Karol Wojtyła’s and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec’s reflections on natural law are part of the anthropological, philosophical-legal and ethical tradition of the Lublin School of Philosophy. Wojtyła’s and Krąpiec’s reflections complement each other in terms of their metaphysical, anthropological, philosophical-legal and ethical aspects. Krapiec’s concept is based on the theory of being and philosophical anthropology. Highlighting the specificity of the practical domain, he emphasizes objective reasons and subjective reasons. Wojtyła, in turn, seeks to reveal the specificity of human morality, showing the tension in the will and the emergence of moral duty, hence proposing to complement the classical concept of natural law based on the principle of synderesis (good should be done, evil avoided) with a reflection on what is morally good and what is morally evil, and by pointing to the personalistic norm of morality, which is the dignity of the human person. In the interpretations of Wojtyła and Krąpiec, we find a common belief that there is a supra-positive law, that this law is present in the nature of human existence and in the world. In the nature of acting beings, in the rationality and purposefulness of action, we find a natural objective order and measure. Interpersonal relationships result in a duty to act or not to act for the good of the person. We read the categories of this good from the order of nature subordinated to development and from the order of objective natural inclinations, affirming the value of human personal being and, ultimately, affirming the transcendent God-Lawgiver.
The review provides a detailed account of the textbook by Yuri Evgenievich Permyakov “Contemporary Philosophy of Law: An Overview of the Main Problems” (St. Petersburg: Lan’, 2023). The author’s contribution to clarifying the province and structure of the discipline, its role in the formation of legal thinking is emphasized. The originality of the proposed reading from the point of view of the metaphysics of law of such categories as agent, ought, judicial authority, subjective right, obligation is noted. The author brings important emphases to the discussion of controversial issues of the boundaries of the law as well as of scientific status and tasks of jurisprudence. Yu. E. Permyakov considers the main task of jurisprudence in general and legal science in particular to be the drawing a line between law and non-law. In view of this task, he examines issues of the legal force of normative and law enforcement acts and of a dispute as an immanent condition of legal life. The author’s proposal to replace the perspective accepted in legal theory, in which the agent of law is considered to be a legal norm, with a “reverse perspective” associated with the concept of a legal construction seems pertinent. Seeing the ontological basis of legal institutions and the starting point of the analysis of law in the claims of the individual, and the most important task of law — in preserving the human cosmos in a state of unity, Yu. E. Permyakov associates the current crisis of law with the inability of the agent to acquire shape, declaring his claims to status, and with the crisis of sociality, in which society loses itself as a whole. The author analyzes the phenomena of provincial comprehension of law and political manipulation of legal consciousness as factors that are directly related to the crisis, reflects on how the latter manifests itself in legal practice, legal science and education.
This article explores the possibility of conceiving political theology beyond its traditional metaphysical foundations. Starting from Carl Schmitt’s formulation of political theology as a domain rooted in analogical and representational transfers between the theological and the political, and drawing on Jean-Luc Marion’s critique of metaphysical theology, or onto-theology, this paper interrogates the foundational assumptions of Schmitt’s political theology and assesses the viability of a non-metaphysical theo-political discourse. The article has three main aims: to elucidate the representational logic at the core of Schmitt’s political theology; to examine postmetaphysical theo-political discourses in light of Marion’s deconstruction of onto-theology; and to vindicate the legitimacy and coherence of postmodern theological-political approaches. Taking inspiration from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s threefold theological method—affirmation, negation, and eminence—the article argues that contemporary political theology can be reframed accordingly: (1) the path of affirmation aligns with Vatter’s reading of Schmitt; (2) the path of negation resonates with Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive strategy; and (3) the path of eminence finds its expression in Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. Ultimately, this paper contends that Marion’s phenomenological approach opens a productive avenue for reconceiving theo-political discourse; it is argued that the phenomenology of givenness proposed by Marion to surpass the conceptual idols of metaphysics has significant implications for the theo-political field that remain unexplored.
St. Bonaventure’s Trinitarianism and Christology offer important food for thought to recover, particularly in the contemporary era, a theology and metaphysics that founds and structures a strong anthropology. It presents a consistent metaphysics finally capable, on the one hand, of giving a reason for the meaning of Creation and its profound nature, and on the other, of reawakening that anthropological centrality that sees the human being precisely from the perspective of an ontological relationality. The latter would then be the foundation of human interiority. This work would therefore primarily highlight the intimate relational structure of the interiority of the human person, and consequently its close link with the dynamism of Creation, considering its Trinitarian and Christological foundation in St. Bonaventure’s thought.
There is a genuine and profound problem about what it consists in for anything to be yourself. Once (perhaps per impossibile) all the empirical and modal facts about a particular human being are in, it still remains unexplained both what being you is, and why that human being is yourself. Being you seems an “extra” feature of anything. The problem admits of no scientific solution, and “being you” resists any purely logical analysis. It is argued that the problem is metaphysical, and that because metaphysical problems have theological answers, being you, and why anything is you may only be explained theologically. You are this soul, this immaterial presence, created by God. A new argument for the existence of God, the Autological Argument, is briefly presented.
Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312) holds a unique place in the history of Chinese thought. The only <i>Zhuangzi</i> we have access to is the version heavily edited, likely changed, and perhaps even rewritten by Guo Xiang. However, his commentary on this Daoist classic is not simply an explanation of what the <i>Zhuangzi</i> says, and in many ways, it is not even a development of the thought found within this text—though at times it is indeed both. Reading Guo’s work reveals a complex philosophical system that critically reimagines some of the key terminologies in early Chinese thought, as well as core assumptions about what things are (being) and how they interact (action). This paper seeks to provide a sketch of Guo Xiang’s metaphysical appreciation of being and action by investigating his unique understanding of the relevant terms and their interrelation. Most scholars see <i>ziran</i> 自然 “self-so” as the conceptual glue that holds Guo’s complex system together. In this paper, I will argue that <i>xing</i> 性, which may be translated as “nature” or “natural dispositions” is more fundamental. In other words, without properly appreciating how Guo conceives of <i>xing</i>, interpretations of Guo’s philosophy can easily go awry.
Este ensayo acomete un análisis del concepto de fantasmagoría en el marco de los materiales del proyecto inacabado del Libro de los pasajes de Walter Benjamin. Para ello, parte de la relación que en ellos se traza entre este término y el carácter fetichista que Marx atribuye a la mercancía, a fin de mostrar cómo dicho carácter, así como la noción de ideología que se segrega de él, constituyen el fundamento de la utilización por parte de Benjamin del concepto de fantasmagoría. Sobre esta base, se defiende que el sentido que Benjamin confiere a esta noción implica una ampliación del concepto marxiano de ideología que obedecería a un doble objetivo: incluir bajo su alcance aspectos de la autocomprensión de la sociedad moderna no tematizados por Marx y adaptarlo a los resultados de la evolución del capitalismo. Por último, se estudia la conexión que la noción de fantasmagoría guarda con lo que Benjamin llama el «despertar» en el contexto de su reflexión sobre la tarea del historiador materialista.
The international conference “Kantian Rationality in Philosophy of Science” was held on 9–11 October 2020 at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (IKBFU) in Kaliningrad. Fifteen participants from different countries discussed aspects of the Kantian understanding of science and the roles of reason in it: the unity, difference, and systematicity of the functions of reason in science, as they are revealed in Kant’s discussions of criteria of scientificity, the classification of sciences, or methods of theoretical and experimental research in specific sciences. The topics discussed fell into two broad categories: firstly, the relationship between metaphysics and science in the context of Kant’s time; secondly, the relevance of Kant’s ideas to modern sciences and the concepts of philosophy of science in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
"The inside and the outside of the long age of spaces and things are replaced by the
age of information. Can we still talk about physical spaces or has the metaphysics
of abstract relationships completely taken over? Are we facing the transmutation of
bodies and shapes into mere memory allocations? The text leaves and asks for a space and a vision that reconcile these terms. The images of the Author’s country become the metaphor of the inside and the outside of the present, acting as a manifesto of people’s participation in shaping their time. However, this life necessity still requires constant reconciliation between residing and overrunning, the identity of places and the one of relationships, history and the
tale that challenges it and wishes to overcome it. Even more today, at the time of
hyperhistory, when everything is told in detail and on every platform, reconciliation
becomes necessary, so that hyper-facts do not simply decree the end of human participation. This goal requires a shift of paradigm of the terms property, citizenship
and community within a new urban and institutional design."
How does the Critical Kant view ontology? There is no shared scholarly answer to this question. Norbert Hinske sees in the Critique of Pure Reason a “farewell to ontology,” albeit one that Kant took a long time to bid (Hinske 2009). Karl Ameriks has found evidence in Kant’s metaphysics lectures from the Critical period that he “was unwilling to break away fully from traditional ontology” (Ameriks 1992, p. 272). Gualtiero Lorini argues that a decisive break with the tradition of ontology is essential to Kant’s Critical reform of metaphysics, as is reflected in his shift from “ontology” to “transcendental philosophy,” two notions that Lorini takes to be related by mere “analogy” (Lorini 2015). I agree with Lorini that a thorough reform of ontology is a pivotal part of Kant’s Critical plan for metaphysics and that ontology somehow “survives within the critical philosophy” (Lorini 2015, p. 76). To make this case, however, I deem it important to identify “ontology” with “transcendental philosophy” in the sense of extensional equivalence. While we can detect this identification in Kant’s writings, only from his metaphysics lectures can we get a full sense of its historical and philosophical significance. In this chapter I focus on how Kant’s Critical metaphysics represents a definitive turn from, as well as notable continuity with, traditional treatments of ontology, particularly the Wolffian one.
O objetivo é criticar os argumentos bioconservadores de Jürgen Habermas contra a eugenia positiva (aperfeiçoamento humano). Em suma, ele sustenta a tese de que a natureza humana seria fundamento das ideias centrais que consubstanciariam a correta compreensão normativa das relações humanas. Assim, para ele, a biotecnociência deveria restringir-se à esfera da eugenia negativa (terapia), apresentando, contudo, argumentos que nos parecem amplamente questionáveis. Anteriormente, todavia, abordamos o debate em torno da noção de pós-humanidade, uma vez que o estágio pós-humano é considerado como uma consequência incontornável das biotécnicas de aperfeiçoamento humano, perfazendo um dos pontos fulcrais da discórdia dos bioconservadores com os transumanistas. Após isto, então, abordamos a perspectiva habermasiana, a fim de mostrar seus problemas.
<p>Retomada de forma dogmática, a tematização<br />platónica da pintura projeta sobre a produção e a contemplação<br />de imagens atributos de irrealidade, irracionalidade e<br />passividade, fazendo do olhar o oposto de conhecer e o oposto<br />de atuar, uma aceitação acrítica das aparências, coisa de<br />crianças. O presente artigo pretende problematizar essa tradição<br />iconoclasta, colocando em causa os seus pressupostos filosóficos<br />e explorando a potência das imagens da arte e do olhar crítico.<br />Dialogando com as obras de Merleau-Ponty, Berger, Damish,<br />Didi-Huberman, Manguel e Rancière, aspira a mostrar que os<br />olhares do pintor e do espectador estão longe de deixar-se<br />reduzir às simplificações platónicas, dando lugar a uma dialética<br />crítica e criativa que desconhece qualquer distinção entre<br />aparência e realidade, entre passividade e atividade, e, em<br />última instância, entre interpretar e transformar o mundo.</p>
Tomando como referências básicas algumas reflexões do
filósofo Martin Heidegger sobre a técnica, essa investigação visa
fundamentalmente compreender em que medida na era do domínio
planetário da técnica a filosofia chega ao seu fim reservando,
contudo, ao pensamento a tarefa de pensar a essência da técnica,
desvelando assim, não apenas o perigo que ali se aloja, mas também
o que salva. Alguns momentos preparatórios para o advento do
domínio planetário da técnica serão analisados na tentativa de se
compreender como a civilização ocidental atingiu a era da técnica
planetária. Em um segundo momento, a partir de uma crítica à
concepção instrumental da técnica, procura-se explicitar o
significado do fim da filosofia e em que medida vivemos um tempo
de indigência e penúria que não pensa, mas apenas planifica e
calcula. O artigo conclui procurando esclarecer que tipo de perigo
existiria na essência da técnica e qual o caráter e a tarefa do
pensamento originário apto a superar o domínio planetário da
técnica.
The thesis that I develop in this paper is that there is a way of
affirmation of the existence and the world in Schopenhauer, assuming
no foundation, an aesthetic justification of existence or a way of life either as a tragic pessimism or pessimism of strength. This is an additional path to his basic position stated in The World as Will and Representation and is clearly in Parerga and Paralipomena, especially in «On Religion» and in «Aphorisms on the wisdom of life». To develop that thesis, I analyze the concept of «need for metaphysics» and its relationship to art and to the author’s project of philosophy.
The paper deals with metamathematical structures based on Malcev's concept of algebraic systems. This approach allows us to extend this concept on systems of physical objects having physical interactions and without such interactions. It is shown, that these extended metamathematical structures can be used in rigorous (scientific) version of metaphysics including its axiomatic, as well as in the theory of evolutionary systems. The formal representation of the latter is differed from that of algebraic systems in mathematics.