowledge. The problem extends to how we selectively retrieve relevant information while ignoring irrelevant details. Literature Review2.1. The Epistemic and Cognitive Dimensions of the Frame ProblemThe most significant interpretation of the frame problem is its epistemic aspect, which relates to updating beliefs and issues of relevance. For example, Dennett (1978) describes the puzzle of how a person, who holds many beliefs about the world, can update these beliefs when taking an action that relies on firm beliefs about the world.Initially proposed in its logical form, the frame problem evolved into a philosophical issue within two decades. Fodor (1987) argues that this issue is deeply philosophical, directly related to human knowledge, and should be studied by philosophers and cognitive scientists rather than being relegated to artificial intelligence.2.2. Cognitive Background and Knowledge RetrievalUnderstanding language expressions requires not only linguistic and semantic knowledge but also knowledge of the world. Similarly, recognizing a piece of cloth as a valuable object, like a flag, depends on prior cultural and social knowledge. Our knowledge is rooted in stored cultural, historical, social, and linguistic frameworks, which constitute our cognitive background. When encountering a new situation, relevant information is retrieved while irrelevant information is ignored—this is a central concern of the frame problem.2.3. Linguistic and Contextual FactorsIn the philosophy of language and linguistics, a key question is how we access our linguistic ability (a person’s institutionalized linguistic knowledge). Linguistic ability can be seen as background knowledge that enables us to understand the meanings of linguistic expressions. Additionally, social and contextual features of speech help us produce or interpret statements appropriate to a given situation. Accessing these features requires background knowledge of the world. MethodologyThis paper examines the frame problem through an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from philosophy, cognitive science, and linguistics to explore how cognitive background knowledge influences problem-solving and belief updating. DiscussionTo illustrate further, consider the cognitive process involved in understanding a simple conversation. When someone hears a sentence, they do not merely parse the syntax and semantics; they also draw on their knowledge of the speaker, the context of the conversation, and relevant world events. This complex integration of information is largely unconscious and highlights the depth of our cognitive background. The frame problem, therefore, is not just about identifying relevant information but also about understanding the mechanisms through which our minds filter and integrate vast amounts of knowledge in real time.Another example can be seen in cultural artifacts. When individuals from different backgrounds encounter a cultural symbol, their interpretations can vary widely based on their unique cognitive backgrounds. For instance, a national flag might evoke feelings of patriotism and sacrifice in one person, while for another, it could signify oppression and conflict. These differing perceptions underscore the importance of background knowledge in shaping our understanding and reactions. ConclusionThe frame problem spans multiple domains, from logic and epistemology to metaphysics and cognitive science. It raises fundamental questions about the nature of human cognition, how we process information, and how we adapt our understanding in dynamic environments. As our world becomes increasingly complex, addressing the frame problem becomes even more critical. Ultimately, the frame problem challenges us to deepen our understanding of the intricate processes that underpin human thought and knowledge.Acknowledgments:This article is an extract from a research project with the code 4001460, which was supported by  Iran National Science Foundation (INSF).

Tristan Guillermo Torriani

Music therapy has been proven useful in the treatment of a wide range of disorders, even if often in only an auxiliary role. Its use for patients requiring neurological rehabilitation is rather recent and its effectiveness has been assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Practitioners must undergo rigorous training to obtain certification and must be able to combine a high level of therapeutic and artistic skills. As members of multidisciplinary teams, music therapists are expected to (1) justify their participation by employing the most effective methods at their disposal; (2) adapt or even create musical material best suited to patients’ needs; and (3) strive for a theoretical understanding of what their intervention is trying accomplish. These recommendations emerge from concrete realities that we could not take cognizance of purely a priori. An attempt to ground them post hoc in an abstract universal conception of human dignity realized in Kant’s practical reason, attractive as that might seem philosophically, is ridden with logical gaps (non-sequiturs) and circularity (Rorty). Moral concepts ought rather to be understood as impure a priori criteria for moral judgment acquired and negotiated through linguistic socialization (Herder, Piaget, Vygotsky, Wittgenstein, Habermas). The collective construction of a future neuroethics makes sense as a humanitarian plea (Herder’s Humanität) following the jurisprudential practice of English common law rather than the top-down imposition of a global civil code. In so far as music therapy is concerned, it will most likely remain embedded in the moral anthropological context of local languages, cultures and traditions, albeit with some foreign influences caused by international exchange.

Ephraim Meir

Mahatma Gandhi and Emmanuel Levinas have much in common. They interpret religion in a radical ethical way and develop an ethical hermeneutics of religious sources. Levinas’s thoughts on a holy history, not to be confused with history, are comparable with Gandhi’s <i>swaraj</i> as the spiritual independence and self-transformation of India. Escaping war logics, they maintain a “beyond the state” in the state and insert ethics in politics. Yet, Gandhi’s ethico-politics works with radical interrelatedness, whereas Levinas differentiates more between the self and the other. Gandhi trusted that, in the end, the good would vanquish evil. Levinas, in turn, did not venture into the future: the present was under “eschatological judgment.” Gandhi’s love of the enemy and his attempt to soften the opponent’s heart are absent in Levinas’s metaphysics. In addition, Levinas does not radically deconstruct the term self-defense, although Gandhi notoriously made also exceptions to his <i>ahimsa</i>. A dialogue can be established between Levinas’s ethical metaphysics and Gandhi’s <i>ahimsa</i> and <i>satyagraha</i>. Both thinkers make a radical critique of a peace based on rational contracts and equate peace with universal brother- and sisterhood. Without underestimating the many similarities between Levinas and Gandhi, I also highlight their dissimilarities. I argue that precisely the differences between both thinkers allow for a “trans-different” dialogue, which respects specificities and promotes communication, in a movement of hospitality and mutual learning.

Christoforos Efthimiou

The concept of political difference concerns the distinction between politics and the political. The political refers to the ontological making possible of the different domains of society, including the domain of politics in the narrow sense. Political difference was introduced as a reaction to the theoretical controversy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. According to Marchart, post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the possibility of grounding. It denies only the possibility of an ultimate transcendent foundation insofar as this ontological impossibility makes possible the historical and contingent grounds in plural. The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference also undermines the possibility of an ultimate ontical ground which establishes the presence of all the other beings. If one wants to think beyond the concept of ground, one should obtain a clear understanding of Being as Being, namely one should grasp the Being in its difference from beings. All the same, Heidegger tends to replace the ontical grounds of metaphysics with Being itself as a new kind of ultimate ontological foundation. On the other hand, one can detect in many points of Heideggerian argumentation traces of a second alternative understanding of ontological difference which does not belong in Heidegger’s intentions and which undermines the primordiality of Being. This alternative understanding establishes a reciprocity between Being and beings. In our view, political difference not only is based in this second way of understanding but, at the same time, develops more decisively the mutual interdependence between Being and beings. In political difference the grounding part, namely the political, possesses both a grounding character and a derivative one. Politics and political both grounds and dislocate each other in an incessant and oscillating, historical procedure which undermines any form of completion of the social.

Samuel Baron, Peter Evans, Kristie Miller

This paper addresses the extent to which both Julian Barbour‘s Machian formulation of general relativity and his interpretation of canonical quantum gravity can be called timeless. We differentiate two types of timelessness in Barbour‘s (1994a, 1994b and 1999c). We argue that Barbour‘s metaphysical contention that ours is a timeless world is crucially lacking an account of the essential features of time—an account of what features our world would need to have if it were to count as being one in which there is time. We attempt to provide such an account through considerations of both the representation of time in physical theory and in orthodox metaphysical analyses. We subsequently argue that Barbour‘s claim of timelessness is dubious with respect to his Machian formulation of general relativity but warranted with respect to his interpretation of canonical quantum gravity. We conclude by discussing the extent to which we should be concerned by the implications of Barbour‘s view.

Benjamin M. Block

The evidentialist objection against Christianity, which states that the Christian faith does not have sufficient evidence to justify belief, can be troubling for Christians, for they do not wish to say that their beliefs are founded upon mere human evidence, and yet, they also wish to affirm that “those who place their faith in this truth, for which human reason offers no experience, do not believe lightly, as those following unlearned fables” (SCG I.6). St. Thomas Aquinas offers a unique and compelling solution to the evidentialist objection—a solution that confirms the Christian belief that faith is a gift from God, but which also respects the proper place of human reason within the believing life of men. St. Thomas teaches that God provides both internal and external confirmation of what He reveals, although only the internal confirmation of the work of the Holy Spirit is necessary to justify Christian belief. Aquinas’s teaching concerning the role of divine confirmation of revealed truths provides at least one important key to understanding the delicate balance between faith and reason within the Christian life.

G. A. Lipton

Although the thought of the Andalusian Sufi Muhyi al-Din ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240) has become increasingly popular in the West during the last century, only very recently has there been any attempt to analyze his contemporary reception. Isobel Jeffery-Street’s recent study on Ibn ‘Arabi in the West – with its dual focus on the Beshara School “for the study of esoteric education” and the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society – offers a fecund starting place for such analysis, since these interrelated institutions have been two of the most significant sources for the growing Western recognition of Ibn ‘Arabi over the last thirty years. Ibn ‘Arabi’s eclectic, unitive metaphysics has a long-standing and popular correlation with the so-called doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd (the Unity of Existence [or Being]), although he never used such particular phraseology.1Nevertheless, the book’s conceptual lynchpin and that of the Beshara School itself is formed around this idea, which the author blithely reifies as central to Ibn ‘Arabi’s “complex Neo-Platonic Gnostic system” (p. 6, n. 13). As if directly reflecting the variegated discourses from which Beshara emerged during the 1970s, this study combines rather antiquated categorizations of “Oriental Sufism” (p. 6) with New Age rhetoric of global spiritual revival. Accordingly, Jeffery-Street aims ...

Francesco Cappa

Foucault come educatore non dirige da un luogo esterno verso di noi un insegnamento, una dottrina, piuttosto sente la responsabilità di cercare e di estrarre dal mondo «qualcosa» che possa animare l’esperienza che si fa del mondo, di mostrare da una prospettiva latente l’esperienza già fatta, come una scheggia di «reale» che nel mondo si manifesta. Foucault può essere un educatore se accettiamo che la verità è sempre ancora da fare, concretamente, che siamo sempre corresponsabili della verità che è in gioco nella nostra formazione. Può essere educatore, infatti, solo chi è disposto non tanto a «comprendere prima», ma a comprendere nuovamente ogni volta, ogni volta che si dà un’occasione formativa e a profanare eventualmente l’attualità e la solidità di quel che si sa nella condivisione del rischio e della libertà che ogni pratica di ricerca comporta.

Giacomo Foglietta, Paolo Taroni

Moving by a theoretic approach, the paper intends to think through the connections between the Indian philosophy of Śaṃkara (the greater thinker of the Vedanta school, lived in the VIII century b. C.) and the thought of H. Bergson. By such a prospective, indeed, becomes possible a critical remark about some problems of interpretation of the thought of both the authors, who – as we shall see – share a common conceptual horizon.

José Manuel Sánchez Fernández

The present work consists on figuring out the problematic relationships between the Logic of the Period of Jena and the internal emergence of a Dialectical one to the own system. Dialectical is more than a simple general methodology of the knowledge.

Wendell Evangelista Soares Lopes

O presente trabalho visa elucidar a renovaçáo da teleologia no pensamento de Hans Jonas, mostrando como esta ocupa aí duas funções centrais, a saber: pensar uma nova ontologia que atenda de forma mais exata à construçáo de um universo psicofísico e em vir-a-ser; e pensar o dever-ser da humanidade enquanto telos e valor absoluto no processo evolutivo do Ser. Para alcançarmos nosso objetivo, primeiro explicitaremos que o que Jonas designa por "enigma da subjetividade" é o problema fundamental da ontologia, e que a filosofia moderna fracassa diante de tal problema, exigindo assim a reabilitaçáo – e renovaçáo – de uma concepçáo teleológica do ser. Depois mostraremos que essa renovaçáo da teleologia – que pode certamente ser designada de "neo-finalismo" – define o finalismo como intrínseco náo só aos seres individuais, mas ao próprio devenir do mundo, onde o homem seria a própria realizaçáo última de uma possibilidade latente no interior de tal processo evolutivo da substância universal. Com isso, resultaria um princípio da ética que náo estaria fundado nem na autonomia do Eu, nem nas necessidades da comunidade, mas antes no próprio caráter teleológico do processo evolutivo da natureza – o homem assumindo aí um valor absoluto por justamente ser o telos – entenda-se: "qualidade final" – de tal processo. Quer isto dizer, a teleologia jonasiana visa por fim responder sobre o bem que é a humanidade, que se firmaria assim como o próprio fundamento da ética.

Lia Maria Alcoforado de Melo

A questao do estabelecimento de quais argumentos indutivos tem maior probabilidade de se aproximar mais da verdade, liga-se com maior intensidade aos raciocinios que envolvem generaliza<;oes humeanas. 0 principio de causalidade, suporte basico da legitimidade da indu<;ao cientifica, ediscutido neste trabalho a partir das obje¢es de HUME, a existencia de uma logica que garanta sua racionalidade. Objetivou-se construir uma arqumentacao justificativa que mostrasse que HUME nao prova atraves de sua teoria cetica, que 0 principio causal e irracional; muito embora que nao se tenha ainda conseguido, cornprova-lo como racional.

Jorge Alberto Molina

Este artigo tem por objetivo expor algumas ideias para elaborar uma perspectiva teórica sobre a negaçáo que permita comparar as abordagens dos filósofos, lógicos e linguistas sobre esse tema. Na introduçáo sáo apresentadas algumas das questões discutidas sobre a negaçáo. Na primeira parte é feita a distinçáo entre frase, enunciado e proposiçáo. Essa análise nos permitirá por um lado diferenciar entidades linguísticas (frases, enunciados) de entidades lógicas (proposições), e pelo outro separar três planos na abordagem das questões sobre a negaçáo: o plano do código linguístico, o do uso do código linguístico ou plano da enunciaçáo, e o plano da lógica. Na segunda parte distinguimos entre os conceitos de oposiçáo, de negaçáo e de expressáo intrínsecamente negativa. Na terceira parte abordamos a teoria fregeana da negaçáo a partir das distinções feitas anteriormente. Na quarta parte discutimos as concepções de Platáo e de Aristóteles sobre a negaçáo. Na quinta parte distinguimos entre a negaçáo de um enunciado, a negaçáo de uma componente de enunciado, a negaçáo proposicional e a negaçáo predicativa. Na sexta parte discutimos a questáo de se haveria um ato ilocucionário de negar oposto ao ato de afirmar. Na última parte apresentamos nossas conclusões.

Raphael Zillig

Aristotle’s discussion of substance at Metaphysics Z1 begins with an issue about the ontological status of some non-substantial items. This issue is usually understood as designed to establish substance as first being. In this paper, I argue for an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s move. The issue concerning the ontological status of some non-substantial items does not aim at establishing substance as first being, but to direct the investigation to the reason why substance is taken as first being.

Arvydas Šliogeris

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas klausimas, keltas visoje tradicinėje Vakarų metafizikoje, bet iki šiol likęs problemiškas: tai klausimas apie visuotinybės kilmę. Tradicinėje metafizikoje buvo pasiūlyti du šio klausimo sprendimo būdai, kuriuos šio straipsnio autorius vadina indukcionistiniu ir dedukcionistiniu. Vienu atveju visuotinybė kildinama iš juslinės patirties duomenų apibendrinimo ir tapatinama su bendrybe; kitu – visuotinybė laikoma apriorine duotimi, „įgimta“ žmogaus intelektui. Abu variantai veda į aklavietę. Nubrėždamas radikalią visuotinybės ir bendrybės perskyrą, autorius kelia hipotezę, pagal kurią tikrasis visuotinybės šaltinis yra savotiškas absoliutus a priori – tik žmogui būdinga Niekio kaip savitos metafizinės duoties patirtis, straipsnyje vadinama Niekio ekstuicija. Visuotinybė – tai Niekio patirtis, sutelkta į neturinčius juslinio referento žodžius – kategorijas, Niekio vardus. Prasminiai žodžiai: visuotinybė, bendrybė, indukcionizmas, redukcionizmas, Niekis. METAPHYSICS AND UNIVERSALITY Arvydas Šliogeris Summary The article addresses a question that has been of major interest during the whole history of the European metaphysics: it is the question about the origin of universality. This article discusses two interpretive options of the traditional metaphysics that author describes as the deductive and inductive approaches to the origin of universality. According to the first approach, universality is derived from human sensual experiences and is equated with generalisation. According to the second approach, universality is an a priori granted to the human intellect. An author focus on the weaknesses of both approaches and emphasizes a radical separation of universality and generality. The author suggests a hypothesis that the only origin and source of universality is a kind of absolute a priori – exceptionally human experience of Nothingness as a metaphysical giveness that the author denominates “extuition of Nothingness.” Universality is considered to be a unique human experience of Nothingness that is concentrated in words which have no sensual reference and therefore are peculiar words – categories, the names of Nothingness.

C. Roldán Panadero

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