Hasil untuk "Metaphysics"

Vladimir A. Tsvyk, Roman I. Mikhan

This study is a detailed analysis of the influence of the philosophy of G.W. Leibniz on the metaphysics and ethics of Gilles Deleuze, with a focus on the transformation of Leibniz’s key concepts within Deleuze’s philosophical system. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of Deleuze’s perception of Leibniz’s philosophy: from the critical perception presented in early works such as “Difference and Repetition” and “Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza”, where Leibniz is interpreted as a philosopher of transcendental representation, to the integration of Leibniz’s key concepts into Deleuze’s own philosophical system, which is particularly evident in “The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque”. The study focuses on Deleuze’s revision of the principles of identity and non-contradiction - which he reinterprets in the context of his ontology of events, series and singularities. The focus is on how Deleuze replaces Leibniz’s theological perspective with an immanent system in which the harmony of the world is based on a mathematically optimal distribution of singularities. Deleuze’s ethical project is examined through the lens of the concept of puissance (force, power, potency), which combines the ideas of Nietzsche, Spinoza and Leibniz. The study emphasises the significance of interrelated categories such as the will to power, the capacity for action and potency, which become the basis of Deleuze’s ethical system. Chaos and difference are seen not as destructive forces, but as grounds for the formation of a dynamic harmony that unites disparate elements into a coherent system. The study is characterized by a unique approach that combines Deleuze’s metaphysics and ethics, as well as an original interpretation of his interaction with Leibniz’s philosophy. The author argues that Deleuze forms a unique view of the world as a process where chaos and difference act as the foundations for dynamic harmony. This approach allows Deleuze to combine elements of Leibniz’s and Nietzsche’s theories, presenting our world as the best possible world because of its ability to maintain maximum variety while preserving wholeness.

Andy Mullins

Our subject is the neurobiological characteristics of virtuous emotional responses and their integration into character. Drawing raw material from the self-reported thoughts and actions of Dr Takashi Nagai, present in Nagasaki at the time of the atomic bomb, our methodology is to conduct a highly granular examination of one specific moment where his self-control is greatly tested. This permits us then to offer an analysis of the neurobiological processes, pathways, and systems that underpin the management of emotional reactions, and in effect, draw insight into the neurobiology of virtues of temperance and fortitude, understood from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. The neurobiological considerations are preceded by discussion of philosophical prerequisites founded on a Thomistic metaphysics of participation. In conclusion we offer some thoughts about the benefits of neurobiological investigations in relation to character and the aptness of the development of virtue for human beings.  

H. Bergson, N. Paul, W. S. Palmer et al.

Arkadiusz Gudaniec

Against the background of the model of the metaphysics of the person (presented in the article “The Existential Metaphysics of the Person. Part 1: The Classical Concept of the Person and the Metaphysical Theory of Esse,” Studia Gilsoniana 10, no. 2) which was initiated by Thomas Aquinas and developed in the Lublin Philosophical School, this paper focuses on the attempt to show the philosophical breakthrough that the concept of personal existence can bring, and points out the most important theoretical consequences of adopting this theory in metaphysics. It outlines the elements of a new metaphysics of the person, based on the concept of personal existence, and hypothesizes about the metaphysical turn this concept could make. The investigations undertaken in the paper lead to the conclusion that not all inferences have yet been drawn from the concept of esse personale, and that the entire depth of the metaphysics of existence has not yet been explored.

Pedro García Casas

"A New Concept of ‘Person’ in Wojtylian Philosophy: A Phenomenological and Metaphysical Analysis of The Acting Person”: This article discusses Karol Wojtyła’s study on the concept of “person” and its anthropological foundations. It refers to his great book: The Acting Person, in which Wojtyła approaches the reality of the person from the perspective of the person’s action. The article shows that, in his book, Wojtyła goes beyond classical Thomism by following the great intuitions of Personalism and Phenomenology and putting them at the service of an adequate anthropology that does justice to the reality of the person. Then it examines Wojtyła’s claims about: (1) the person as a source of validation of moral experience, (2) experience as a source of knowledge, (3) consciousness and the efficient causality of the person, (4) the transcendence of the person in action (self-determination), (5) the integration of the person in action, and finally (5) the person’s subjectivity and irreducibility. The article is aimed at delivering a framework to elaborate a metaethics that would contribute to the human person’s happiness and fulfillment.

D. Borchert

Michael Rauschenbach

The tenth proposition of Spinoza’s Ethics reads: “Each attribute of substance must be conceived through itself.” Developing and defending the argument for this single proposition, it turns out, is vital to Spinoza’s philosophical project. Indeed, it’s virtually impossible to overstate its importance. Spinoza and his interpreters have used EIp10 to prove central claims in his metaphysics and philosophy of mind (i.e. substance monism, mind-body parallelism, mind-body identity, and finite subject individuation). It’s crucial for making sense of his epistemology (i.e. Spinoza’s account of knowledge and response to skepticism) and in resolving puzzles within the Ethics (i.e. explaining human ignorance of all but two attributes). Even those who do not attribute some of the above claims to Spinoza need EIp10 to defend much of what they believe about Spinoza’s system. This paper locates a previously unnoticed argument for this proposition in Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well Being. There, Spinoza shows himself concerned with a powerful and underappreciated form of philosophical skepticism, one with echoes in the work of his contemporary Leibniz as well as in the later Wittgenstein. Spinoza’s introduction of EIp10 in the Ethics circumvents this form of skepticism, solving the problem the Short Treatise envisions while also explaining that text’s argument’s absence from the explicit justificatory structure of the Ethics.

Ignacio Silva

The main goal of this paper is to compare how Thomas Aquinas expressed his doctrine of providence through secondary causes, making use of both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic principles, in the seventh article of the third question of his Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei and his Super Librum de Causis Expositio, in which he intends to solve the problem of the metaphysical mechanism by which God providentially guides creation. I will first present his arguments as they appear in the disputed questions, followed by a presentation of his thought on the matter in his commentary of the Liber de Causis, and concluding with my comparative analysis of Aquinas’ solution to the issue of God’s providential activity in nature.

Sören Häggqvist, Å. Wikforss

The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and that the currently popular homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent that fails to vindicate the Kripke–Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for anti-descriptivist semantics. 1 Introduction 2 From Semantics to Metaphysics 3 Metaphysics, Part I: The Demise of Micro-essentialism   3.1 Original micro-essentialism   3.2 Placeholder essentialism 4 Metaphysics, Part II: Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory 5 Prospects for Natural Kind Term Semantics 1 Introduction 2 From Semantics to Metaphysics 3 Metaphysics, Part I: The Demise of Micro-essentialism   3.1 Original micro-essentialism   3.2 Placeholder essentialism   3.1 Original micro-essentialism   3.2 Placeholder essentialism 4 Metaphysics, Part II: Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory 5 Prospects for Natural Kind Term Semantics

Bogusława Filipowicz

Prof. Maria Ossowska (1896-1974) consecrated her professional life to study and teach the science of morality described by Descartes (1596-1650) in the metaphor of a philosophical tree: physics is the trunk, metaphysics the roots, ethics one of the branches. This scientist received a classical education. She analyzed the ancient philosophical texts. In Antiquity the development of Socratic and Hellenistic idea systems go together with Judaic and Christian schools thought about the tree of knowledge of good and evil and the tree of life. In relation to the old-Hebrew ethics concept, the author emphasized the significance of the transgression of the law: (Hbr.) ‘awôn. Death, in Torah, is one of concequences of ‘awôn. ‘awôn translated as “sin” was the important subject in the patristic comments.  This was the important subject in the patristic interpretations. In this context Church Fathers evoked the Gospell’s passage about the resurrection. The allegory of the tree as the way of transmission of knowledge and life was presented by Mary Cassatt (1844-1926). In the article Gela Seksztajn (1907-1943) is remembered also. Like M. Cassatt, G. Seksztajn consecrated a large part of her pictures to children. During the occupation of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union (1939-1945), Maria Ossowska, a teacher of philosophical science, participated in the system of underground education as part of the Department of Education and Culture in the Polish Secret State. She and her husband Stanisław Ossowski dedicated their time to save the life of many Jews in Poland. They were one of the vital connections to the Council to Aid Jews Żegota.

Catereva Irina

The Transcendental Theatre presents a unique phenomenon in the European theatre in the second half of the 20th century. Going beyond the limits of any membership or religious movements, being based on the metaphysical and spiritual essence as general‑human components of theatrical art and on the experience of centuries‑old traditions of the Oriental and Western theater, it has become the mentor of transcendental knowledge, so that through theatrical art to help man to reach anothe level of spirituality.

J. Derrida, E. Husserl

Donald C. Williams

Motsamai Molefe

Supposing that an African metaphysics grounded on the notion and/or value of vitality is true, can it do a better job in terms of informing an African religious ethics than its Western counterparts, specifically, the Divine Command theory (DCT)? By ‘religious ethics’, in this article, I have in a mind a meta-ethical theory i.e., an account of moral properties whether they are best understood in spiritual rather than physicalterms. In this article, I articulate an under-explored African meta-ethical theory grounded on vitality, and I argue that the Euthyphro problem is not a successful objection against it like it is usually thought to be for DCT. This relative advantage of the vitalist meta-ethics does not necessarily render it plausible, but it gives us some ground to seriously consider the future of African religious ethics grounded on it.

M. Heidegger, D. Krell

J. Garrison

Cecilia Rearte Terrosa

Resenham-se oito artigos de prestigiosos autores sobre a proposta filosófica de Peter Strawson referentes a epistemologia, lógica, teoria do conhecimento, metafísica, filosofia da linguagem e as réplicas a eles realizadas por Strawson.

Casimir Klim

The question of whether or not the terminally ill should be granted an institutional right to die rose to the forefront of the national consciousness recently, due in large part to the efforts of the late Brittany Maynard. Diagnosed with untreatable brain cancer, Maynard decided to end her life last fall in Oregon, where state law permits physician-assisted suicide.[i] In an editorial for CNN, Maynard wrote: “having this choice at the end of my life has … given me a sense of peace during a tumultuous time that otherwise would be dominated by fear, uncertainty, and pain” (“My right to death with dignity at 29”). Having the option to end her life gave Maynard back her sense of agency, and allowed her to die on her own terms. Laws like Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act are not without their critics, however. Prominent among them is philosopher J. David Velleman, who makes a case against these laws in his essay “Against the Right to Die.” Velleman challenges those—like Maynard—who claim that state-sanctioned assisted suicide can preserve the dignity of the terminally ill. He claims that dignity and autonomy are intertwined in such a way that someone lacking dignity also necessarily lacks the ability to rationally choose suicide. Velleman also argues that the presence of an institutional right to die places an undue pressure on the terminally ill to exercise such a right. In this essay, I will argue that Velleman’s first claim does not adequately account for the ability of rational adults to make binding decisions about their future selves. I will also argue that while Velleman’s second concern is valid, it is not a sufficient reason to oppose legislation like the Death with Dignity Act. Velleman’s initial claim hinges on the concepts of dignity and autonomy—specifically as defined by Immanuel Kant in his ethical writings. In The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that a person’s dignity is predicated upon his ability to make autonomous decisions and, more specifically, by his ability to use reason (Kant 48, 43). Assisted suicide, Velleman claims, is only morally permissible in situations where one’s dignity is compromised andwhere one is able to rationally choose to die. Based on Kant’s definition, though, if a person is able to rationally determine that he wants to die, he must necessarily still have his dignity—due to his ability to exercise reason. It also follows that if a person lacks dignity, he must also lack the ability to rationally choose suicide. Therefore those without dignity (who would be justified in choosing death) should not be allowed to do so even if they so choose, as they are not doing so rationally. On the other hand, those who are able to rationally choose suicide lack the grounds to do so as they still possess their dignity (Velleman ). This argument, that all instances of assisted suicide are either irrational or unjustified, ignores the ability of human beings to make binding decisions regarding their future selves. Velleman assumes that the terminally ill patient must choose whether he will live or die ‘right then and there’ at his moment of greatest suffering—which is unrealistic. Maynard, for example, decided to end her life well before her illness robbed her of her dignity or autonomy; but she did so in confidencethat it inevitably would. She wrote: “Because the rest of my body is young and healthy, I am likely to physically hang on for a long time even though cancer is eating my mind … and my family would have had to watch that” (Maynard, “My Right to Death with Dignity at 29”). In Maynard’s case, suicide was a prophylactic measure, ensuring that her dignity and autonomy remained intact for the remainder of her life. Velleman could claim that Maynard represents a special case, in that she was forewarned about what was to come—but what about those who suddenly fall ill? A sudden stroke or head injury could steal away one’s capacity to reason in seconds, and with it, the ability to rationally choose death. Surely euthanasia would not be justified for these patients, even if they requested it. In these cases, however, it is informative to consider advance directives—a commonly employed legal device that allows people to decide ahead of time whether or not they want specific life-saving interventions, like CPR or intubation. It is not a stretch to imagine these directives being expanded to include a clause that calls for euthanasia in certain circumstances—such as a devastating but not-immediately-fatal illness or injury. Again, in this situation, the person signing the advance directive is in full possession of her faculties, an adult making a binding decision about her future—just as Maynard did. Next, Velleman argues that institutionalizing the right to die has a coercive effect on the terminally ill. Such a right, he says, exerts an unwelcome pressure on the dying to justify their continued existence. The presence of this option, he says, deprives the terminally ill of the ability to “ the status quo without choosing it” (Velleman 84). In other words, an expectation of continued existence is currently the norm for these individuals. Once a law permitting physician-assisted suicide is in place, that is no longer the case—these patients could be held accountable for their decision to continue living, and be required to justify it. Thus, when the state gives a human being the institutional right to die, it also forces her to actively justify her existence (86). This is a valid concern. Brittany Maynard and her family moved to Oregon from California in order to take advantage of the Death with Dignity Act. This fact, as well as her outspoken activism in favor of assisted suicide for the terminally ill, makes it clear that she was not acting under duress or out of guilt when she took her own life. However, for people living in places where physician-assisted suicide is already legal, things are not so clear-cut. They may, as Velleman fears, feel forced to give reasons for not ending their lives. Considering the financial and emotional strain their condition may cause their loved ones, some may find this difficult to do. Nevertheless, these concerns are not insurmountable. In Oregon, patients like Maynard must follow an extensive protocol, which includes multiple physician visits and (at their doctor’s discretion) a psychological examination.[ii] As such, those who take advantage of the Death with Dignity Act must make a strong and concerted effort to do so—minimizing, if not eliminating, the concern that these patients are being called on to justify their continued existence. On the contrary, they are asked—again and again—to justify their decision to end it. Still, it’s crucial that these safeguards be included in any future legislation that provides a legal avenue for assisted suicide. Velleman’s view of the terminally is, ultimately, paternalistic and condescending. Furthermore, it reflects a larger tendency in America to view these individuals as frail, helpless, and confused, rather than as adults capable of making important decisions. Brittany Maynard’s advocacy highlights our need to cast off this fallacious outlook. “Who,” Maynard asked, “has the right to tell me that I don’t deserve this choice?” The dying are already forced to give up so much. To return to them a measure control over their lives is an act of compassion that we as a society ought to take.  [i] The Oregon Health Authority uses the term ‘physician-assisted suicide’ to refer to the practice of “ending life through the voluntary self-administration of lethal medications prescribed by a physician for that purpose” ("Frequently Asked Questions About the Death with Dignity Act."). [ii] "Frequently Asked Questions About the Death with Dignity Act." Oregon Health Authority. Web. 6 Sept. 2015.     References: "Frequently Asked Questions About the Death with Dignity Act." Oregon Health Authority. Web. 6 Sept. 2015. Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press, 1997. Maynard, Brittany. "My Right to Death with Dignity at 29." Cable News Network, 2 Nov. 2014. Web. 23 Aug. 2015.

U. Thiel

J. Aertsen