The first annotated publication of two letters from Ivan Mirchuk to Ivan Krevetskyi from 1929 regarding the publication of the Ukrainian translation of “A prolegomena to every future metaphysics that could act as a science.”
This article describes the history of modern metaphysics as the history of the immanentization of transcendence. We show this from the concept of the “idea of god”, which is the phenomenon that violently separates subjectivity from transcendence and opens up a tear in it that we call “psycho-theological”: the divine violently leaves a trace in us by its very distance. We describe this phenomenon by means of a study of four archives: Descartes’ third <i>Metaphysical Meditations</i> (1641), the refutation of the cosmological proof of the existence of God in Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> (1781–87), Schelling’s commentary on this Kant’s text in his Introduction to the lectures on <i>Philosophy of Revelation</i> (1841), and the traces of Descartes’ third <i>Meditation</i> in the work of Levinas.
This paper focuses on the work to which the concept of image is put by Heidegger in his retrieval of the schematism in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Whereas the schematic role of the image is never fully developed by Kant, Heidegger pays it much more attention, investing it with properties that have the potential to make the schema an active component in his own ontology. However, the motifs he uses to characterize the image depart from the conventional notion of an image as the representation of an object or scene, and are puzzling, if not to say mysterious. I show how the motifs acquire new relevance when they are considered in relation to (a) Boehm’s ‘indeterminacy’ theory of the image, and (b) the novel, ontological concept of time that Heidegger introduces. With these perspectives in mind, the motifs allow us to ‘image’ or imagine aspects of continuity that are central to Heidegger’s concept of primordial time, and therefore confirm the schema as a coherent element in his system. I also suggest how this clarified schema-image might act as a bridge between Heidegger’s philosophy before and after the turn.
The starting point for consideration is to put the Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy into question whether the status of “absolute Otherness” may also belong to the Other other than man. On the basis of the thought of Levinas it receives a negative responseand it is because of his involvement in the so-called anthropological machine (which he shares with Martin Heidegger and some other critics of metaphysics). But it is, however, possible to open the (broadly defined) phenomenological ethical thought drew on the achievements of Levinas to the question of the animal. This attempt might be centered around the proposals of Jacques Derrida, the author of the essay The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow), where he spoke about the singularity of each animal, the problematic status of border between man and animal,and the being-with animals as a full-fledged modality of being. This is a provocative thought which asks us about our attitude to such issues as “responsibility” and “responsiveness”, “carno-phallogocentrism”, or the status of non-human animals. Derrida’s thought is here very close to some kind of phenomenological language, but it is rather the phenomenology of the otherness than the phenomenology of intentional subject. The same phenomenology that we find in Bernhard Waldenfels’s or John D. Caputo’s writing.
Moral reductionist believes that the reality of moral qualities are the same qualities which can be expressed with immoral words. Such an ontological view has an epistemological aspect which states our understanding of moral facts is either our understanding of immoral facts or our deductions of immoral understanding. From moral reductionists and especially the naturalists’ point of view, the ability to explain moral knowledge without resorting to some theories such as moral intuition is considered to be an important advantage and even a strong reason for their view. Therefore, the present paper is going to study the reductionistic explanations about moral knowledge and justifications of moral believes. We have come to the conclusion that among the explanations presented by the naturalists, analytic knowledge has the same problems which have discredited the theory of analytic reductionism. Also, deducing value from non-value is either facing the logical gap of is-must; or if there is a meaningful descriptive-valuable link, we can’t finally come to unconditional moral results.
The proposal opposes three authors (Jacobi, Baader and Schelling) in a certain moment of the history of the philosophy on having analyzed the dialog that establishes between them through their respective texts: <em>Ueber gelehrte Gesellschaften, ihren Geist und Zweck</em> (Jacobi, 1807); <em>Ueber die Behauptung: dass kein uebler Gebrach der Vernunft sein könne</em> (Baader, 1807) and <em>Philosophische Untersuchungen über give Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände</em> (Schelling, 1809), in order to answer to the question about if the reason is the causer of the evil, if can exists an evil use of it, or if evil, following the philosophical tradition, has its origin in the sensibility or in the understanding.
<p>O objetivo desse artigo é compreender a diferença entre a<br />moralidade dos sistemas filosóficos de Bentham e John Stuart Mill,<br />bem como provar que há mais espaço para a elaboração de regras<br />morais no utilitarismo de Mill, quando comparado ao utilitarismo<br />de Bentham. Contudo, para que se entenda como a moral no<br />sistema de Bentham distingue-se da moral no sistema de Mill, é<br />necessário ter uma clara noção da natureza humana dos indivíduos<br />de ambos os autores e dos respectivos princípios de utilidade que<br />derivam destas distintas noções de natureza humana, pois o<br />conceito de moralidade de cada autor decorre das respectivas ideias<br />de natureza humana e do princípio de utilidade de tais autores.</p>
The author does a hegelian interpretation of Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072b 18-30, passage with which the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences concludes. Here are drawn the relations and similitudes that exist between Aristotle's Unmoved Mover and Hegel's Absolute. In order to understand in which points both thinkers coincide when describing divine thought, it is highly important to analyze the notions of thought, movement, power, act, concept, object, material substance, formal substance and suprasensible substance. The interpretative turn that Hegel does of Metaphysics and the comparative reading here offered, point towards a better understanding of the nature of the Unmoved Mover and the Absolute.
This article aims to contribute to the study of the ontology of space in the work of Martin Heidegger. To do so, within the limitations of this work, we analyze the characteristics of Heideggerian phenomenology, pointing out how the German philosopher thinks his philosophy as an alternative to traditional metaphysics conceived in modernity. The main objective here is to focus discussion on the meaning of man as being in the world, understanding space as a category of analysis of great importance to man-in-the-world, to society and, therefore, for science geographical.
O presente artigo tem por objetivo abordar o tema dos direitos humanos e cidadania sob a perspectiva da filosofia política de Hannah Arendt. O artigo retrata, em sua primeira parte, a ilusáo fundacionista dos direitos humanos ante a situaçáo dos apátridas e refugiados, situaçáo que leva a autora a formular o conceito de cidadania como o direito a ter direitos. Na sequência, analisa os elementos que configuram sua teoria política, tais como: liberdade, açáo, pluralidade e espaço público, os quais, articulados entre si, permitem a formaçáo de um conceito de cidadania baseado na real participaçáo dos cidadáos na organizaçáo política de uma comunidade, em contrapartida a um conceito meramente formal de cidadania. Para, finalmente, abordar o sistema de conselho, instância em que a cidadania é compreendida como açáo vivenciada no espaço público, favorecendo, assim, a possibilidade de efetivaçáo dos direitos humanos, exercidos como dignidade política dos cidadáos.