A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational value function should be used to conduct welfare analysis of the final outcome. We use the Nash demand game to illustrate our model.
For an ascending correspondence $F:X\to 2^X$ with chain-complete values on a complete lattice $X$, we prove that the set of fixed points is a complete lattice. This strengthens Zhou's fixed point theorem. For chain-complete posets that are not necessarily lattices, we generalize the Abian-Brown and the Markowsky fixed point theorems from single-valued maps to multivalued correspondences. We provide an application in game theory.
We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic auction that finds a stable outcome when primitive contracts are gross complements for all participants.
Two theorems announced by Topkis about the topological description of sublattices are proved. They are applied to extend some classical results concerning the existence and the order structure of Nash equilibria of certain supermodular games, with some problems in Zhou's proof corrected.
We propose a measure of learning efficiency for non-finite state spaces. We characterize the complexity of a learning problem by the metric entropy of its state space. We then describe how learning efficiency is determined by this measure of complexity. This is, then, applied to two models where agents learn high-dimensional states.
We show that probabilistic equivalence of a regret-based preference relationship over random variables is implied by a weak form of continuity and monotonicity.
This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of voters, which indicate that ranked-choice elections require different considerations for voters and candidates alike. While this model assumes that voters vote sincerely, the model of ranked-choice elections this paper presents allows for considerations of strategic voting in future work.
In this paper, I prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a large class of games with nonconvex strategy spaces. Specifically, if each player's strategies form a compact, connected Euclidean neighborhood retract and if all best-response correspondences are null-homotopic, then the game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. As an application, I show how this result can prove the fundamental theorem of algebra.
We give a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. We construct two topological spaces: one for the space of preference profiles and another for the space of outcomes. We show that social choice functions induce continuous mappings between the two spaces. By studying the properties of this mapping, we prove the theorem.
Carlo Baldassi, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci
et al.
We develop a full-fledged analysis of an algorithmic decision process that, in a multialternative choice problem, produces computable choice probabilities and expected decision times.
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms' acceptable sets. We also provide a class of preference profiles that satisfy this condition. Our results indicate that stable matching is compatible with a wide range of firms' complementary preferences.
A formal write-up of the simple proof (1995) of the existence of calibrated forecasts by the minimax theorem, which moreover shows that $N^3$ periods suffice to guarantee a calibration error of at most $1/N$.
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of monotonic reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowments-merging-proof, at least one is endowments-splitting-proof and that no such rule is pre-delivery-proof.
This note shows that the value of ambiguous persuasion characterized in Beauchene, Li and Li(2019) can be given by a concavification program as in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). In addition, it implies that an ambiguous persuasion game can be equivalently formalized as a Bayesian persuasion game by distorting the utility functions. This result is obtained under a novel construction of ambiguous persuasion.
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.
This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We demonstrate the power of our characterization results by applying them to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
In many choice problems, the interaction between several distinct variables determines the payoff of each alternative. I propose and axiomatize a model of a decision maker who recognizes that she may not accurately perceive the correlation between these variables, and who takes this into account when making her decision. She chooses as if she calculates each alternative's expected outcome under multiple possible correlation structures, and then evaluates it according to the worst expected outcome.
The basic concepts of the differential geometry are shortly reviewed and applied to the study of VES production function in the spirit of the works of Vîlcu and collaborators. A similar characterization is given for a more general production function, namely the Kadiyala production function, in the case of developable surfaces.