Artificial intelligence (AI) is the name popularly given to a broad spectrum of computer tools designed to perform increasingly complex cognitive tasks, including many that used to solely be the province of humans. As these tools become exponentially sophisticated and pervasive, the justifications for their rapid development and integration into society are frequently called into question, particularly as they consume finite resources and pose existential risks to the livelihoods of those skilled individuals they appear to replace. In this paper, we consider the rapidly evolving impact of AI to the traditional questions of philosophy with an emphasis on its application in mathematics and on the broader real-world outcomes of its more general use. We assert that artificial intelligence is a natural evolution of human tools developed throughout history to facilitate the creation, organization, and dissemination of ideas, and argue that it is paramount that the development and application of AI remain fundamentally human-centered. With an eye toward innovating solutions to meet human needs, enhancing the human quality of life and expanding the capacity for human thought and understanding, we propose a pathway to integrating AI into our most challenging and intellectually rigorous fields to the benefit of all humankind.
Preface Introduction Part I. The Intellectual Context: The Conditions of Enquiry: 1. Manuscripts John F. D'Amico 2. Printing and censorship Paul F. Grendler 3. The Renaissance concept of philosophy Cesare Vasoli 4. Translation, terminology and style in philosophical discourse Brain P. Copenhaver 5. Humanism Paul Oskar Kristeller Part II. Philosophy and its Parts: Logic and Language: 6. Traditional logic E. J. Ashworth 7. Humanistic logic Lisa Jardine Part III. Natural Philosophy: 8. Traditional natural philosophy William A. Wallace 9. The new philosophy of nature Alfonso Ingegno 10. Astrology and magic Brian P. Copenhaver 11. Moral philosophy Jill Kraye 12. Political philosophy Quentin Skinner Part IV. Psychology: 13. The concept of psychology Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler 14. The organic soul Katharine Park 15. The intellective soul Eckhard Kessler 16. Metaphysics Charles H. Lohr Part V. Problems of Knowledge and Action: 17. Fate, fortune, providence and human freedom Antonino Poppi 18. Theories of knowledge Richard H. Popkin 19. Epistemology of the sciences Nicholas Jardine Part VI. Philosophy and Humanistic Disciplines: 20. Rhetoric and poetics Brian Vickers 21. The theory of history Donald R. Kelley Supplementary material Appendices 22. The availability of ancient works Anthony Grafton 23. The rise of the philosophical textbook Charles B. Schmitt Bibliographies Michael J. Wilmott and Charles B. Schmitt Bibliography Michael J. Wilmott and Charles B. Schmitt Index.
ABSTRACT Recent years have seen a rise in the engagement with empirical methods in philosophy. However, explicit discussion of the method and methodology behind such approaches is scarce, in particular for engagement with qualitative ethnographic styles of empirical research. This entry gathers debates from various philosophical subfields where ethnography has found a philosophical use. First, I introduce ethnography and highlight different versions through examples from phenomenology, political philosophy, ethics and philosophy of science. Then, I address three common challenges raised against the relevance and legitimacy of ethnographic philosophy, some specific to ethnography, others shared with experimental philosophy and integrated history and philosophy of science. The entry ends by suggesting some benefits of ethnographic philosophy, including a potential for genuine surprise, the opportunity to fine‐tune and enrichen concepts and a better grasp at philosophical significance in human lives. In addition, I note that ethnography encourages more thoroughgoing philosophical self‐reflection about contextual and situational features of philosophical theories and about the particularities of the philosophers developing them, introducing the idea of ‘naturalising the philosopher’.
Nadya Carissa Fernanda Putri, Nabila Kharimah Vedy
This study aims to examine the effects of service quality, customer perceived value, and trust on customer satisfaction, while also analyzing the meditating role of trust. Consumer shopping behavior has shifted alongside the growth of internet usage, leading to the rapid development of online food delivery (OFD) services. Online food delivery enables customers to conveniently order meals online and receive delivery directly to their address. In this highly competitive business environment, understanding the determinants of customer satisfaction is crucial. This study aims to examine service quality, customer perceived value, and trust in relation to customer satisfaction, both directly and to investigate the role of trust as a mediator. A quantitative research design was adopted and analyzed using PLS-SEM with the SmartPLS software. Data were collected through an online survey of 175 ShopeeFood users. The results reveal that service quality, customer perceived value, and trust significantly and positively influence customer satisfaction. Furthermore, trust is confirmed as a significant mediator in the relationship between service quality and customer perceived value toward customer satisfaction.
Mikhail G. Katz, Karl Kuhlemann, Sam Sanders
et al.
Abraham Robinson's philosophical stance has been the subject of several recent studies. Erhardt following Gaifman claims that Robinson was a finitist, and that there is a tension between his philosophical position and his actual mathematical output. We present evidence in Robinson's writing that he is more accurately described as adhering to the philosophical approach of Formalism. Furthermore, we show that Robinson explicitly argued {against} certain finitist positions in his philosophical writings. There is no tension between Robinson's mathematical work and his philosophy because mathematics and metamathematics are distinct fields: Robinson advocates finitism for metamathematics but no such restriction for mathematics. We show that Erhardt's analysis is marred by historical errors, by routine conflation of the generic and the technical meaning of several key terms, and by a philosophical {parti pris}. Robinson's Formalism remains a viable alternative to mathematical Platonism.
This paper explores the use of large language models (LLMs) as research tools in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science (HPSS). LLMs are remarkably effective at processing unstructured text and inferring meaning from context, offering new affordances that challenge long-standing divides between computational and interpretive methods. This raises both opportunities and challenges for HPSS, which emphasizes interpretive methodologies and understands meaning as context-dependent, ambiguous, and historically situated. We argue that HPSS is uniquely positioned not only to benefit from LLMs' capabilities but also to interrogate their epistemic assumptions and infrastructural implications. To this end, we first offer a concise primer on LLM architectures and training paradigms tailored to non-technical readers. We frame LLMs not as neutral tools but as epistemic infrastructures that encode assumptions about meaning, context, and similarity, conditioned by their training data, architecture, and patterns of use. We then examine how computational techniques enhanced by LLMs, such as structuring data, detecting patterns, and modeling dynamic processes, can be applied to support interpretive research in HPSS. Our analysis compares full-context and generative models, outlines strategies for domain and task adaptation (e.g., continued pretraining, fine-tuning, and retrieval-augmented generation), and evaluates their respective strengths and limitations for interpretive inquiry in HPSS. We conclude with four lessons for integrating LLMs into HPSS: (1) model selection involves interpretive trade-offs; (2) LLM literacy is foundational; (3) HPSS must define its own benchmarks and corpora; and (4) LLMs should enhance, not replace, interpretive methods.
Bell's inequality is derived from three assumptions: measurement independence, outcome independence, and parameter independence. Among these, measurement independence, often taken for granted, holds that hidden variables are statistically uncorrelated with measurement settings. Under this assumption, the violation of Bell's inequality implies that either outcome independence or parameter independence fails to hold, meaning that local hidden variables do not exist. In this paper, we refer to this interpretive stance as the nonfactorizable position. In contrast, superdeterminism represents the view that measurement independence does not hold. Despite its foundational role, this assumption has received relatively little philosophical scrutiny. This paper offers a philosophical reassessment of measurement independence through three major frameworks in the philosophy of science: de Regt's contextual theory of scientific understanding, Kuhn's criteria for theory choice, and Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes. Using these lenses, we evaluate the two major responses to the violation of Bell's inequality, the nonfactorizable position and superdeterminism, and argue that the nonfactorizable position currently fares better across all three criteria. Beyond this binary, we introduce a spectrum of intermediate positions that allow for partial violations of measurement independence, modeled via mutual information. These positions modify the ``positive heuristic'' of superdeterminism, a crucial component in Lakatos's definition of research programmes, offering avenues for progressive research. This analysis reframes the debate surrounding Bell's inequality and illustrates how methodological tools can effectively guide theory evaluation in physics.
Masaharu Mizumoto, Dat Tien Nguyen, Justin Sytsma
et al.
Multilingual large language models (LLMs) face an often-overlooked challenge stemming from intrinsic semantic differences across languages. Linguistic divergence can sometimes lead to cross-linguistic disagreements--disagreements purely due to semantic differences about a relevant concept. This paper identifies such disagreements as conflicts between two fundamental alignment norms in multilingual LLMs: cross-linguistic consistency (CL-consistency), which seeks universal concepts across languages, and consistency with folk judgments (Folk-consistency), which respects language-specific semantic norms. Through examining responses of conversational multilingual AIs in English and Japanese with the cases used in philosophy (cases of knowledge-how attributions), this study demonstrates that even state-of-the-art LLMs provide divergent and internally inconsistent responses. Such findings reveal a novel qualitative limitation in crosslingual knowledge transfer, or conceptual crosslingual knowledge barriers, challenging the assumption that universal representations and cross-linguistic transfer capabilities are inherently desirable. Moreover, they reveal conflicts of alignment policies of their developers, highlighting critical normative questions for LLM researchers and developers. The implications extend beyond technical alignment challenges, raising normative, moral-political, and metaphysical questions about the ideals underlying AI development--questions that are shared with philosophers and cognitive scientists but for which no one yet has definitive answers, inviting a multidisciplinary approach to balance the practical benefits of cross-linguistic consistency and respect for linguistic diversity.
This piece is written to be performed in front of an audience. It can also be read as a paper, in the way that a play is written to be performed but can also be read as a script. Like a play, it includes stage directions. These are designed to draw attention to the actions of the speaker and the responses of the audience. The piece plays with form in order to explore the role of performance and communication style in our philosophical work. Both content and performance (including staging, sound and imagery) affect how the audience receives and responds to the work. In the course of the piece, I try to show how audience feelings matter in philosophy, and why they are worthy of further examination. Alongside the usual philosophical objectives, I hope to make the audience feel entertained, attentive, and open to new experiences. I aim for us to experience and accomplish something together.