Hasil untuk "Political institutions and public administration (General)"

S. Greer, E. King, E. M. da Fonseca et al.

ABSTRACT COVID-19 has created a ramifying public health, economic, and political crisis throughout many countries in the world. While globally the pandemic is at different stages and far from under control in some countries, now is the time for public health researchers and political scientists to start understanding how and why governments responded the way they have, explore how effective these responses appear to be, and what lessons we can draw about effective public health policymaking in preparation of the next wave of COVID-19 or the next infectious disease pandemic. We argue that there will be no way to understand the different responses to COVID-19 and their effects without understanding policy and politics. We propose four key focuses to understand the reasons for COVID-19 responses: social policies to crisis management as well as recovery, regime type (democracy or autocracy), formal political institutions (federalism, presidentialism), and state capacity (control over health care systems and public administration). A research agenda to address the COVID-19 pandemic that takes politics as a serious focus can enable the development of more realistic, sustainable interventions in policies and shape our broader understanding of the politics of public health.

Jeffrey R. Lax, J. Phillips

Leopoldo Abad Alcalá

La transparencia y la rendición de cuentas, consustanciales al Estado democrático, adquieren una nueva dimensión con la generalización del uso de la Inteligencia Artificial, especialmente por las denominadas VLOP (Very Large Online Platforms). El presenta trabajo aborda como la gestión de los contenidos realizadas por estas plataformas puede incidir en la configuración del espacio público, modificando gran parte de las instituciones políticas esenciales del Estado democrático. En este sentido, realizamos un aproximación conceptual, normativa y jurisprudencial a la transparencia algorítmica, con diversas propuestas que parten de su consideración como una nueva forma de acceso a la información en el contexto de la IA. La transparencia algorítmica es aplicable a los poderes públicos (como vemos en la reciente sentencia Bosco aquí analizada) pero también a las VLOP, actuando como instrumento de salvaguarda del Estado democrático en el nuevo ecosistema digital.

Rafael-Petruţ Gardoş

Recent advances in generative image models have enabled the creation of highly realistic political deepfakes, posing risks to information integrity, public trust, and democratic processes. While automated deepfake detectors are increasingly deployed in moderation and investigative pipelines, most existing systems provide only point predictions and fail to indicate when outputs are unreliable, being an operationally critical limitation in high-stakes political contexts. This work investigates conditional, uncertainty-aware political deepfake detection using stochastic convolutional neural networks within an empirical, decision-oriented reliability framework. Rather than treating uncertainty as a purely Bayesian construct, it is evaluated through observable criteria, including calibration quality, proper scoring rules, and its alignment with prediction errors under both global and confidence-conditioned analyses. A politically focused binary image dataset is constructed via deterministic metadata filtering from a large public real-synthetic corpus. Two pretrained CNN backbones (ResNet-18 and EfficientNet-B4) are fully fine-tuned for classification. Deterministic inference is compared with single-pass stochastic prediction, Monte Carlo dropout with multiple forward passes, temperature scaling, and ensemble-based uncertainty surrogates. Evaluation reports ROC-AUC, thresholded confusion matrices, calibration metrics, and generator-disjoint out-of-distribution performance. Results demonstrate that calibrated probabilistic outputs and uncertainty estimates enable risk-aware moderation policies. A systematic confidence-band analysis further clarifies when uncertainty provides operational value beyond predicted confidence, delineating both the benefits and limitations of uncertainty-aware deepfake detection in political settings.

Natalija Shikova

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to present the role of the Ombudsman in upholding the principles of good governance when protecting and promoting the rights of citizens and other individuals within a democratic framework. The research focuses on the work of the Ombudsman in North Macedonia, examining its activities and its authority over public institutions when acting or failing to act.Design/Methodology/Approach: The research methods applied include desk research, an analysis of documents and reports related to the institutional and legal set-up of the Ombudsman’s office in North Macedonia, and content analysis. To understand the complexities of the Ombudsman’s competencies within the Macedonian institutional set-up, a comparative analysis was conducted, covering examples from the EU and other global contexts. To clarify the findings, semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant officials, including the Ombudsman of North Macedonia and its deputies.Findings: The results of this research indicate that, although the Ombudsman is empowered to protect the human rights and freedoms of individuals or groups when they are violated by state authorities, its efforts to contribute towards the efficient and effective operation of public administration, and to promote the principles of good governance and the right to good administration in North Macedonia, are limited. However, this corresponds with the overall efficiency of the institution and its positionwithin the legal and political system. In general, the institutional response to the Ombudsman’s remarks is weak, as evidenced by missed hearings before the Government, delays in the adoption of its annual reports by Parliament, a lack of public debate, and insufficient implementation of follow-up measures addressing the Ombudsman’s remarks. Furthermore, the Ombudsman institution does not enjoy full independence.Practical Implications: The paper is based on research conducted in 2023/2024 and provides clear and structured recommendations for the improvement of the Ombudsman’s office in North Macedonia, aimed at achieving good governance standards. Due to its practical applicability, the recommendations can serve to improve the work of Ombudsman offices elsewhere in the region and beyond.Originality/Value: This research highlights the role of the Ombudsman in fostering good governance and presents it as a necessary condition for establishing a robust system for the protection of individual rights. Often, the work of the Ombudsman is analysed through its ex officio interventions aimed at protecting rights when violated by state institutions. In this sense, the office intervenes with proposals, suggestions, and recommendations, acting as a guardian of individuals’ rights in relation to public administration. This research presents another perspective on the Ombudsman’s role—often neglected in public discourse—by offering a broader view of its function in upholding democratic standards and good governance principles.

Olha Ivanytska, Lin Sike

This article explores the governance structures of vocational education systems in two countries with fundamentally different political and administrative models—China and Germany. The purpose of the study is to analyze how these systems are shaped by national governance traditions and to identify the institutional characteristics that influence the development of vocational education. The methodological basis of the study includes a comparative approach supported by qualitative research methods. The analysis is structured around three main dimensions: the legal system governing vocational education, the structure of the education system, and the configuration of administrative management. By applying methods of analysis, synthesis, and generalization, the study draws meaningful comparisons between the two country, while identifying patterns and differences that are essential for cross-national learning. The findings of the study reveal that Germany’s vocational education governance is characterized by a decentralized, legally codified structure that grants significant autonomy to regional authorities and industry bodies. The system is underpinned by collaborative arrangements between educational institutions and enterprises, ensuring a strong alignment between training programs and labor market needs. By contrast, China's vocational education system is governed through a centralized administrative model, where policy design and implementation are directed by national-level authorities. Recent reforms have elevated vocational education to a status equal to general education and introduced new mechanisms to encourage school-enterprise collaboration and expand access to higher-level vocational programs. While both countries aim to integrate vocational education into broader development strategies, their methods reflect different priorities and institutional logics. The German model emphasizes systemic continuity and shared governance, whereas the Chinese model highlights strategic planning and centralized policy leadership. These contrasting approaches offer valuable insights into the interplay between education systems and national governance structures.

Ravi Varma Pakalapati, Gary E. Davis

Acts of political violence in the continental United States have increased dramatically in the last decade. For this rise in political violence, we are interested in where and when such incidents occur: how are the locations and times of incidents of political violence distributed across the continental United States, and what can we learn from a detailed examination of these distributions? We find the distribution of locations of political violence is neither uniform nor Poisson random, and that such locations cluster into well-defined geographic regions. Focusing on the county level we find a markedly skewed distribution of county counts of incidents of political violence. Examination of news reports and commentaries provided by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project for the extreme outlier counties reveals compelling political and social background to the reported incidents of political violence. This, together with credible information on the role of social media in fomenting political violence leads us to postulate a field notion of upsetness as a major background to political violence. Using the time stamp on incidents of political violence we constructed a nearest neighbor model to predict future incidents of political violence at specific locations that involved a fatality.

Dong Yang

The divergence in globalization strategies between the US (retrenchment and polarization) and China (expansion) presents a puzzle that traditional distributional theories fail to fully explain. This paper offers a novel framework by conceptualizing the globalized economy as a "Congestible Club Good," leading to a "Fractured Metropolis." We argue that globalization flows ($M$) are constrained by domestic Institutional Capacity ($K$), which is heterogeneous and historically contingent. We introduce the concept of the "Optimization Cutoff": globalization incentivized the US to bypass costly domestic upgrades in favor of global expansion, leading to the long-term neglect of Public Capacity ($K_{Public}$). This historical path created a deep polarization. "Congested Incumbents," reliant on the stagnant $K_{Public}$, experience globalization as chaos ($MC>MB$), while "Insulated Elites" use Private Capacity ($K_{Private}$) to bypass bottlenecks ($MB>MC$). This divergence paralyzes the consensus needed to restore $K_{Public}$, creating a "Capacity Trap" where protectionism becomes the politically rational, yet economically suboptimal, equilibrium. Empirically, we construct an Institutional Congestion Index using textual analysis (2000-2024), revealing an exponential surge in disorder-related keywords (from 272 hits to 1,333). We triangulate this perception with the material failure of $K_{Public}$, such as the 3.7 million case backlog in US immigration courts. Our findings suggest the crisis of globalization is fundamentally a crisis of uneven institutional capacity and the resulting political paralysis.

Kirill Chmel, Eunji Kim, John Marshall et al.

Political apathy and skepticism of traditional authorities are increasingly common, but social media creators (SMCs) capture the public's attention. Yet whether these seemingly-frivolous actors shape political attitudes and behaviors remains largely unknown. Our pre-registered field experiment encouraged Americans aged 18-45 to start following five progressive-minded SMCs on Instagram, TikTok, or YouTube between August and December 2024. We varied recommendations to follow SMCs producing predominantly-political (PP), predominantly-apolitical (PA), or entirely non-political (NP) content, and cross-randomized financial incentives to follow assigned SMCs. Beyond markedly increasing consumption of assigned SMCs' content, biweekly quiz-based incentives increased overall social media use by 10% and made participants more politically knowledgeable. These incentives to follow PP or PA SMCs led participants to adopt more liberal policy positions and grand narratives around election time, while PP SMCs more strongly shaped partisan evaluations and vote choice. PA SMCs were seen as more informative and trustworthy, generating larger effects per video concerning politics. Participants assigned to follow NP SMCs instead became more conservative, consistent with left-leaning participants using social media more when right-leaning content was ascendant. These effects exceed the impacts of traditional campaign outreach and partisan media, demonstrating the importance of SMCs as opinion leaders in the attention economy as well as trust- and volume-based mechanisms of political persuasion.

Jose A. Olmeda

Recensión del libro de Evert A. Lindquist, Michael Howlett, Grace Skogstad, Geneviève Tellier y Paul ‘t Hart, Policy Success in Canada: Cases, Lessons, Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2019, 514 pp.

V. Yemelyanov, Viktoria Andriyash

The article examines the concept and content of the state financial system. It was emphasized that state finance is one of the key and most important spheres of the financial system of the modern state, which must undoubtedly provide appropriate amounts of financial resources to all branches and spheres of state activity and the effective performance of both economic and social functions. The main theoretical approaches to determining their structure are substantiated. Study of the peculiarities of the formation of public finances in foreign countries, their functions and directions of use. An analysis of the state financial systems of leading foreign countries: the USA (as a country with the leading economy in the world) and Germany (a country with a leading economy in Europe), their structures and features was carried out. The purpose of the study is to determine the essence of the state financial system as a whole, to consider approaches to the definition of the essence of the financial system by domestic and foreign scientists, to identify the common features and structural differences of the state financial systems of leading foreign countries, as well as to conduct an analysis of the financial system of politics before and during the COVID- 19 and the war in Ukraine, which showed the socio-economic and political orientation of these countries. As a result of the study, generalizing definitions of the main approaches to defining the financial system were selected. Also, among the general features of the state financial systems of the analyzed countries, the state budget as the main link, and the presence of special extra-budgetary funds, which will allow using the best institutional features in the field of financial policy and regulation of the budget sphere according to priority directions, were found. It has been proven that the state finances are the foundation of stable functioning and the guarantee of the economic development of the country, its further improvement of the material well-being of the population.

Alberto Baccini

The Coalition for Advancing Research Assessment (CoARA) agreement is a cornerstone in the ongoing efforts to reform research evaluation. CoARA advocates for administrative evaluations of research that rely on peer review, supported by responsible metrics, as beneficial for both science and society. Its principles can be critically examined through the lens of Philip Kitcher's concept of well-ordered science in a democratic society. From Kitcher's perspective, CoARA's approach faces two significant challenges: definitions of quality and impact are determined by governments or evaluation institutions rather than emerging from broad public deliberation, and a select group of scientists is empowered to assess research based on these predefined criteria. This creates susceptibility to both the ''tyranny of expertise'' and the ''tyranny of ignorance'' that Kitcher cautions against. Achieving Kitcher's ideal would require limiting administrative evaluations to essential tasks, such as researcher recruitment and project funding, while establishing procedures grounded in principles of fairness.

Mahdi Goldani

Political stability is crucial for the socioeconomic development of nations, particularly in geopolitically sensitive regions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. This study focuses on predicting the political stability index for these six countries using machine learning techniques. The study uses data from the World Banks comprehensive dataset, comprising 266 indicators covering economic, political, social, and environmental factors. Employing the Edit Distance on Real Sequence method for feature selection and XGBoost for model training, the study forecasts political stability trends for the next five years. The model achieves high accuracy, with mean absolute percentage error values under 10, indicating reliable predictions. The forecasts suggest that Oman, the UAE, and Qatar will experience relatively stable political conditions, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain may continue to face negative political stability indices. The findings underscore the significance of economic factors such as GDP and foreign investment, along with variables related to military expenditure and international tourism, as key predictors of political stability. These results provide valuable insights for policymakers, enabling proactive measures to enhance governance and mitigate potential risks.

Orestes Enrique Díaz Rodríguez

Entre 1982 y 2021, treinta y seis mandatarios provenientes de catorce países latinoamericanos que celebran comicios presidenciales competitivos arribaron al inicio de la campaña electoral con una alta aprobación. En veintiséis de los casos el candidato presidencial oficialista se impuso en las urnas. La comprobación empírica arrojó que la aprobación presidencial alta tiende a constituir un predictor mayoritario, aunque no necesariamente contundente, del éxito del partido o coalición de gobierno en las elecciones presidenciales. La variable evidenció un potencial como predictor superior al mostrado por las tasas de crecimiento del producto interno bruto, el desempleo y la inflación, tomadas individual o en conjunto. Corroboramos a su vez, que su dinámica tendió a ser relativamente autónoma, especialmente en los casos en que anticipó de manera efectiva el éxito electoral del oficialismo. El hallazgo puede constituir un punto de partida en la reevaluación de la función voto de la aprobación presidencial en la región y contribuir a la disminución, en ciertos escenarios, de la incertidumbre en torno al desenlace electoral.

Тетяна Доценко, Сергій Шапаренко, Юлія Гуменна

У статті наголошено, що під впливом цифровізації змінюються тенденції устрою сьогоднішнього світу, розширюються можливості суспільства, доступ до інноваційних речей, збільшуючи вимоги споживачів. Підкреслено, що для задоволення потреб населення та бізнесу сучасний світ технологічного розвитку рухається вперед, розширюється, дозволяючи впроваджувати та широко застосовувати зручні, комфортні сервіси телекомунікаційних компаній, спонукаючи розвиток інструментів cashless economy. Відзначено необхідність урахування негативних наслідків їх широкого застосування, що передбачають можливість незаконних дій, шахрайства, розвитку тінізації економіки. Основна мета дослідження – визначити сучасні методики моделювання cashless economy, сервісів телекомунікаційних компаній і тіньової економіки, ураховуючи взаємозв’язки між цими поняттями. У статті проаналізовано літературні надбання сучасних світових і вітчизняних науковців щодо зосередження інтересів учених, які вивчають фінансову сферу, на дослідженні особливостей безготівкової економіки, ролі телекомунікаційних компаній і пов’язаної з ними тінізацією економіки. Актуальність визначення сучасних методик моделювання досліджуваних процесів полягає в тому, що цифрові технології продовжують удосконалюватися і використання інструментів cashless economy, цифрових сервісів телекомунікаційних компаній надалі зростатиме, усе більше споживачів буде реалізовувати цифрові транзакції. І відповідно, зі зростанням обсягів безготівкових операцій посилюється ризик можливих зловживань, шахрайства, зростання тінізації економіки. Дослідження проведене за чотири етапи, які дозволяють визначити різні вектори наукового пошуку. Побудовано структурно-логічну схему взаємозв’язків між досліджуваними поняттями. Висвітлено новітні ефективні методики моделювання cashless economy. Виділено сучасні дієві методики моделювання сервісів телекомунікаційних компаній. Описано сучасні методичні підходи до моделювання тіньової економіки. Як методичний інструментарій дослідження використано теоретичний аналіз літератури, теоретичні методи дослідження (абстрагування, синтез, групування), емпіричні методи дослідження (опис, спостереження), ресурсну базу інформаційної платформи Scopus, дизайнерську платформу Figma. Результати дослідження дозволять керівному персоналові та урядові запровадити більш чіткі та жорсткі нормативні акти щодо безпеки цифрових, безготівкових сервісів, посилити політику безпеки цифрових операцій, покращити конфіденційність даних та інформації, створити для користувачів безготівкових, цифрових послуг безпечніше середовище.

Hugh Stephens

Canada has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis in its relationship to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and its offshoot, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP (comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam). Initially a disinterested and disengaged observer of the developing TPP process back in 2006–09, by 2011–12 Canada underwent a conversion to become a determined, almost desperate suitor seeking to gain entry to the TPP club. It finally succeeded, but a change of government in 2015 led to a re-evaluation of the decision to accede to the TPP, under pressure from anti-globalization forces. Effectively, Canada sat on its hands for over a year until the U.S. had determined its final position. Then, after the TPP’s impending collapse, when the United States under then president Donald Trump announced its withdrawal, Canada changed tack once again and decided to work with Japan and others to rescue the agreement. However, during the negotiations to adapt the original TPP into the TPP-11 agreement (which became known as the CPTPP), Canada earned a reputation as a difficult and demanding partner, pushing its “progressive trade agenda” and slowing down the process. Indeed, Canada is often seen as trying to impose very progressive values on a region with little receptivity for such views. The cultural-exemption and auto-trade issues were of principal concern to Canada. Through its policy positions and negotiation style, Canada under the Trudeau government almost scuttled the CPTPP process and risked finding itself locked out once again. Quick action was taken to stem the damage and Canada became not only a signatory, but one of the first six countries to ratify the CPTPP, bringing it into force on December 30, 2018. Today, Canada has fully embraced the CPTPP, situating it as an important leg in its developing Indo-Pacific strategy, and is open to considering expansion to new members who are able and willing to meet the CPTPP’s high standards.  Deborah Elms, in her essay “The Origins and Evolutions of TPP Trade Negotiations” (Elms, 2016, 29-49), sketches out the history of how the TPP came into being, starting with the “P4 agreement” (between Singapore, Chile, New Zealand and Brunei) in June 2005. That agreement, technically called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, came into effect “with very little attention” (Elms, 2016, 30) and was incomplete. It did not cover investment or financial services, which were to be left for later negotiation. When the parties finally got around to discussing the two missing chapters in February 2008, the United States joined the discussions. In September 2008, a couple of months prior to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held in Lima, Peru in November, the U.S. announced that it would seek to join the agreement in its entirety. This set the stage for announcements at that meeting of other countries joining the talks, namely Australia, Peru and Vietnam. Now there were eight. What about Canada? At the Lima summit, attended by then prime minister Stephen Harper and then international trade minister Stockwell Day, Canada expressed no interest in getting on board, much to the frustration of accompanying officials (Stephens, Conversation). Elms states (2016, 40) that Canada had expressed interest in joining earlier but had been rebuffed over concerns regarding the supply management system that it maintains for dairy, poultry and eggs. Dairy is a particular concern for both the United States and New Zealand. However, senior Canadian officials closely involved with APEC and trade policy at the time told the author that Canada had been invited to join the P4 agreement in the early days, by New Zealand, but had refused (Sloan; Plunkett). The assessment was that Canada had little to gain, as it already had an agreement with Chile, at the time was negotiating one with Singapore (which was never completed) and had little to gain from an agreement with New Zealand, given the political need to defend the dairy industry. There are various explanations for Canada’s lack of interest in 2008–09. Part of the reasoning was domestic. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper was in a minority situation and would remain so until Harper won his first majority in 2011 (after two minority governments in which he was prime minister). Despite the Conservatives’ support for trade liberalization, it was a hot-button issue and anti-globalization sentiments were vocal, in Canada and in other countries. The Harper government was dealing with the 2008 financial crisis and was focused very much on the U.S. market and NAFTA. The initial coolness toward the P4 continued to apply, and from the perspective of trade negotiating resources, Canada was already fully engaged in negotiations with South Korea and the EU. There was concern that if Canada entered the TPP negotiations, it would have to make additional market concessions beyond those already conceded in NAFTA, but with little likelihood of getting additional concessions from the U.S. Yet, in the end, it was probably NAFTA that changed the position of Harper vis-à-vis the TPP. Both Canada and Mexico had preferential access to the U.S. market through NAFTA. There was growing concern in both countries that the TPP could be a back door to the U.S. market, undermining the value of NAFTA concessions. Autos were a particular concern. Canada and Mexico concluded therefore that they needed to be at the negotiating table. In essence, Canada decided to try to enter the TPP tent for defensive reasons, although the possibility of Japan eventually joining was an additional factor, given Canada’s longstanding desire to improve its access to the Japanese market and the limited prospect that a bilateral agreement would be concluded in the foreseeable future (Ciuriak 2018). That realization kicked off a series of meetings with officials from TPP-negotiating states, since admittance of new negotiating partners required a unanimous decision of the existing members. But, as in many things, the United States played an outsized role. The U.S. initially was not helpful, especially at the officials level. It is not fully clear why, but anecdotally the author was told by U.S. trade officials that the addition of Canada would “complicate” matters. Canada’s unhelpful position on trade in dairy products was certainly a factor. Canada pushed its advocacy to the political level and Canadian participation in the TPP was a major topic of discussion between Harper and then president Barack Obama at the 2011 Honolulu APEC summit. At that meeting, Obama “welcomed” Harper’s expression of interest in seeking to join the TPP talks and initiating consultations toward that goal (White House 2011).

Aviva Amalda, Lince Magriasti

MPP which stands for Public Service Mall is a building in which to practice services in the field of administration or licensing. The purpose of its establishment is to provide convenience, speed, security and comfort as well as affordable services for the community in receiving direct services in the same place. In this study, we will discuss the community satisfaction index using the customer satisfaction index (NCSI) at the Public Service Mall for the community in Padang City. Qualitative methods become the methods used which are research methods that produce descriptive data in the form of writing, speech, or object behavior. The data obtained is sourced from the official website of the Padang City Public Service Mall and from direct observations at the Padang City Public Service Mall. And it was obtained that the value of the Community Satisfaction Index for the Padang City Public Service Mall reached 87.30% with a perfect score above 95%. If referring to the ratio of CSI scores, the Community Satisfaction Index in MPP Padang City received a Good predicate with a value of 87.30%. This certainly brings a breath of fresh air which is expected to continue to evolve at higher numbers and better service quality as well. So it can be concluded that the community satisfaction index in the public service mall in Padang City is already at a good level according to the Customer Satisfaction Index standard. Keywords: Public Service; Community Satisfaction Index; Customer Satisfaction Index

Jonás Chaia De Bellis

La Argentina de la post-convertibilidad sirvió al mismo tiempo como inspiración y como ejemplo de la teoría económica neo-desarrollista. Pero si un aspecto central de esta teoría es que el Estado ya no desempeña funciones empresariales ¿cómo comprender entonces la casi veintena de estatizaciones kirchneristas? La hipótesis de este artículo es que las estatizaciones kirchneristas no niegan la correspondencia entre el enfoque neo-desarrollista y la política económica que tuvo lugar en la Argentina entre 2003 y 2015, ya que el Estado reemplazó al empresariado privado en la gestión pero no reemplazó al mercado en la distribución, esquema que parecería seguir cuadrando en el programa (económico-político y teórico) del neo-desarrollismo. Más aún: la estatización más importante del kirchnerismo, la de Repsol-YPF en 2012, puede ser comprendida como una pura medida de política fiscal para frenar la salida de divisas. Este artículo reconstruye, desde un enfoque de economía política comparada, todas las estatizaciones del kirchnerismo y estudia en profundidad el caso de Repsol-YPF para intentar demostrar cómo una intensa intervención del Estado es totalmente compatible con las reglas de juego del mercado, tal como prescribe y describe la teoría del neo-desarrollismo. 

Antonio F. Peralta, Pedro Ramaciotti, János Kertész et al.

Political polarization in online social platforms is a rapidly growing phenomenon worldwide. Despite their relevance to modern-day politics, the structure and dynamics of polarized states in digital spaces are still poorly understood. We analyze the community structure of a two-layer, interconnected network of French Twitter users, where one layer contains members of Parliament and the other one regular users. We obtain an optimal representation of the network in a four-dimensional political opinion space by combining network embedding methods and political survey data. We find structurally cohesive groups sharing common political attitudes and relate them to the political party landscape in France. The distribution of opinions of professional politicians is narrower than that of regular users, indicating the presence of more extreme attitudes in the general population. We find that politically extreme communities interact less with other groups as compared to more centrist groups. We apply an empirically tested social influence model to the two-layer network to pinpoint interaction mechanisms that can describe the political polarization seen in data, particularly for centrist groups. Our results shed light on the social behaviors that drive digital platforms towards polarization, and uncover an informative multidimensional space to assess political attitudes online.

Sofía M del Pozo, Sebastián Pinto, Matteo Serafino et al.

In an era marked by an abundance of news sources, access to information significantly influences public opinion. Notably, the bias of news sources often serves as an indicator of individuals' political leanings. This study explores this hypothesis by examining the news sharing behavior of politically active social media users, whose political ideologies were identified in a previous study. Using correspondence analysis, we estimate the Media Sharing Index (MSI), a measure that captures bias in media outlets and user preferences within a hidden space. During Argentina's 2019 election on Twitter, we observed a predictable pattern: center-right individuals predominantly shared media from center-right biased outlets. However, it is noteworthy that those with center-left inclinations displayed a more diverse media consumption, which is a significant finding. Despite a noticeable polarization based on political affiliation observed in a retweet network analysis, center-left users showed more diverse media sharing preferences, particularly concerning the MSI. Although these findings are specific to Argentina, the developed methodology can be applied in other countries to assess the correlation between users' political leanings and the media they share.