This essay aims to interpret Ernst Jünger’s book Der Waldgang through the conceptual contraposition between exile and dwelling. It analyses the idea of Waldgang as an act of exile carried out by an individual in relation to the menaces produced by the power in the contemporary era, which exile individuals from their existence. The exile of the Waldgang is considered in its essential link to the «metaphysical power of humankind». The implications of the Waldgang for the human action and politics are taken into consideration to show how Jünger recognizes in it a way for the mankind to dwell anew in the world.
This article seeks to challenge what may seem to be an obvious assertion: that finitude is original in the sense that it must be presupposed that any possible meaning can only be thought beginning from this finitude. I do this through a rereading of Derrida’s epochal essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” which perhaps is the most decisive interpretation of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. In the essay, Derrida demonstrates how Levinas is forced to betray his own intentions in his attempt to describe the Other as transcendent. By making use of a newly published lecture series, Derrida held at the same time as writing the essay, I show how Derrida’s reading of Levinas is intimately tied to his interpretation of Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, and how both Levinas and Derrida end up in the paradox I call “original finitude.” I then show how new commentary literature on Levinas’ analysis of enjoyment gives us an alternative to Derrida’s notion of original finitude. I do not propose that this alternative overcomes Derrida’s problematic, but rather that it gives another option of how to relate to that which escapes the grasp of philosophy. The key difference will be whether transcendence is conceived as a failure of philosophy or its excess.
References to Dmitrii Anichkov’s Annotationes in logicam, metaphysicam et cosmologiam (1782) regularly appear in literature on Russian book history. However, this publication not only did not exist, but could not exist. Anichkov, following the classification put forth by Christian Wolf and Friedrich Baumeister, regarded cosmology as part of metaphysics. In fact, Anichkov’s textbook, entitled Annotationes in logicam et metaphysicam, which was published in 1782 and 1783, included two volumes that ontology and cosmology respectively. Both are yet to be explored.
History of Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
Modern mathematical physics often claims to make philosophy obsolete. This presentation aims to show that the modern concept of wisdom fundamentally diverges with the thinking of Descartes, that, strictly speaking, at least in his metaphysical first principles, if not in his chief aim, he may be a sophist and no philosopher at all. Descartes denies the classical understanding of philosophy and thereby reduces the human person to an intellect separate from the body. Descartes initiated a popular understanding of sophistry that reverberates to today in our modern institutions of philosophy and science. But St. Thomas Aquinas anticipated this divergence and gave a defense of true wisdom in his writing against Averroes. This presentation concludes with what constitutes real philosophy and science as presented by St. Thomas Aquinas, namely sense wonder that creates a search for the true knowledge of the unity responsible for true causes of true effects. For a true restoration of philosophy and science we will need a reemergence and recovery of this understanding of wisdom.
<p>The foundations of reductions in the Guayra region followed a methodology based on the understanding of the way of being of indigenous groups. In this context there was absolute respect for the typologies of indigenous spaces and the pre-existing conformity of social hierarchies. This was made possible essentially by the understand-ing of Guarani language and that of the Gualachos or Ibirajaras. Understanding the meaning of a word could be the difference between life and death. The Jesuits and the Indians exchanged knowledge. The technological contribution was important, essential-ly the iron wedges. But it was also the implementation of agricultural techniques and, therefore, the realization of new crops such as sugar cane and cotton. To realize these innovations it was necessary to know the earth, the water and the plants. The introduc-tion of cattle with the provision of milk and the manufacture of butter and cheeses sub-stantially modified the diet. The construction of roads changed the structure of space. What was the ideology that supported the organization of space?<br />We think that there was a philosophy of conformation of the missionary space as a sum of places that can be linked with the ideas of Leibniz. Although this one broke in a few years later in the world of the ideas we maintain that some concepts of the metaphysics of the space of this author could be instrumented some years before in the formation of the Jesuits in the level of the noviciado or later. To continuously fold and unfold the subregions, that is what we call successive approximations. We will analyze these no-tions and the role of Father Joseph Cataldini in his conformation.</p>
This paper aims to explore and compare the metaphysical entailments of the conventional psychopharmacological approach in the treatment of depression to those of a psychedelic approach. We will examine the thesis by which knowledge of how drugs act upon us shapes our self-image and our understanding of psychopathology––and defend that this process can only take place in a supportive environment. It is commonly claimed that the nature of depression was shaped after the therapeutic success of antidepressants; nevertheless, psychedelic drugs were at least as successful as antidepressants, and they didn’t end up having the same power to influence our views. It was possible for first and second-generation antidepressants to influence our views because of a supportive environment, where social, political, economic and even metaphysical issues were at play to create that result. We will compare the unfolding of the two paradigms elicited by these two kinds of drugs, one where pills are seen as magic bullets aimed to restore biochemical balance, and another where drugs are seen as therapeutic tools capable of inducing a life-changing experience, provided there is an adequate context. We will review different factors that contributed to the establishment of a reductionist paradigm, such as the aspirations of psychiatry and the assumed objectivity of biologically oriented explanations. Finally, we will reflect on the new paradigm that unfolds with contemporary research.
Among medieval Aristotelians, William of Ockham defends a minimalist account of artifacts, assigning to statues and houses and beds a unity that is merely spatial or locational rather than metaphysical. Thus, in contrast to his predecessors, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, he denies that artifacts become such by means of an advening ‘artificial form’ or ‘form of the whole’ or any change that might tempt us to say that we are dealing with a new thing ('res'). Rather, he understands artifacts as per accidens composites of parts that differ, but not so much that only divine power could unite them, as in the matter and form of a proper substance. For Ockham, artifacts are essentially rearrangements, via human agency, of already existing things, like the clay shaped by a sculptor into a statue or the stick and bristles and string one might fashion into a broom. Ockham does not think that a new thing is thereby created, although his emphasis on the contribution of human artisans seems to leave questions about the ontological status of their agency open. In any case, there are no such things as natural statues, any more than there could be substances created by human artifice.
Language in a broad sense becomes imperative for communication to ensue. Language considered as a system of signs and signification is achieved through a process involving sign relations, e.g. semiosis. Charles S. Peirce’s Theory of Signs can provide a basic framework for the elucidation of the intelligibility of signs. Furthermore, the ability for generating sign processes in an organized manner is determined by what Thomas A. Sebeok designates as an organism’s modeling capacity. Modeling capacities range from primitive to complex, thus generating three orders of language corresponding to language as a Primary Modeling System (PMS), a Secondary Modeling System (SMS) and a Tertiary Modeling System (TMS). This Peirce-Sebeok framework for communication, which John Deely places as “postmodern,” is premised upon what he designates as the suprasubjective nature of sign relations and their equally suprasubjective function. Thus, Sebeok’s Modeling Theory together with Peirce’s doctrine on the nature and behavior of signs can be used to direct the generation as well as the interpretation of language systems in accordance with the ultimate norm of communication, that is, to reflect truth as an icon of reality.
Gilles Deleuze’s thought is uniquely placed at the interface of post-structuralism and the speculative/ontological turn which marked the humanities in general and continental philosophy in particular at the beginning of the twenty-first century. On the one hand, Deleuze shares with his post-structuralist contemporaries the commitment to Nietzsche’s project of overturning Platonism and the critique of representation. On the other hand, while post-structuralism for the most part unfolded under the aegis of Heidegger’s pronouncements on the end of philosophy and the overcoming of metaphysics, for Deleuze the critique of representation constitutes the necessary condition for the reaffirmation of philosophy’s rights to metaphysical speculation. In this respect, Deleuze can be regarded as an important predecessor to the speculative/ontological turn. Therefore an engagement with Deleuze’s thought presents an opportunity to better understand the current conjuncture
in the humanities. This paper presents an account of Deleuze’s critique of representation by tracing his argument against representation and in favour of intuitive knowledge and speculative metaphysics through a close reading of a few select and particularly revealing places in Deleuze’s early writings. The conclusion then places this discussion of Deleuze’s thought in the context of the recent turn in the humanities and continental philosophy away from post-structuralism and towards speculative realism.
The article aims at demonstrating that, by his teaching on human person and his action, St. John Paul II (also known as Karol Wojtyła) implicitly contributed to a resolution of the most serious problem of contemporary philosophy, which consists in separating wisdom from love and substituting wisdom with understanding or knowledge. The author concludes that John Paul II makes a persuasive contribution to recover philosophy as the love of wisdom by (1) identifying truth in the area of freedom, self-fulfillment and conscience, and (2) appealing to man’s honesty and happiness.
Inspired by selected passages from Wendell Berry’s story “A Place in Time,” the article discusses Étienne Gilson’s essay “The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics” with a special regard to the relation of habits to metaphysics. The basis of this relation is human being whose life, from the perspective of Augustinian metaphysics, is permanently unsettled. Man is the one mortal being whose perfection does not come with his being, but only with his own input into what it already is. Habits, then, prefect an already constituted human being in what he or she is. Man is not born, however, with habits, but acquires them through acts of the virtues or vices. The article develops the Augustinian idea according to which the moral effort of man to pursue virtues and escape vices results not so much from his natural desire of ‘beatitude’, but rather from the fact of being led to God by God.
This paper aims at questioning the role of image and imagination in Descartes’ Metaphysics, especially in the Meditations on First Philosophy, by holding both a certain doctrinal or theoretical discourse on image/imagination and the Cartesian use of images/imagination. Besides the fact that this rarely considered perspective prevents from freezing the original text, this strategy allows to highlight the ambiguity of theses notions, revealed through what is doing by the act of imagining compared to the act of conceiving with the understanding.
<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> Solipsism, which is set up by a very influential modern philosopher Immanuel Kant, constitutes one main characteristic of modern philosophy and thought. In the realm on metaphysics, it has brought down the meaning of reality. In epistemological perspective, it has caused modern man to live and think in an isolated mental world that is alienated from objective reality. In the levels of ethics and psychology, it paves the way for flourishing any kind of self-centered standpoint and attitude such as individualism, egoism, racism, and anthropocentrism in the context of human and universe relation. We however find another kind of solipsism in the context of theology and religion (focused on Muslim community). Neo-Salafi Wahhabi puritanism that appears to claim its doctrine as a purified version of Islamic teachings and tradition is essentially an elimination and alienation of Islamic Ummah from transcendent reality, universe, history, humanity, and civilization. Similar to Kantian ontological assumption, Wahhabi insists to believe in transcendent reality with denial of the gates and ways of understanding the reality as well as with removal the keys of revealing reality. Both Kant and Wahhabi reject the capability of human reason to grasp and understand the transcendent reality.</p><p><em>Keywords : Agnosticism, noumenalism, phenomenalism, solipsism, Kant, Wahhabi, onto-epistemological solipsism, onto-theological solipsism, intellectuality, spiritual intelligence.</em></p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Solipsisme, yang dirumuskan oleh tokoh filsuf modern Immanuel Kant, merupakan salah satu karakter utama filsafat dan pemikiran modern. Pada level metafisis, ia telah memiskinkan wawasan manusia modern terhadap realitas. Sementara pada level epistemologis, ia telah memenjarakan manusia modern dalam dunia subyektif mental belaka yang terisolasi dari realitas obyektif dan bahkan terasing dari realitas kemanusiaannya sendiri. Dalam wilayah praktis, yaitu psikologis dan etis, solipsisme melahirkan dan menyuburkan berbagai bentuk self-centered view seperti individualisme, egoisme, rasisme, dan juga antroposentrisme dalam konteks hubungan manusia dengan kosmos. Pandangan yang amat mirip dengan solipsisme modern tersebut juga ditemukan di sebagian umat beragama (Islam) yang mengusung gerakan pemurnian oleh kaum neo-Salafi Wahabi. Setelah mengisolasi dan memutuskan hubungan onto-epistemologis manusia dengan realitas transenden, keduanya – Kant dan Wahabi – menolak kapabilitas rasional manusia untuk mencerap dan memahami realitas transenden.</p><p><em>Kata kunci : Agnostisisme, noumenalisme, fenomenalisme, solipsisme, Kant, Wahabi, solipsistik onto-epistemologis, solipsistik onto-teologis, kecerdasan simbolik dan spiritual.</em></p></div>
According to Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Avrum Stroll, there are compelling reasons for talking about a “third Wittgenstein” whose corpus would be made up of all the works written by the Viennese philosopher following 1946, including the second part of his Philosophical Investigations. The main reasons are the description of a new form of foundationalism in which foundational items and the items which rest upon them do not belong to the same category; the grammaticalization of experience; the dissolution of the mind-body problem, and the demystification of scepticism. In this paper, I will not only analyze these arguments, but I will also bear in mind the main differences between the so-called “first” and “second Wittgenstein” to conclude that it doesn’t make sense to talk about a “third Wittgenstein”.