Miroslav Penchev Ivanov, Heather Zecchini, Petra Hamerlik
R-loops, structures that play a crucial role in various biological processes, are integral to gene expression, the maintenance of genome stability, and the formation of epigenomic signatures. When these R-loops are deregulated, they can contribute to the development of serious health conditions, including cancer and neurodegenerative diseases. The detection of R-loops is a complex process that involves several approaches. These include S9.6 antibody- or RNAse H-based immunoprecipitation, non-denaturing bisulfite footprinting, gel electrophoresis, and electron microscopy. Each of these methods offers unique insights into the nature and behavior of R-loops. In our study, we introduce a novel protocol that has been developed based on a single-molecule DNA combing assay. This innovative approach allows for the direct and simultaneous visualization of RNA:DNA hybrids and replication forks, providing a more comprehensive understanding of these structures. Our findings confirm the transcriptional origin of the hybrids, adding to the body of knowledge about their formation. Furthermore, we demonstrate that these hybrids have an inhibitory effect on the progression of replication forks, highlighting their potential impact on DNA replication and cellular function.
This book is about dynamic programming and its applications in economics, finance, and adjacent fields. It brings together recent innovations in the theory of dynamic programming and provides applications and code that can help readers approach the research frontier. The book is aimed at graduate students and researchers, although most chapters are accessible to undergraduate students with solid quantitative backgrounds.
This note explains the equivalence between approximate rationalizability and approximate cost-rationalizability within the context of consumer demand. In connection with these results, we interpret Afriat's (1973) critical cost efficiency index (CCEI) as a measure of approximate rationalizability through cost inefficiency, in the sense that an agent is spending more money than is required to achieve her utility targets.
This paper investigates the value of recommendations for disseminating economic information, with a focus on frictions resulting from preference heterogeneity. We consider Bayesian expected-payoff maximizers who receive non-strategic recommendations by other consumers. We show by which channels a recommendation system influences consumer demand and welfare. Our analysis reveals how the welfare-maximizing design of a recommendation system may differ from what a profit-maximizing designer would choose to do.
This study examines the relationship between automation and income inequality across different countries, taking into account the varying levels of technological adoption and labor market institutions. The research employs a panel data analysis using data from the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, and other reputable sources. The findings suggest that while automation leads to an increase in productivity, its effect on income inequality depends on the country's labor market institutions and social policies.
Two fundamental issues are incorporated in the present monograph: the issue related to the quantification of the social costs and the issue, related to the defining of the circular economy concept as a theoretical model. The analysis is based on the methodology of the new institutional economics, which fact distinguishes it from the many other circular economy analysis based on the neo-classical methodological apparatus.
The November 2022 ranked choice election for District 4 School Director in Oakland, CA, was very interesting from the perspective of social choice theory. The election did not contain a Condorcet winner and exhibited downward and upward monotonicity paradoxes, for example. Furthermore, an error in the settings of the ranked choice tabulation software led to the wrong candidate being declared the winner. This article explores the strange features of this election and places it in the broader context of ranked choice elections in the United States.
The social cost of carbon is the damage avoided by slightly reducing carbon dioxide emissions. It is a measure of the desired intensity of climate policy. The social cost of carbon is highly uncertain because of the long and complex cause-effect chain, and because it quantifies and aggregates impacts over a long period of time, affecting all people in a wide range of possible futures. Recent estimates are around $\$$80/tCO$_2$.
Adjustments to public health policy are common. This paper investigates the impact of COVID-19 policy ambiguity on specific groups' insurance consumption. The results show that sensitive groups' willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance is 12.2% above the benchmark. Groups that have experienced income disruptions are more likely to suffer this. This paper offers fresh perspectives on the effects of pandemic control shifts.
We illustrate the point with an empirical analysis of assortative mating in the US, namely, that the outcome of comparing two distant groups can be sensitive to whether comparing the groups directly, or indirectly via a series of counterfactual decompositions involving the groups' comparisons to some intermediate groups. We argue that the latter approach is typically more fit for its purpose.
I construct the professor-student network for laureates of and candidates for the Nobel Prize in Economics. I study the effect of proximity to previous Nobelists on winning the Nobel Prize. Conditional on being Nobel-worthy, students and grandstudents of Nobel laureates are significantly less likely to win. Professors and fellow students of Nobel Prize winners, however, are significantly more likely to win.
We examine the allocation of a limited pool of matching funds to public good projects using Quadratic Funding. In particular, we consider a variation of the Capital Constrained Quadratic Funding (CQF) mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (2019) where only funds in the matching pool are distributed among projects. We show that this mechanism achieves a socially optimal allocation of limited funds.
This textbook is an introduction to economic networks, intended for students and researchers in the fields of economics and applied mathematics. The textbook emphasizes quantitative modeling, with the main underlying tools being graph theory, linear algebra, fixed point theory and programming. The text is suitable for a one-semester course, taught either to advanced undergraduate students who are comfortable with linear algebra or to beginning graduate students.
Tatiana Kozitsina, Alexander Chaban, Evgeniya Lukinova
et al.
This paper examines how the group membership fee influences the formation of groups and the cooperation rate within the socialized groups. We found that monetary transactions do not ruin the establishment of social ties and the formation of group relations.
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis on the income inequalities recorded in the EU-15 in the 1995-2014 period and to estimate the impact of private sector credit on income disparities. In order to estimate the impact, I used the panel data technique with 15 cross-sections for the first 15 Member States of the European Union, applying generalized error correction model.
This paper proposes the governance framework of a gamified social network for charity crowdfunding fueled by public computing. It introduces optimal scarce resource allocation model, technological configuration of the FIRE consensus protocol, and multi-layer incentivization structure that maximizes value creation within the network.
In this article, a game-theoretic model is constructed that is related to the problem of optimal assignments. Examples are considered. A compromise point is found, the Nash equilibriums and the decision of the Nash arbitration scheme are constructed.
We present a complete characterization of the classical transfer problem for an exchange economy with an arbitrary finite number of traders. Our method is geometric, using an equilibrium manifold developed by Debreu, Mas-Colell, and Balasko. We show that for a regular equilibrium the transfer problem arises if and only if the index at the equilibrium is $-1$. This implies that the transfer problem does not happen if the equilibrium is Walras tatonnement stable. Our result generalizes Balasko's analogous result for an exchange economy with two traders.
An algorithm of solution of the Automatic Classification (AC for brevity) problem is set forth in the paper. In the AC problem, it is required to find one or several artitions, starting with the given pattern matrix or dissimilarity, similarity matrix.