I study symmetric competitions in which each player chooses an arbitrary distribution over a one-dimensional performance index, subject to a convex cost. I establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium, document various properties it must possess, and provide a characterization via the first-order approach. Manifold applications--to R&D competition, oligopolistic competition with product design, and rank-order contests--follow.
This model offers a compelling explanation for the observed decline in fertility rates in developed countries, correlating it with the rising economic status of women, and thereby providing valuable insights for policy-making. In summary, through a game theory model, we identify the rising economic status of women as the underlying cause of low fertility rates in modern developed countries.
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations exhibit same-side complementarity and cross-side substitutability. Our results apply to pick-side matching problems and membership competition in online duopoly markets.
I provide a sufficient condition under which a principal does not benefit from committing to a mechanism in economic models represented by a maximisation problem under constraints. These problems include mechanism design, principal-agent models or sender-receiver games. In principal-agent problems, this condition holds if the agent has a finite strategy space and the principal's value function is continuous in the mechanism.
A natural way of quantifying the ``amount of information'' in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.
Cripps, Ely, Mailath and Samuelson (2008) showed that if there are finitely many states, and the signals are i.i.d and finite, then individual learning is sufficient for common learning. In this note we describe what is commonly learned when this sufficient condition does not hold.
By embedding uncertainty into time, we obtain a conjoint axiomatic characterization of both Exponential Discounting and Subjective Expected Utility that accommodates arbitrary state and outcome spaces. In doing so, we provide a novel and simple time-interpretation of subjective probability. The subjective probability of an event is calibrated using time discounting.
We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the market is concave. We provide a class of concave markets. In the proof of the existence theorem, we use Scarf's algorithm to find a stable schedule matching, which is of independent interest.
Following the decision-theoretic approach to game theory, we extend the analysis of Epstein & Wang and of Di Tillio from hierarchies of preference relations to hierarchies of choice functions. We then construct the universal choice structure containing all these choice hierarchies, and show how the universal preference structure of Di Tillio is embedded in it.
In a New Keynesian model where the trade-off between stabilising the aggregate inflation rate and the output gap arises from sectoral asymmetries, the gains from commitment are either zero or negligible. Thus, to the extent that economic fluctuations are caused by sectoral shocks, policies designed to overcome the stabilisation bias are aiming to correct an unimportant problem.
I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent's preferences to be represented by a unique ergodic transformation. Put differently, if an agent seeks to maximize the time average growth of their wealth, what axioms must their preferences obey? By answering this, I provide economic theorists a clear view of where "Ergodicity Economics" deviates from established models.
This document contains all proofs omitted from our working paper 'Screening for breakthroughs'; specifically, the March 2025 version of the paper (arXiv:2011.10090v9).
McCall (1970) examines the search behaviour of an infinitely-lived and risk-neutral job seeker maximizing her lifetime earnings by accepting or rejecting real-valued scalar wage offers. In practice, job offers have multiple attributes, and job seekers solve a multicriteria search problem. This paper presents a multicriteria search model and new comparative statics results.
This is a general competitive analysis paper. A model is presented that describes how an individual with a physical disability, or mobility impairment, would go about utility maximization. These results are then generalized. Subsequently, a selection of disability policies from Canada and the United States are compared to the insights of the model, and it is shown that there are sources of inefficiency in many North American disability support systems.
In this paper we characterize the niveloidal preferences that satisfy the Weak Order, Monotonicity, Archimedean, and Weak C-Independence Axioms from the point of view of an intra-personal, leader-follower game. We also show that the leader's strategy space can serve as an ambiguity aversion index.
AbstractThe American debate over free trade and protectionism has taken many forms, but it is particularly instructive when it occurs within a single sector of the economy, pitting allied economic interests against each other. That occurred in the shipping industry in the 19th century when shippers and shipbuilders fought each other over trade‐related questions: subsidies for shipbuilding and reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations. Shipbuilders wanted protection and subsidies; shippers wanted the freedom to make use of cheaper foreign vessels for trade and to develop trade agreements. We show how these opposing forces stymied each other and prevented the shipping industry from taking an active, unified role in national politics. These particular intra‐industry debates reveal broader divisions within the business community over the relationship between business and government under modern commercial capitalism.