Eunice Magalhães, Ariadne Leite, Joana Almeida
et al.
Evidence suggests that secondary victimization exacerbates the impact of sexual violence and undermines victim recovery. This study aims to a) provide evidence of the validity and reliability of the Secondary Victimization Scale (SVS) and b) test the mediating role of empathy in the relationship between personality and secondary victimization. A sample of 285 Portuguese adults (aged 18-75, 86% females) completed an online survey. The original three-dimensional structure of the SVS was retained, and appropriate reliability was found – Minimising of Suffering (α = .87), Victim Blaming (α = .89), and Victim Avoidance (α = .85). High SVS scores were associated with greater endorsement of sexual violence beliefs and higher social dominance. Indirect effects of empathy on the relationship between agreeableness, openness to experience, and secondary victimization were also found. The SVS is a valid and reliable measure that enables further cross-cultural studies on secondary victimization. Raising social awareness of sexual violence is critical to protect victims and prevent secondary victimization.
Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law, Psychology
Il contributo analizza la sentenza n. 3693/2023 con cui il TAR Lazio ha accolto la domanda di ostensione di un documento della FIGC, che era stata sostanzialmente negata all’istante da parte della CoViSoc. L’articolo si sofferma in particolare sull’analisi della natura delle federazioni sportive e sulla natura degli atti posti in essere dalla società di vigilanza derivanti dai poteri attribuitegli dal sistema predisposto dalla l. 91/1981, analizzando anche l’applicabilità della c.d. pregiudiziale sportiva ex art. 3 della l. 280/2003 ai procedimenti volti all’ottenimento dell’accesso agli atti ai sensi della l. 241/1990. L’autore ripercorre la genesi e la metamorfosi di questi tre istituti al fine di mettere in luce alcune carenze della Giustizia Sportiva, evidenziando i rischi di ulteriori e più pervadenti interventi dello Stato in caso di mancata introduzione e di mancato ammodernamento di alcuni istituti nel sistema sportivo.
Mulla Sadra has based his philosophical system on a number of principles, which will have important implications for each of them; the most important of which is the "Originality of Being", whose belief will lead to the adoption of the well-known theory of "unity of existence"; A view that is based on the denial of the full difference. On the other hand, the basis of "Hierarchy of existence" is one of the pillars of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, which plays a major role in explaining the plural theory of the beings of the universe. Sadra has attempted to explain two of the aforementioned foundations that do not fall into the paradox of the unity and plurality; what has made him successful for the first time in providing a rational explanation of the theory of “Multiplicity While Unity” is his particular reading of the theory of unity of existence using the viewpoint of Hierarchy of existence that is formed in the context of the two bases of the Originality of Being and the existence of a disabled interface.
Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law
Asumiendo la visión propia del paradigma constitucionalista, este trabajo pretende ofrecer argumentos, analizando tanto el marco normativo internacional como interno, para justificar que los dictámenes de los órganos de Tratados de Naciones Unidas tienen un valor más que meramente recomendatorio y que el Estado español está obligado a tomarlos en consideración y permitir sus efectos en el Derecho interno. Asimismo, incluye propuestas orientadas a posibilitar la implementación de los dictámenes en el sistema jurídico español.
Авторы статьи ставили цель дать сравнительно-правовой анализ доктрины «снятия корпоративной вуали» в контексте законодательства и судебной практики Российской Федерации и некоторыхазиатских стран (Китайская Народная Республика, Индийская Республика). В процессе изучения данной проблемы сделан вывод о наличии в иностранном законодательстве сходных с российскими нормо запрете использования правового статуса компании с целью злоупотребления правом, о запрете аффилированности, а также дискуссионной нормы о полной солидарной ответственности единственного учредителя общества с ограниченной ответственностью. Кроме того, сделан вывод о всё болеешироком использовании данной доктрины в стране нетипичной для неё правовой семьи — Китайской Народной Республике. На основе материалов судебной практики Индийской Республики предложена классификация данной доктрины по критерию цели злоупотребления: в случае ограниченного подхода ответственность на контролирующих лиц возлагается в случае изначально фиктивнойцели создания юридического лица, а в случае неограниченного подхода — за любое недобросовестное действие с использованием конструкции ограниченной ответственности учредителя (участника) компании по её долгам.
Comparative law. International uniform law, Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law
The free flow of information and ideas is a core part of any thought on democracy and is essential for the successful respect of human rights. It has the potential to cause human rights violations to occur in secret, there is no way to reveal a corrupt and inefficient government, and many other things. Based on this background, this research is based on the formulation of the problem 1) Philosophical Basis of Public Bodies as Public Information Providing Institutions in the Era of Public Information Openness; 2) Existence of the Information Commission as Administrator and Law Enforcer in Public Information Disclosure; 3) Public Entity's Liability Against Disputes Public Information From the Aspects of Administrative Law, Civil Law and Criminal Law. This research is a legal research (legal research). The approach in this research is a statutory, conceptual, and case approach. The conclusions of this study include: Freedom of information is the spirit of democratization that offers freedom, but in this freedom the state can function itself effectively and efficiently without neglecting democratic principles. The effective enactment of the UU KIP in Indonesia starting April 30, 2010 opened a new era of public information disclosure in the country. The enactment of this law is part of the implementation of the spirit of transparency as the fulfillment of citizens' human rights to know public information (right to know) guaranteed by Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
Private international law. Conflict of laws, Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law
While Law & Emotions movement made large waves in the international academic community in the last 30 years, it remains virtually unknown in Poland. However, applying perspectives of this multidisciplinary research enterprise in Polish law and jurisprudence could yield promising results. As the field is vast and consists of many voices, an attempt at consolidating its findings and demonstrating their relevance is needed. The objective of the text is thus to provide a cross-section of this influential movement and point out why it potentially revolutionizes thinking about law. To this end, the text analyses a body of works dealing with the relationship between law and emotion, evaluates their usefulness and presents the finding across a range of potential implications for: theory and philosophy of law, study of constitutional law and lawmaking, particular doctrines of law and knowledge about emotions of legal actors.
In Recognizing Wrongs, Goldberg and Zipursky provide what is, effectively, a highly readable conspectus of roughly two decades’ worth of first rate tort theory. The breadth and depth of learning on offer in this book is as impressive as it is skilfully deployed. The sources upon which the authors draw traverse American constitutional legal history, English legal history, moral philosophy, political philosophy, analytical jurisprudence as well as, predictably enough, various schools of late twentiethand early twenty-first-century tort theory. Their obvious comfort within each of these fields, while by no means over-played, comes through loud and clear as the theses they advance are frequently fortified by recourse to this diverse range of material. And yet, for all of the sophistication and (in places) subtlety of their arguments, the text of this book remains somehow admirably accessible: readers will find here nothing dense or impenetrably recondite. This counts for a lot, for I suspect there will be many readers, besides myself, who will not be especially well-versed in matters of American constitutional law, or law and economics, or legal history or political theory. Nor is there a danger of getting lost in the thickets of voluminous footnotes that so often characterise American legal scholarship and which not infrequently push to the extreme one’s powers of understanding and patience. Indeed, one of the most striking features of this book is the paucity of footnotes. The result is something that comes as close to being a “page-turner” as a work of legal theory is ever likely to get. As to its substance, the book contains not just one theory, but two. The authors are, of course, synonymous with (indeed best known as the architects of) civil recourse theory; and Part I of the book is devoted to this. Part II, by contrast, sets out a theory of torts: that is, a theory concerning “the type of wrong that triggers the civil recourse principle” (p. 341). Of course, the two theories fit tightly together. Indeed, the authors in fact regard them as forming a single, integrated “constitutive justice theory of tort law” (p. 354). But the fact remains that their civil recourse theory is “a theory of tort law’s structure and the place of private rights of action within it” (p. 230), while their theory of torts concentrates on the particular wrongs of tort law and conceives of torts as “legally recognized, injury-inclusive, and relational wrongs” (p. 4). To my mind, it is more helpful to think of a theory about the type of redress available as being separate from a theory concerning the types of wrongs that trigger the power to pursue such redress. Indeed, by the authors’ own admission, “the civil recourse principle does not itself provide an account of tort law’s wrongs” (p. 230). Accordingly, the elaboration of the two theories in separate parts of the book appears to have more going for it than the interesting, but not (in my view) very helpful suggestion that they combine to form a single, amalgamated, “constitutive justice theory”. But already I am getting ahead of myself, drifting into the discussion of material that does not appear until the closing pages of this book. I shall therefore backtrack to Part I, for there are several observations that I should like to make about their civil recourse theory. To begin with, two huge compliments are in order. Although the authors have written very extensively about various aspects of civil recourse over the last 20 years, there is (despite this being a fairly common phenomenon) no mere, lazy recycling of material here. Naturally, to anyone familiar with the authors’ Cambridge Law Journal, 80(1), March 2021, pp. 184–208
Why does contemporary jurisprudence have so little to say about law and gender? I think that is because gender is not relevant to theories of the nature of law. Joanne Conaghan disagrees. She says the methods of analytic philosophy screen out gender by abstracting concepts from social contexts, smuggling in hidden values, and ignoring empirical evidence. My own work on the law of marriage is said to exemplify this. But Conaghan is comprehensively mistaken in her diagnosis. She misunderstands analytic jurisprudence, misunderstands the relation between sex and gender, and misunderstands the role of social facts in legal philosophy. Feminist legal theory is made poorer if it accepts the caricature she offers. Legal scholars should be more open to the contributions of analytic philosophy to feminist inquiry.
A research on the relation between sufism, sharia, and the local culture is essential for some reasons. First, Islamic philosophy and customary law (or the law of the peoples) are perceived as opposing each other. Second, Islamic philosophy, also in Geertz’s theory, regards Islam merely as the structure of religious orthodoxy. Third: the structure of Islamic orthodoxy, often portrayed as a highly rigid one, is often (seen as) conflicting with sufism in the world of Islamic scholarship. This paper aims to determine the dynamic relation between the spiritual values of Sufism and traditional values surviving in the so-called Nusantara legal culture. It also elaborates on the extent to which a distinct epistemology typical to sufism may contribute to enriching the cultural space of Nusantara law. As normative legal research, this paper employs the principle of legal culture developed by Lawrence M. Friedman. It concludes that the spiritual values of sufism are not conflicting with the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. It would also argue that the construction of Nusantara legal culture has a unique character resulted from dynamic interaction of traditional values, on the one hand, and sufism on the other.
Punishing people for crimes depends upon aims the penal system should go after. This is a field of inquiry always actual and sensitive. The present volume contains contributions of acknowledged experts in jurisprudence, criminal law theory, criminology and penology. It focuses on a variety of the most recent streams of thought as to the philosophy of punishment, on international and interdisciplinary criminal law issues, on the role criminal sanctions play as well as on law comparative issues concerning Cyprus and Greece. The theoretical part presents vistas relative to the relationship of criminal law and politics, whereas the international/interdisciplinary criminal justice discourse touches upon topics like EU and international criminal law, organized crime, sentencing, correctional policy and transitional justice. The comparative part deals with crucial sectors of applied discourse as to punishment like suspension of imprisonment, life term, penology problems and problems of specific sanctions like confiscation. The volume contributes thus to a comprehensive updating of the respective academic discussion.
This book addresses the relevance of the state of exception for the analysis of law; whilst reflecting on the deeper symbolic and jurisprudential significance of the coalescence between law and force. The concept of the state of exception has become a central topos in political and legal philosophy as well as in critical theory. The theoretical apparatus of the state of exception sharply captures the uneasy relationship between law, life and politics in the contemporary global setting, while also challenging the comforting narratives that uncritically connect democracy with the tradition of the rule of law. Drawing on critical legal theory, continental jurisprudence, political philosophy and history, this book explores the genealogy of the concept of the state of exception and reflects on its legal embodiment in past and present contexts – including Weimar and Nazi Germany, contemporary Europe and Turkey. In doing so, it explores the disruptive force of the exception for legal and political thought, as it recuperates its contemporary critical potential. The book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of jurisprudence, philosophy and critical legal theory.
The work of Jerzy Wróblewski has had a huge impact not only on the theory and philosophy of law, both in Poland and internationally, but also on the whole of jurisprudence, especially the fields of doctrinal legal research and the practical application of the law (in particular on adjudication). The aim of this study is to present one of Wróblewski’s most influential concepts, namely the theoretical model of judicial interpretation, from the point of view of axiology and epistemology in the field of jurisprudence.
One of the Mulla Sadra’s basic principles to demonstrate man’s corporeal resurrection is attention to the place of the faculty of imagination. He explains the nature of the faculty of imagination and believes the necessity of its continuity after death. One of the fundamental functions of the faculty of imagination is the image of corporeal essence of man in intermediary world which based on Mulla Sadra’s belief, spiritual resurrection comes true in this world. Some believes that Mulla Sadra has also generalized the function and the role of the faculty of imagination in intermediary world to Doomsday arena. The creation of other-worldly body is carried out by the faculty of imagination and innovation of soul. Consequently, corporeal resurrection considered by Mulla Sadra is an imaginal body which is not consistency with traditional arguments. With his amazing by this interpretation, Mulla Sadra expressed his objection with gathering of other-worldly bodies in the mould of an imaginal body. He distinguishes between the function of the faculty of imagination in intermediary world and Doomsday arena and maintains gathering of bodies from graves and the blowing of spirits in them by angles. Through relying on rational arguments and citing some of Mulla Sadra terms, this paper demonstrates that the function of the faculty of imagination in intermediary world is different from that one in Doomsday arena and it has no role in creation of other-worldly body.
Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law
A century ago the pragmatists called for reconstruction in philosophy. Philosophy at the time was occupied with conceptual analysis, abstractions, a priori analysis, and the pursuit of necessary, universal truths. Pragmatists argued that philosophy instead should center on the pressing problems of the day, which requires theorists to pay attention to social complexity, variation, change, power, consequences, and other concrete aspects of social life. The parallels between philosophy then and jurisprudence today are striking, as I show, calling for a pragmatism-informed theory of law within contemporary jurisprudence. The realistic theory outlined in this essay focuses on what law does, what law is used for, what people think of law, how they act in relation to law, and what the social consequences of law are. It portrays law as a complex of institutions that evolve over time in connection with surrounding social, cultural, economic, political, technological, and ecological factors. Drawing on pragmatism, this essay sets forth the epistemological, ontological, and methodological aspects of the realistic theory of law, along with a sampling of insights that differ from or challenge widely held positions within jurisprudence. The topics covered, in order, are pragmatism, reconstruction in jurisprudence, naturalism, historicism and holism, social construction of law, and instrumentalism, power, and ideals.
The article discusses the subject of Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence with particular emphasis on the concept of social engineering, as well as the use of law as a tool through which the assumptions of this concept are implemented. The article also presents the key concepts of social engineering, specifically the theory of social interests, defined by R. Pound, and the theory of social development stages, which theories form the basis which enables the assumptions of social engineering to be implemented. The article also presents the sources of inspiration that R. Pound was guided by in the process of developing his theories. The concept of social engineering is compared to the theories of Leon Petrażycki, Alf Ross, and Karl Popper. The benefits and threats of social engineering are also indicated. The conclusions touch upon the subject of the topicality of R. Pound’s philosophy in the context of contemporary democracy and the potential threats to civil liberties that could flow from the implementation of the assumptions of R. Pound’s philosophy.
Resumen: La Convención sobre los Derechos de los Niños incorpora los derechos de participación al elenco de derechos e insiste en la realización del derecho a ser escuchado porque consolidan una nueva imagen del niño como sujeto de derecho. Esa escucha del menor de edad en sede judicial, cuando ha cometido un delito, debe permitirle sentirse partícipe del proceso y que el juicio sea percibido como justo y las medidas entendidas como legítimas. Dada la trascendencia de esta escucha, es importante analizar cómo se realiza y qué sentido se le da en la declaración del menor ante la policía o la fiscalía.
Abstract: The Convention on Children's Rights incorporates the rights of participation to the list of rights and insists on the realization of the right to be heard because they consolidate a new image of the child as a subject of law. That hearing of the minor in juvenile justice, when he/she has committed a crime, should allow him/her to participate of the process and perceive the trial as fair and the measures as justified. Given the importance of this hearing, it is important to analyze how it is done and the meaning of it in the declaration of the minor before the police or the prosecutor's office.