Hasil untuk "History of Oceania (South Seas)"

C. Moore

The exhibition Connections across the Coral Sea is a partnership between Queens-land Museum and the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Australian Biodiversity and Heritage. On display is the story of cultural movement and interaction around and across the Coral Sea. It is an area with a human time-depth as old as the habitation of Sahul (Australia and New Guinea): 65,000 years. The archipelagos off New Guinea were settled 40,000 – 30,000 years ago, and a land bridge remained at Torres Strait until 8,000 years ago. More recent movements out of Asia and into the Western Paci fi c occurred between 3,500 and 2,500 years ago. These migrants spoke Austronesian languages and developed ‘ Lapita ’ pottery. The exhibition uses recent research and the Queensland Museum ’ s excellent collection to uncover ancient two-way cultural movements across the Coral Sea. It features the Torres Strait Islands and the Dingaal and Ngurrumungu nations from North Queensland. There are many unknowns in the settlement of the Paci fi c and Australia, not least the early, late and post-Lapita movements. Prehistorians have found few connections between the north and south of Sahul. Earlier research on the Lapita migrants suggested they avoided the underbelly of New Guinea, working their way along the north coast, loitering for a thousand years in the Bismarck Archipelago, then leapfrogging over most of the Solomon Islands, settling in the Santa Cruz group and Vanuatu, before continuing into Remote Oceania. The Queensland Museum exhibition deals with connections around the Coral Sea, raising implications for Australian and Paci fi c history, which have been known to prehistorians for a decade, but not by the public or even, I suspect, most modern historians. Canoes

The Jack Gordon Institute of Public Policy Florida International University

This article examines terrorism, arguing that the goal of terrorists is to invoke fear into individuals. The consequences of terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and Paris, among other places, is that the perceptions that terrorism is a threat to national security are high. This work contends that such fears are unwarranted as it is more likely that one dies in a traffic accident than a terrorist attack. Delving into the International Relations literature, this article highlights the current debates about terrorism and threats to security. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, fear is on the rise. A December 2015 poll showed 40 percent of the American people saying that national security and terrorism were their top concern, with job creation and economic growth coming in a distant second at 23 percent.1 But even before these dramatic and disturbing events, political elites in the U.S., probably more than mass opinion, were worried. In 2009, two-thirds of the members of the Council on Foreign Relations reported believing that the world the U.S. faced was more dangerous than it had been during the Cold War.2 Three years later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, claimed, “We are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime,”3 and the director of National Intelligence James Clapper, similarly said, “Looking back over my more than a half century in intelligence I have not experienced a time when we’ve been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.”4 Taking these concerns to heart, on December 22, 2015 the Dallas symphony cancelled its European tour “due to the recent and tragic events in Europe and the United States, and based on extensive conversations with national and international security professionals.”5 The point of this brief article is that these fears are unwarranted.6 The most dangerous thing I and most of us do every day is to cross the street; deaths from traffic accidents dwarf those from terrorism. The comparison to the Cold War is also telling; although there is no objective estimate of how likely nuclear war was then, let alone of how likely nuclear war with Russia or China is in the foreseeable future, the consequences of the latter would of course be dreadful, but nothing like the civilization-ending impact of the former. So why are people saying such foolish things? In part—but I believe only in small part—people are consciously exaggerating for bureaucratic, political, or personal reasons. It would hardly behoove the head of the intelligence establishment to say something like: “Although there are no grave dangers to American national security, there are a lot of smaller problems we need to be aware of and multiple interests that while less than vital, still require attention.” Not only budgets but people’s sense of mission are entangled with believing that what they do is vital. During political campaigns (which consume more and more of the electoral cycle) advantage often goes to a candidate or a party that can claim that the opponents dangerously neglect American security. The media also has both an interest in playing up danger and an outlook that focuses on them. Bad news is generally good for circulation, and reporters and editors believe that it is their responsibility to keep a sharp eye out for threats to the country. But this does not explain why so many members of the general public are fearful. In part, of course, they are picking up on the cues provided by the elites. This is not all there is to it, however. Although most of the dangers to our lives come in the form of everyday activities like driving, people both overestimate the degree of control they have over their lives and are more fearful of risks they feel that they cannot control. We incorrectly think that we are about-average drivers and that if are careful we can take care of ourselves. By contrast, it is next to impossible for any of us to influence the chance of dying in a terrorist attack. Furthermore, each terrorist attack gets deeply embedded in our memories because they are vivid and widely covered in the media, and the irony is that the extensive coverage is due to the fact that they are so rare. Even traffic accidents that kill significant numbers of people, such as bad bus accidents, occur frequently enough so that we have come to expect them. The very fact that terrorism is so infrequent makes an instance unexpected and therefore more impactful. Unprecedented Security The greatest threat to national security comes from war among the major powers, and so our starting point is that those who are so worried have lost sight of the fact that the world used to be dangerous be4 Global Security Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1 https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/gsr/vol1/iss1/1 DOI: 10.25148/GSR.1.009613 Global Security Review | 5 cause these states used to fight each other with some regularity. By contrast, currently the leading powers— the U.S., the states that form the EU, and Japan—form a security community.7 According to Karl Deutsch, a security community is a group of countries who not only are at peace, but among whom war is unthinkable.8 This is a very restricted category. Even countries who remain at peace with each other for prolonged periods often think about and plan for war with one another. It is exceedingly rare for major states to fail to do so, and when they have put the thought of war between them out of their minds, the reason often is the pressing threat from a common enemy. Indeed, it was the perception of a common threat from the USSR that was partly responsible for the rise of the security community, but that country’s demise has not led to the community’s demise. The importance of this break with the past hardly can be exaggerated: it is not an exaggeration to say that the history of world politics has been dominated by war and the shadow of war among the most powerful states. My definition of leading powers excludes Russia and the PRC, and a skeptic might argue that it was designed with that purpose in mind. Nevertheless, even if a war involving these two countries remains possible, one reason why these possibilities receive as much attention as they do is the lack of greater dangers. Furthermore, when we look at the possible causes of a war between NATO and Russia or the U.S. (and/or Japan) and China we see that, despite some overheated rhetoric growing out of conflicts over Ukraine and the East and South China seas, the issues are not direct and vital to the U.S. That is, only those with overheated imaginations can envision Russia as a military threat to Europe, and the danger to the U.S. arising from China’s rise is indirect only, stemming as it does from the maintenance of America’s Cold War alliances in East Asia. China does indeed challenge the U.S. dominance in East Asia, but even leaving aside the pacifying effects of nuclear weapons and high levels of economic interdependence, the U.S. has room to accommodate the rising power and the level of threat is much lower than that which characterized much of IR in the past. The same is true for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, another issue high on the American agenda. Even those who reject the argument that proliferation will be stabilizing have difficulty estimating the magnitude of the danger, and therefore the level of effort and resources that should be arrayed against it. Although rank-ordering these and other threats is difficult, more difficult still is putting them on some absolute scale. The result, I believe, is that the American leadership if not the mass public has lost its sense of proportion in the international dangers being posed, and concomitantly has failed to see how much safer we are now. In other words, the leading powers now have an unprecedented degree of security, or at least security against threats from other countries (I am leaving aside the dangers of climate change and other menaces from nature even if we can trace them to human activities), and the result is to give greater salience to minor threats like terrorism. Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history.” Understood—or rather misunderstood—as the claim that history and conflict had come to an end, this is clearly incorrect. But this is not what Fukuyama argued. His claim is that we have seen the end of clashing ideologies that purport to be universally valid and that, as such, seek to spread themselves throughout the world. There is much to this. While the ideology of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism, far from converting everyone, has spurred a backlash, there is no other general contender such as fascism or communism. Islamic fundamentalism (the term is imprecise if not misleading, but there is no other one in widespread use) rejects and seeks to exclude Western liberalism, but in no realistic sense aspires to spread its truth to the entire world. The PRC has also followed its own path, and the combination of some degree of economic liberalization coupled with authoritarian rule and enriching the leaders has produced dramatic results. But China has not touted this as a model for others to follow, its success may depend on factors particularly Chinese, and others have not flocked to approach. As Arnold Wolfers explains, when states have met their needs for security and autonomy, they often turn toward what he called “milieu goals”10 which arise from non-material motives. For the West today, this means democracy, human rights, and limits on if not the elimination of corruption. These embody the way of life in the West, or, to be more precise, the way the West likes to see itself. The argument for spreading these values and ways of behaving is partly that they will enhance international cooperation and so be in the interests of the West, but at least as important is that they will benefit the societies that adopt them. Whether or not this is the case is fortunately 5

I. Giovos, Dimitrios K. Moutopoulos, S. Nakagun et al.

Since prehistoric times, cetaceans have been important food sources, but they also have been seen as monsters of the sea, a perception that did not change much during the past centuries. Due to a better understanding of their biology in recent years, the public perception towards cetaceans has been evolving. Various studies have been developed aiming to evaluate the attitude and perception of humans towards cetaceans, but these have been local and focused on specific target groups. Our study aimed to evaluate the attitude of the public towards cetaceans on a wide scale by using an international online questionnaire distributed exclusively on social media. An attitudinal scale proposed by Kellert (1985) on a Likert scale matrix was used with nine statements referring to dolphins and nine referring to whales. Even though specific constraints occur from such types of research (e.g., mostly highly educated and young respondents from developed countries), 5,222 responses were collected from 107 countries in total. While Europe, North America, South America, and Oceania were well represented, the number of answers from Africa and Asia were limited. Our results revealed a shift in the public attitude towards cetaceans, with the majority of people exhibiting a positive attitude following the global trend of a rising appreciation for wild-life. Whaling nations and ex-whaling nations that have continued that practice until recently exhibited a more negative attitude towards cetaceans, revealing the importance of culture, heritage, and memory in shaping attitudes. Finally, we discuss our findings under the light of the culture and history of different countries. (Less)

N. Khan, Erica L. Ashe, T. Shaw et al.

Cornelis Renes

An introduction to this series of essays on identity formation, belonging, migration and diaspora in Pacific and Atlantic contexts.

María Jesús Lorenzo Modia

This article analyzes the transnational features of narratives between Galicia and Australia from the year 1519 to the Present-day. Sailors like Pedro Fernandez de Quiros and Luis Váez de Torres, who reached Australia in the sixteenth century, will be considered as the starting point of a cultural dialogue still going on in today’s literature not only as regards the geography of the continent but also in the collective imagination of the country. Other connections between these countries are also established by contemporary novelists such as Peter Carey, Sally Morgan and Murray Bail, who use Galician history and places, filtered through British sources, to address Australia and its present-day characters and decolonizing conflicts. Finally, the works of other authors such as Robert Graves and Félix Calvino, who also deal with this literary dialogue in their fiction, are explored.

Lisa C. Belskis, Amy Frey, M. Jensen et al.

Ulla Rahbek

This paper discusses the work of the Australian writer and historian Drusilla Modjeska through a focus on the intersections between women‟s lives, love and art, which constitute the central triptych of Modjeska‟s writing. It argues that Modjeska‟s oeuvre unfolds a connective feminine discourse through a development of what the paper calls hinging tropes, discursive connectors that join life, love and art, such as weaving, folding and talking. That connective feminine discourse is indeed central to Modjeska‟s personal and sometimes idiosyncratic feminism.

Raghavendra Mishra

Anne Holden Rønning

Looking back to the past this paper discusses why Pacific studies and in particular Australasian studies became an area of interest in tertiary education in Europe. What subject areas initiated these studies, and how do past legacies shape the present? With cutbacks in higher education over the past two decades the future of interdisciplinary studies and the humanities looks bleak. At the same time due to global business and increased political communication across borders there is a vibrant interest in and need for such studies among businesses and students. For most Europeans the literature of settler countries, with their European legacy, makes access to ways of thought and culture easier than studies of countries with other mythological backgrounds. In today’s multicultural environment such studies can provide knowledge for an understanding of other cultures and increase tolerance of the ‘other’. Area studies have relevance to our situation in Europe with increased migrancy, not least as a result of Schengen and EU regulations.

Alfredo Martínez-Expósito

The history of Spanish departments in Australian universities can be traced back to the 1960s, when a number of British hispanistas relocated to Australia and created a small number of successful teaching programs that reproduced the British model. A second generation of Spanish scholars arrived in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly from Latin American countries, in a migration wave that is still current. The transition from a British understanding of the Spanish discipline, with a strong focus on (canonical) literary studies, to current curricula that emphasise communicative skills and a loose notion of cultural studies, is symptomatic of deeper changes in the way the discipline has sought to reposition itself in the context of the Modern Languages debate.

Janie Conway-Herron, Marin Renes

Bill Boyd, Les Christidis, Kristin den Exte et al.

In 2010, the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the International Social Science Council (ISSC) published their Grand Challenges in Global Sustainability Research, seeking to mobilise researchers in a 10-year scientific effort to address what they call the “grand challenges in global sustainability”. In this paper, we ask whether these Grand Challenges are relevant to Australian environmental management. We examine this from two angles, insights from public perception surveys, and our own survey data. Public attitudes surveys indicate public ambiguity on the knowledge base, a finding that implies an immediate need for improved public communication of scientific knowledge. Our on-line survey, attached to a conference, Innovative Solutions for Environmental Challenges, targeted Australian environmental managers and scientists’ views on critical issues. The results mirrored global scientists’ views on the need to find ways for the scientific, social and political communities to work together to develop innovative approaches to solving future environmental concerns. Importantly, we found that the specific responses were context and scale dependent, while highlighting the inherent tensions between maintaining production and consumption, and protection of resources and ecosystem services.

Andrew Jones

Ashutosh Gowariker’s critically acclaimed Lagaan (2001), is a marvellous piece of cinematic troubling, which, via an astute use of allegory, reflects upon identity politics and power relations in both colonial and postcolonial contexts. Bringing two cornerstones of Indian popular culture together, namely cricket and Hindi formulae films, Gowariker produces an engagingly, affective alchemy of image and sound, which intervenes critically in the discourses of British colonial rule. This article’s intention is to demonstrate the mimetic devices inherent in Lagaan’s narrative, and how they mirror the regional resilience evident in the global success of both popular Indian cinema and the Indian performance of cricket. The sport of cricket and its role and effectiveness within a larger colonial project, is contextualized and reconsidered by tracing some resistant tangents in the sports evolution and performance in the Asia Pacific region. Making the most of the South Asian diaspora, which has exploited the networks and routes of the former British Empire, Indian popular cinema, likewise, serves to illustrate the point that local cultural dynamics can add their own nuances to global media flows. Interdisciplinary approaches are required to traverse within and between cultures, and to underscore the deep currents of contestation, as well as the radical and often surprising politics that characterise popular culture. In this respect, a range of scholars from different fields of study are consulted; Ashis Nandy, Arjun Appadurai, Chandrima Chakraborty and Homi Bhabha amongst them. Their voices will help to open up uncertainties in the conventional discourses, and to articulate some of the cultural politics and poetics at play in Lagaan specifically and the performance of cricket more generally.

Bill Boyd

In 1984, J. Douglas Porteous challenged the geography world to silence. True geographical appreciation cannot be expressed in prose; the logical conclusion is for geographers to be silent. Given that they cannot be silent, Porteous advocated nontraditional writing, such as poetry. In 1994, Paul Cloke illustrated the power of reflective narrative for a geographer grappling to understand the world. In 1998, I started writing geographic poetry. In 2012, I draw these strands together in this reflective essay, drawing on a poetic journey over a decade old now. Can I reflect a sense of place or place-making that transcends traditional geographical expression? Did Porteous truly open a geographic window otherwise closed to me? I conclude the poetry does create geographical sense and sensibility, but more as constructed possibilities than as objective realities. The poetry provides glimpses into the experiences of geographical displacement encountered by many New Australians, and thus may best be considered as metageographical expressions.

Kristina Everett, Eloise Hummell

Among the many inhibitors to social inclusion and mobility faced by Indigenous peoples in Australia, under-representation of Indigenous students in Higher Education has long featured as a concern for government and human rights advocates. This is due to the attendant lower social indicators than those of the wider Australian society which characterise Indigenous peoples’ life experience. UNESCO’s guidelines on inter-cultural education published in 2007 provide some principles for groundwork to develop classrooms which are inclusive but not assimilationist. Models of how this might be done in practice, however, are scarce. In this paper we consider a model for inter-cultural education which uses joint analysis and dialogue surrounding self-representation of Indigenous peoples by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peers to then co-create a new, inter-cultural representation. The ‘Daruganora’ program involves Indigenous students leading dialogue with nonIndigenous peers and teachers to jointly interpret a purpose-built Indigenous art exhibition. We explain in this paper how spaces created by this dialogue can allow open, honest and respectful interaction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people relating to Indigenous representations of identity. We argue that Daruganora provides a model for inter-cultural classrooms.

Rongxing Guo

The term ‘Greater China’ is defined in this chapter as one which includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland China. There have been different names for the greater China area, such as ‘the Chinese circle’, ‘the Chinese community’, ‘the greater China community’, ‘China economic circle’, ‘Chinese economic area’, ‘China economic zone’, and so on. Probably first used by George Cressey at least as far back as the 1930s, the term ‘Greater China’ was to refer to the entire Chinese empire, as opposed to China proper (Harding, 1993, p. 660). The term ‘Greater China’ is now generally used for referring to the cultural and economic ties between the relevant territories, and is not intended to imply sovereignty. Sometimes, to avoid any political connotation, the term Chinese-speaking world is often used instead of the Greater China. Despite the common historical, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity, the greater China economic area has followed different routes of economic developments. Hong Kong and Macau have been under the colonial administrations of the UK and of Portugal, respectively. Taiwan was a Japanese colony between 1895 and 1945 and, following a short period of reunification with mainland China, has been operating independently from the rest of the world. As a result, significant social and economic differences have been present in the four parts of the area, especially since 1949. The Taiwan Strait became a forbidden boundary in 1949 when the Nationalist-led government fled to Taiwan and, at the same time, the Communist-led government was founded on the mainland. Since then, Taiwan and mainland China have been two divergent regimes. Against the common cultural and linguistic homogeneity, mainland China chose essentially to pursue a socialist line, while Taiwan followed the route of market-oriented capitalism. Furthermore, the two sides have also treated each other antagonistically, particularly during the high tide of military confrontation, when the mainland claimed that it would liberate the Taiwan compatriots from the black society sooner or later, while in turn Taiwan maintained that they would use the ‘three democratisms’ to reoccupy the mainland eventually. The Chinese people have a long history of migrating overseas. One of the migrations dates back to the Ming dynasty when Zheng He (1371–1435) became the envoy of the Ming emperor. He sent people – many of them Cantonese and Hokkien – to explore and trade in the South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean. Different waves of immigration led to subgroups among overseas Chinese such as the new and old immigrants in Southeast Asia, North America, Oceania, the Caribbean, Latin America, South Africa, and Russia. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, emigration has been directed primarily to Western countries (such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and Western Europe). Many of these emigrants were themselves overseas Chinese or were from Taiwan or Hong Kong, particularly from the 1950s to the 1970s, a period during which the PRC placed severe restrictions on the movement of its citizens. In 1984, Britain agreed to transfer the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC; this triggered another wave of migration to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, USA, Latin America, and the other parts of the world. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 further accelerated the migration. The wave calmed after Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty in 1997. In addition, many citizens of Hong Kong hold citizenships or have current visas in other countries so if the need arises, they can leave Hong Kong at short notice. Keywords Greater China, Chinese-speaking world, economic area, emigration, the Taiwan Strait, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, multiregional economic comparison, cross-Strait economic relations, overseas Chinese

Anne Pender

This essay considers the work of Australian actor Kerry Walker (b. 1948) in the years 1977-1989. It focuses on Walker’s acting style in the roles she played in a variety of works by Patrick White, her approach to acting and her enduring friendship with White. It seeks to document the specific qualities Walker brought to her performances in White’s plays and to explain her distinctive understanding of White’s drama.

Oliver Haag

There was something peculiar about meeting Bruce Bennett. Chances to see Bruce in Europe were much higher than getting hold of him in Australia. The first time we met was neither in Australia nor in Europe, but in Kolkata, India. This was at the 2008 IASA conference, one of the biennial meetings of the Indian Association for the Study of Australia. Bruce was surrounded by a bevy of Indian scholars, especially students, eager to ask for his advice or simply having a chat about their papers over coffee. Bruce had always had an open ear for everyone. He was interested in talking to students and emerging scholars alike. An eminent authority on Australian literature and culture, Bruce was not only preoccupied with ‘big’ names. He also engaged with young scholars of Australian studies.