Hasil untuk "Competition"

Ardi Tampuu, Tambet Matiisen, Dorian Kodelja et al.

Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments.

D. Acemoglu, David H. Autor, David Dorn et al.

Even before the Great Recession, US employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000 and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable employment gains achieved during the 1990s, with a historic contraction in manufacturing employment being a prime contributor to the slump. We estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in US manufacturing employment and—through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium channels—weak overall US job growth. Our central estimates suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.

C. Nadell, K. Drescher, K. Foster

Melanie Ghoul, Sara Mitri

J. Boyd, Gianni De Nicolò

T. Schoener

B. Caillaud, B. Jullien

J. C. Stein, J. C. Stein

J. Bergstrand

A. Shaked, J. Sutton

R. Holt

E. Fothergill, Juen Guo, Lilian Howard et al.

P. Adler, Danielle M Smull, K. Beard et al.

Theory predicts that intraspecific competition should be stronger than interspecific competition for any pair of stably coexisting species, yet previous literature reviews found little support for this pattern. We screened over 5400 publications and identified 39 studies that quantified phenomenological intraspecific and interspecific interactions in terrestrial plant communities. Of the 67% of species pairs in which both intra- and interspecific effects were negative (competitive), intraspecific competition was, on average, four to five-fold stronger than interspecific competition. Of the remaining pairs, 93% featured intraspecific competition and interspecific facilitation, a situation that stabilises coexistence. The difference between intra- and interspecific effects tended to be larger in observational than experimental data sets, in field than greenhouse studies, and in studies that quantified population growth over the full life cycle rather than single fitness components. Our results imply that processes promoting stable coexistence at local scales are common and consequential across terrestrial plant communities.

Xiaoyuan Ma, Peilin Zhang, Weisheng Tang et al.

MOTIVATION • Quality of Service (QoS) provision in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is extremely challenging because of: – resource constraints of sensor nodes – influential changes in the environment – dynamic network topology – redundant data • Stringent QoS metrics are required for mission-critical applications, e.g., in wireless industry, smart grids, cooperative driving, etc. – high reliability – low latency – high energy efficiency – high robustness against interference

Alexey Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, Samy Bengio et al.

To accelerate research on adversarial examples and robustness of machine learning classifiers, Google Brain organized a NIPS 2017 competition that encouraged researchers to develop new methods to generate adversarial examples as well as to develop new ways to defend against them. In this chapter, we describe the structure and organization of the competition and the solutions developed by several of the top-placing teams.

F. Hayek

It would not be easy to defend macroeconomists against the charge that for 40 or 50 years they have investigated competition primarily under assumptions which, if they were actually true, would make competition completely useless and uninteresting. If anyone actually knew everything that economic theory designated as “data,” competition would indeed be a highly wasteful method of securing adjustment to these facts. Hence it is also not surprising that some authors have concluded that we can either completely renounce the market, or that its outcomes are to be considered at most a first step toward creating a social product that we can then manipulate, correct, or redistribute in any way we please. Others, who apparently have taken their notion of competition exclusively from modern textbooks, have concluded that such competition does not exist at all. By contrast, it is useful to recall that wherever we make use of competition, this can only be justified by our not knowing the essential circumstances that determine the behavior of the competitors. In sporting events, examinations, the awarding of government contracts, or the bestowal of prizes for poems, not to mention science, it would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in advance who the winner would be. Therefore, as the title of this lecture suggests, I wish now to consider competition systematically as a procedure for discovering facts which, if the procedure did not exist, would remain unknown or at least would not be used.

W. H. Hoffmann, Dovev Lavie, J. Reuer et al.

Research streams on competition and cooperation are central to the field of strategic management but have evolved independently. The emerging literature on coopetition has brought attention to the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and cooperation, yet the interplay between the two has remained under-researched. We offer a roadmap for studying this interplay, which identifies some of its antecedents and consequences, highlights debates concerning the nature of competition and cooperation and the association between the two, and directs attention to the tension between competition and cooperation and the alternative approaches for managing this tension. We discuss the broader implications of the interplay, note some intriguing open questions, offer directions for future research, and present an organizing framework for the interplay of competition and cooperation.

S. Makridakis, Evangelos Spiliotis, V. Assimakopoulos

J. Chod, Evgeny Lyandres, S. A. Yang

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.

Binch Mendelsohn

cacy role, with the vendor then typically turning to its regulatory counsel to evaluate the suitors. Bidders in a well run auction will be judged in part on their regulatory (Competition Act, Investment Canada Act, etc.) risk profile and the steps they are prepared to take to manage it. Thus, while the foregoing items are all negotiable, bidders have a strong incentive to minimize derogations from such vendor proposals. The auction process also may move bidders’ counsel into a bid-advo