Posthumanistic ideas associated with the rejection of anthropocentric discourses and practices and implying (in transhumanism) the technological transition of man and society to a fundamentally new level of existence and organization of life, have a solid history of almost four decades. In Russia, with the exception of top essays such as “A Cyborg Manifesto” by Donna Haraway or “The Transhumanist FAQ” by Nick Bostrom, posthumanist conceptology began to take root intensively since the 10s. 21st century. Then “Cannibal Metaphysics” by Eduardo de Castro and “Being Ecological” by Timothy Morton first appeared on the Russian market. Gradually, the transmission of posthumanist ideas gained more intense momentum. Today, the domestic literary market features transhumanist literature (“Upgrade to Superhumans”), new anthropology, or “postanthropology,” marking the boundaries “beyond man,” representation of indigenous thinking, a series of books about socio-natural phenomena (“Insectopedia,” by Hugh Raffles, “How forests think” by Eduardo Kohn, “Gathering moss” by Robin Kimmerer), as well as new ontologies (Graham Harman, Ian Bogost), revising the classical subject-object picture of the world. Posthumanism can no longer be considered an inconspicuous cultural phenomenon. It is not surprising that sharp critical reactions appeared in the form of monographic studies. The article provides reviews of current Russian posthumanist literature and criticism. Particular attention is paid to the critical agenda, which positions posthumanism as a carrier of apocalyptic strategies for humans. The need for a careful study of the intellectual phenomenon and the search for common grounds for a constructive dialogue between cultures and concepts are argued.
History (General) and history of Europe, Social Sciences
In the present article, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who, in two different intellectual traditions, namely philosophical hermeneutics and moral phenomenology, have referred to the concept of the Other as the fundamental possibility of the individual. The other, as an ontological and common concept in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, is the turning point of the condition for the possibility of understanding and ethics. Focusing on the concept of the other, while addressing the points of difference and commonality between Gadamer and Levinas, this article will show that Levinas’s preoccupation with the other as a philosopher refers to the foundations of ethics, and the condition for the possibility of foundations of ethics is encountering the other. In Gadamer, the turning point is the determination of the possibilities of understanding in dialectical and dialogue-oriented relationships. Without the other, in Levinas’s thought, ethics, and moral matter, and in Gadamer’s thought, the process of understanding will not occur in the form of a fusion of horizons. Therefore, this article shows that the other is a common concept between these two philosophers, which both of them cannot avoid in their philosophical analyses of ethics or the process of understanding. IntroductionThe analysis of ethics is one of the important and innovative achievements of Levinas’s philosophical intellectual structure. Levinas’s concern is to refer to the foundations of morality itself, regardless of institutionalizing the moral in the form of law, and the foundation of morality is in face-to-face relationships with others. Regardless of Levinas’s plan about the concept of the other, Gadamer imagines the determination of understanding in a new way in the face of the other. The other is the comprehensible strain in philosophical hermeneutics, in such a way that the process of understanding is formed by the presence of the other and the face-to-face encounter with it. According to Gadamer, the other is the factor of openness in the process of understanding. The fusion of horizons is the product of openness and mutual encounters in dialogue, which is not possible without the other. The other is the condition of determining the possibility of understanding in each of the parties who are allowed to reveal a part of their being and allow the other to open up and talk. In fact, understanding is a kind of event that is revealed in a two-way conversation in an event-like way. This type of understanding depends on the presence of another. The main focus of the research is the analysis of the concept of the other, which has been done with emphasis on two important works: Truth and method, Totality and infinity.Body & discussionIn general, the process of understanding is a dialogical process, whether the other side of the conversation is a text or a person, the foundation of understanding is formed in a relationship with the other. Determining the other as an independent personality and a different perspective is an ontological determination. The other thinks and becomes meaningful beyond the subject or object and even beyond my intellectual position, it belongs to its own independent world and its own experience. In conversation, it plays a significant role in the production of truth. Openness provides the possibility of dialogue and mutual agreement. In dialogue, the final product is not reproduced. The other condition for the production of the final product is dialogue According to Gadamer, facing the other is facing his world. At the moment of facing me, the other makes his abstract aspects concrete and opens his lived experience to me. He believes that the question-and-answer process is a kind of encounter with the world of experience and openness toward it. According to Gadamer, the process of understanding is the result of dialectical-hermeneutic relations between me (the interpreter) and you (the other). The dialogical relationships that allow each other to enter the other’s history are relationships that are formed based on questions and answers. From Gadamer’s point of view, questions and answers are the opening of a new horizon based on tradition and contemporary history.Levinas phenomenologically refers to the philosophical tradition of the West to reread the process of the formation of the concept of the other. Many commentators and interpreters of Levinas’s works believe that it is possible to determine the foundations of ethics from Levinas’s point of view from face-to-face relationships. The condition for the possibility of morality is to pay attention to others. To describe another concept, Levinas analyzes the negative and positive aspects of this concept. In a negative way, Levinas first answers what the other is not, and for this reason, he criticizes the history of Western metaphysics and the criticism of Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology. Positively, the other is relative to me and different from me. The other is beyond subject and object. The other is not subjugated by any concept and recognizes its independent identity. The other and the encounter with him are the conditions for determining fundamental ethics from Levinas’s point of view. Another condition of concreteness refers to another person. According to Levinas, it is the condition for the formation of moral form. He believes that ethics is a kind of double encounter in the context of bilateral relations. Many moral concepts are formed in relation to a concrete other. In Levinas’s genealogy of ethics, we are faced with the presence of the other in a concrete way and with the subjectivity of the subject in an abstract and a priori way. Levinas specifies two approaches with the description of the other in the form of an infinite idea. First of all, there is an infinite gap between the other and the same. This issue shows its foreignness and otherness, its independence, and being true to its essence towards me. Second, it is the determination of another in a concrete or abstract form, which in both cases evokes an identity independent of me.ConclusionAccording to the explanations of the concept of the other in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who have paid attention to the ontological aspects of the concept of the other in the fields of philosophical hermeneutics and ethics. In Gadamer’s thought, the other is an ontologically dialectical relationship between I-Thou and the starting point of the conversation process. The fusion of horizons is the turning point of the formation of the relation to the other, which is manifested in another area. The other has its own history, world, tradition, and authority, regardless of the formation of dialogical relationships, and has an independent identity. The other is allowed to share his lived experience in the conversation. The other creates new worlds. The other has opened himself and in return can be self-interpreting and self-revealing. Regardless, the other is the consistency of the complex relationship between language and the world. This form of bilateral relations, which is manifested in the presence of another, is a linguistic form that is the cause of a deep connection between language and the world. The other, whether concrete or abstract, is the turning point of our connection with the world in an ontological way.Regardless of Gadamer’s point of view, Levinas returns to another concept in his new thought project entitled “How to determine the possibilities of ethics.” According to Levinas, finding the foundations of ethics and determining the condition of moral possibilities is in facing the other and in face-to-face relationships. The other is concretely a kind of bilateral encounter which is the basis of many moral events and is manifested abstractly in the form of the subject’s subjectivity. This kind of infinite aspect of the other is revealed in subjectivity is implied in sense. Encountering another in an abstract form within itself is the encounter of the subject’s subjectivity with the sense, and the sense is in the encounter with the other. Sense is the basis of the subjectivity of the subject. Sense is a kind of concrete and visual face-to-face encounter that adds to the importance of determining another. Therefore, both Gadamer and Levinas raise many possibilities about the concept of the other, which shows the importance of this concept in the Western philosophical tradition.
Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects
Philosophy is an eternal topic of human development, and it is also the basic promoter of the inheritance and development of traditional culture. Since ancient times, there have been many differences in concepts and mechanisms between Chinese and Western philosophies. Moral ethics, natural health preservation, and the golden mean are the main manifestations of Chinese philosophical concepts. This is also the main feature of Chinese traditional culture, which shows strong secularism as a whole. Western philosophy is mainly characterized by the origin of elements, metaphysics, and unity of will and spirit, which also makes most Western cultures surpass the present world. At present, my country is at a critical stage of national rejuvenation. The inheritance and development of Chinese traditional culture have become the only task for national rejuvenation, and it is also the main means for Chinese excellent traditional culture to go abroad and enhance China’s soft power. In this regard, to promote the inheritance and development of Chinese traditional culture, based on the comparative perspective of Chinese and foreign philosophy, this paper analyzes the secularism of Chinese traditional culture and proposes the secular development and future succession of Chinese traditional culture.
El tema de este artículo es la metafísica en la investigación del neoescolástico croata Stjepan Zimmermann. La introducción y la primera parte resumen los datos biobibliográficos básicos de Zimmermann y su importancia para la filosofía croata del siglo XX. La segunda parte trata de las observaciones de Zimmermann sobre si se puede hablar de metafísica científica. Dado que admite tal posibilidad, la justificación del realismo metafísico se analiza a continuación. Además, la contribución presenta la crítica de Kant a la metafísica y la crítica de Zimmermann a Kant y su filosofía, un tema con el que Zimmermann lidió a lo largo de su vida. La siguiente sección del artículo trata de la cuestión de hasta qué punto las ciencias naturales pueden reemplazar a la metafísica. La respuesta inequívoca de Zimmermann fue que esto no es posible. Sólo la filosofía, y en este contexto la metafísica, puede llevar al hombre a Dios, y según Zimmermann esa es también la meta de la filosofía.
Abastract: The subject of this paper is metaphysics in the research of the Croatian neo-scholastic Stjepan Zimmermann. The introduction and the first part summarize the basic bio-bibliographical data of Zimmermann and his importance for the Croatian philosophy of the 20th century. The second part deals with Zimmermann's statements as to whether one can talk about scientific metaphysics at all. Since he allows for such a possibility, the justification of metaphysical realism is discussed below. Furthermore, the contribution presents Kant's critique of metaphysics and Zimmermann's critique of Kant and his philosophy, a topic Zimmermann grappled with throughout his life. The following section of the article deals with the question to what extent the natural sciences can replace metaphysics. Zimmermann's unequivocal answer was that this is not possible. Although great importance was then attached to the natural sciences, as well as to philosophical currents such as positivism, naturalism and materialism, in Zimmermann's opinion metaphysics largely transcends empirical reality and is therefore still possible and very necessary. Only philosophy, and in this context metaphysics, can lead man to God, and according to Zimmermann that is also the goal of philosophy.
More and more people talk about so-called Daoist ecological thought. Actually, Daoism does not have a ready-made ecological thought. However, it indeed can act as a vital theoretical resource for constructing such thought. In this article, I will argue how this is possible, and what realm Daoism can attain in the relation between human and nature. I will mainly employ such methods as original problem research, literature analysis and comparative research in the inquiry. Compared with traditional Western metaphysics, Daoist ontology can provide stronger philosophical support for the value and significance of empirical things. In addition, Dao does not dominate things like a personal god with will, but gives them the chance to grow and develop according to their own nature. Lao-Zhuang called on people to imitate this character of Dao. They believed that the primitive nature itself was worthy of respect, and urged us to set limits for ourselves and never to distort things’ natural propensities to suit us. Consequently, natural things are neither overshadowed by a noumenon, nor are they subject to humans’ conquering and abuse, so they are capable of flourishing freely. This is precisely the realm of <i>tianfang</i> which Daoism seeks.
RAMONN DE OLIVEIRA ALVES, FLÁVIO LUIZ DE CASTRO FREITAS, MICHELE ANGELO TINAGLI CASAROSA
O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em tentar explicitar uma possível relação entre o argumento do filósofo Arthur Schopenhauer acerca da natureza humana, à luz de sua metafísica da vontade, e aspectos das ciências empíricas, tomadas aqui enquanto base para uma filosofia imanente da natureza. Para tanto, algumas obras importantes foram adotadas como base deste estudo, tais como: O Mundo como Vontade e Representação e Sobre Vontade na Natureza. Inicialmente, procurou-se aproximar alguns elementos de sua formação científica e investigar como o autor utiliza os recursos das ciências da vida em sua metafísica, transferindo seus argumentos filosóficos para áreas de estudo como a fisiologia. Em seguida pretendeu-se com explorar uma espécie de argumento naturalista, à medida que adentra o panorama observacional do filósofo. O objetivo não é estabelecer uma defesa desta visão, mas compreender a dinâmica desta intelecção sobre natureza, o que permitirá examinar dimensões tanto do ponto de vista naturalista quanto existencial, intimamente relacionadas com a sujeição do homem a um princípio volitivo.
Palavras-chave: Schopenhauer. Ciências. Metafísica. Natureza Humana.
The Metaphysics of Will and The Sciences: a study in Schopenhauer on human nature
ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to try to explain a possible relationship between the argument of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer about human nature, in the light of his metaphysics of will, and aspects of the empirical sciences, taken here as the basis for an immanent philosophy of nature. Therefore, some important works were adopted as the basis for this study, such as: The World as Will and Representation and About Will in Nature. Initially, an attempt was made to bring together some elements of his scientific training and investigate how the author uses the resources of life sciences in his metaphysics, transferring his philosophical arguments to areas of study such as physiology. Then, it was intended to explore a kind of naturalist argument, as it enters the observational panorama of the philosopher. The objective is not to establish a defense of this vision, but to understand the dynamics of this understanding of nature, which will allow us to examine dimensions both from a naturalistic and an existential point of view, closely related to the subjection of man to a volitional principle.
Keywords: Schopenhauer. Science. Metaphysics. Human Nature.
The main orteguian’s idea that «my life» is «reason», radically different from the phenomenological conception of reason that establishes Husserl in Ideen, mainly founded in being. Vital reason is theory of man as its circumstantial project; its unifying thread comes from an aesthetic reflection especially aimed at understanding realisms and idealisms, and whose philosophical consequences will be crucial.
Between the Human and the Animal
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The author of the contribution begins with Umberto Eco’s answer to the question:
“Why philosophy?” which points to the distinction between human and animal. Based
on Heidegger’s lectures entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World,
Finitude, Solitude, where the question: “What is world?” is answered through the
famous three theses about the “world-less-ness” of the stone, of the animal as being
“poor-of-world,” and of the human being as the “creator of world,” the author gives
a detailed analysis, accompanied with a critical reflection in defense of Heidegger’s
position against Derrida’s critique of “anthropocentrism” and “Cartesianism.” In the
final part, the author connects the conception of human-animal with the contemporary
issue of ethics and responsibility with the aid of Nancy’s philosophy.
Undoubtedly, Avicenna is one of the most outstanding intellectual and cultural characters in the Islamic civilization. Though the stand of Avicenna is somehow clear in areas such as metaphysics, natural sciences, logic and other disciplines, there is little consent regarding his political philosophy. The present study aims to observe his reflections on politics from a new perspective, i.e. studying Avicenna’s political thought in the context of his oriental (or eastern) philosophy. To do so, the paper demonstrated that instead of following Peripatetic philosophers who regard politics as a subcategory of practical wisdom, he intended to derive his political thought under the subjects of prophethood. This was the reason that the subjects such as speculation (Hads) and imagination in Avicenna’s political philosophy drew significant attention. Hence, we can say that in his extensive framework the political philosophy is converted from a rational-civic knowledge to a cosmic imagination-based wisdom. From this perspective, we can assume that not only he was the precursor of Sohravardi but also influenced a significant portion of Iranian intellectual history based on a unique system of wisdom.
In the natural attitude, and in the ordinary language, religion is strictly bound to transcendence. In this paper I ask whether the concept of “transcendence” is legitimate in the phenomenological dimension, which is opened by the methodological operation of reduction to the immanence of transcendental consciousness. By examining how “transcendence” gains increasingly importance in Husserl’s thought, the necessity emerges to distinguish three levels of it: intentional (or horizontal) transcendence, intersubjective transcendence and transcendence as “superposition” (or trans-horizontal transcendence). Such distinction allows to rethink the sense, the possibilities and the limits of phenomenology of religion.
Keywords: Husserl, transcendence, epoché, reduction, intersubjectivity, religion
Apresenta-se a tese da ressemantização do conceito de fundamento em Adorno (1903–1969). Através de análise bibliográfica e teórica, pretende-se demonstrar como é possível pensar a fundamentação numa filosofia marcada, essencialmente, pelo fracasso do projeto iluminista recente.
[This paper presents the thesis of the resemantization of the concept of foundation in Adorno (1903-1969). Through bibliographical and theoretical analysis, it is intended to demonstrate how it is possible to think the foundation in a philosophy marked, essentially, by the failure of recent Enlightenment project.]
The article is focused on the Lublin Philosophical School; it explains its name, presents its founders, reveals the causes of its rise, and introduce the specific character of the School’s philosophy.It starts with stating the fact that in the proper sense, the term “Lublin Philosophical School” describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by a group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity (achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism.
O objetivo desse artigo é compreender a diferença entre a
moralidade dos sistemas filosóficos de Bentham e John Stuart Mill,
bem como provar que há mais espaço para a elaboração de regras
morais no utilitarismo de Mill, quando comparado ao utilitarismo
de Bentham. Contudo, para que se entenda como a moral no
sistema de Bentham distingue-se da moral no sistema de Mill, é
necessário ter uma clara noção da natureza humana dos indivíduos
de ambos os autores e dos respectivos princípios de utilidade que
derivam destas distintas noções de natureza humana, pois o
conceito de moralidade de cada autor decorre das respectivas ideias
de natureza humana e do princípio de utilidade de tais autores.
This article investigates the naturalisation of the Bible. Three voices are of special importance in the narrative presented in this article; they are Aristotle (384–322 BC), Rene Descartes (1596–1650) and Baruc Spinoza (1632–1677). This article will investigate the scientific method and metaphysics espoused by each of the three scholars, thereby highlighting changes in scientific method and metaphysics that lead to the naturalisation of the Bible. Firstly, Aristotle pioneered a scientific method (his logic) that would dominate for centuries, as well as a highly influential metaphysics. Secondly, Descartes, witnessing the horrors of the Thirty Years War and seeing first-hand the new discoveries that brought about the scientific revolution, reacted against Aristotle’s metaphysics. Ironically he then used Aristotle’s scientific method to provide a foundation for the new science resulting in Descartes’s famous dualism. Thirdly, Spinoza, equally horrified by the amount of religious violence of his time, reacts against Descartes’s dualism, providing scholars with a monist metaphysics that would contribute greatly to the naturalisation of the Bible. This article will be relevant to theologians who wish to engage more fully with contemporary Western culture.