PurposeThis study aims to examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance for a large representative sample.Design/methodology/approachThis empirical analysis focuses on a large number of companies covering 20 important industries of the Indian manufacturing sector for the period 2001-2010. Several alternative specifications and estimation techniques are used for analysis purposes, including system generalized methods of moments, which effectively overcomes the problem of endogeneity and simultaneity bias.FindingsOn one side, the findings indicate that larger boards are associated with a greater depth of intellectual knowledge, which in turn helps in improving decision-making and enhancing the performance. On the other side, the results indicate that return on equity and profitability is not related to corporate governance indicators. The results also suggest that CEO duality is not related to any firm performance measures for the sample firms.Practical implicationsThe outcomes of the analyses advocated that companies that comply with good corporate governance practices can expect to achieve higher accounting and market performance. It implies that good corporate governance practices lead to reduced agency costs. Hence, it is concluded that firms of the developing world can possibly enhance their performance by implementing good corporate governance practices.Originality/valueDeparting from the conventional system of the prior studies and instead of focusing on a single measure framework, a range of measures of corporate governance and firm's performance variables are used. Also, several alternative specifications and estimation techniques are used for analysis purposes. Furthermore, the sample also covers a large sample of manufacturing firms.
Mustafa Tevfik Kartal, Serpil Kılıç Depren, Özer Depren
Purpose This paper aims to determine priority issues in the corporate governance (CG) principles to increase CG rating notes of publicly traded companies. Design/methodology/approach This study defines the priority issues for publicly traded companies that should be focused to increase the CG rating notes. In this context, this study considers the companies in Borsa Istanbul CG index (XKURY), use data for 2018, 2019, 2020, and applies machine learning algorithms. Findings Overall, importance of each CG principle changes for the CG rating notes; first five CG principles in terms of significance have a total of 43.6% importance for the CG rating notes; following a straight-line approach in completing deficiencies of the CG principles cannot help increase the CG rating notes. Hence, empirical results highlight the impact of the most significant CG principles in terms of the CG rating notes that should be focused on by publicly traded companies so that CG ratings can be increased. Research limitations/implications This study uses Turkey data and considers publicly traded companies in the XKURY index. The main cause of this condition is that consolidated data of compliance report format for all publicly traded companies cannot be obtained. Practical implications The publicly traded companies can increase the CG rating notes by considering the results of this study while focusing on priority issues in the CG principles. Social implications The study determines the most important CG principles that companies can focus on, highlights the importance of usage of machine learning algorithms in determining the most influential CG principles in terms of the CG rating notes and reflects on the difficulties for gathering consolidated CG principles compliance reporting data for all publicly traded companies. Hence, societies can have better companies that are ruled more efficiently and corporately by increasing their compliance with the CG principles. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first empirical study that determines the priority issues to increase the CG rating notes of publicly traded companies based on the new CG principles compliance reporting scheme in Turkey. Following this aim, machine learning algorithms, which can present better results with regard to most of the econometric models, are used in this study.
Yan Wang, Kaleemullah Abbasi, Bola Babajide
et al.
PurposeThis study aims to examine the extent to which board characteristics and ownership structure affect firm performance with specific focus on providing new empirical insights following the revised corporate governance (CG) code 2012.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX)-100 index for the years 2011-2014. Firm performance is measured by accounting-based performance indicators (ROA and ROE) and market-based performance indicators (Tobin’s Q and MTB). This study uses multivariate regression techniques including fixed effects model and two-stage least squares (2SLS).FindingsThe findings show that board diversity increases over the two periods (pre-2012 and post-2012), whereas there are cases that companies have not fully complied with the revised CG code 2012 in terms of board independence. In addition, the multiple regression results show that firm performance is negatively and significantly associated with institutional ownership. Nevertheless, the results show that board size, board independent, board diversity and board meetings do not have significant impact on firm performance. The findings are fairly consistent and robust across two periods (pre-2012 and post 2012) and a number of econometric models that sufficiently address the potential endogeneity problems.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first empirical study which investigates the impact of the compliance and implementation of 2012 CG code on firm performance in Pakistan. This study is different from the most prior studies in that they use independent non-executive directors rather than conventional non-executive directors to measure board independence.
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the link between board of directors’ composition (independent directors’ ratio, board size, CEO-duality) and financial transparency and disclosure (T&D).Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyzes board composition and financial T&D of Italian listed companies using multiple linear regression analysis.FindingsThe results of this paper show a significant link between board composition and the level of financial T&D. In particular, the authors found a positive and significant relationship between the independent directors’ ratio and the level of financial T&D and a negative relationship between board size and the level of financial T&D.Research limitations/implicationsWhile this paper focuses on a sample of 100 Italian listed companies, the authors acknowledge the importance of extending the results to other national context and to other type of firms (e.g. non-listed firms or SMEs). Moreover, while this paper concerns the amount of information disclosed by firms, it does not look at the quality or accuracy of disclosure.Practical implicationsThis paper reveals the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (such as board composition) in enhancing the level of financial T&D. Indeed, the authors provide some indications to firms to improve their internal governance mechanisms (e.g. the importance of high proportion of independent directors and of small- and medium-sized boards of directors).Originality/valueThis paper provides interesting insights to firms which are under pressure to improve the level of information to stakeholders. Moreover, has the level of information that is not legally required vary among companies and countries, the authors shed light on a context characterized by high level of ownership concentration, where firms can experience different types of conflict of interests.
PurposeThis paper aims to examine whether board-related characteristics matter for cost efficiency in banking sector.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a sample of publicly traded US commercial banks and savings institutions to estimate a relationship between cost efficiency measured by stochastic frontier analysis and a set of board-related characteristics for the period 2007-2013.FindingsAn inverted U-shape relation is found between board size and efficiency. Thus, there is a trade-off between costs and benefits of larger boards. Optimal board size is higher for banks with more complex operations. This study also observed an inverted U-shape relation between board independence and cost efficiency. The banks where the Chairman also executes the CEO responsibility show lower efficiency. However, a higher proportion of independent board members in banks with unitary leadership structure may mitigate the conflict of interest and lower efficiency stemming from CEO duality.Research limitations/implicationsThis study’s evidence supports the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision emphasis on advising a board composition that provides for a sufficient degree of director independence.Practical ImplicationsThe results are relevant for banks and their external and internal stakeholders. Banks may adjust their current board characteristics to increase the board effectiveness. Externally, potential investors can evaluate the quality of corporate governance of banks before making investment decisions. The empirical findings can also be useful for regulators imposing corporate governance codes in banking.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide empirical evidence on the impact of board characteristics on bank efficiency for a wide panel of US banks. Additionally, a comprehensive set of board-related variables is used.
PurposeThis study aims to provide a review of corporate governance in China because effective and strong corporate governance is necessary for the efficient functioning and long-term sustainability of financial markets and corporations.Design/methodology/approachThe author provides a literature review of corporate governance in China through themes such as the concentration of state ownership, the degree of independence among board directors, insider trading, quality of financial disclosures and the maturity of capital markets.FindingsThe author reviews empirical work surrounding key corporate governance variables and identifies avenues for future research. The author finds that corporate governance mechanisms exhibit implications for firm performance, fraud, capital retention, financial constraints, institutional investors, auditing and the quality of financial disclosures. In addition, the author reviews evidence documenting the importance of independent board directors in regulation and ethical conduct.Originality/valueThe literature review contributes to the growing literature on responsible corporate governance and provides further understanding of the importance of business ethics for promoting the integrity and long-term sustainability of China’s capital markets and corporations and to ensure that company assets are used efficiently and productively in the best interests of investors and other stakeholders. This study offers insights to policy-makers interested in enhancing the quality of corporate governance within their nation. In addition, it provides a macro-level perspective for executives of multinational firms to consider if they are considering making a direct investment in China.
Purpose This paper aims to investigate board director disciplinary and cognitive influence on corporate value creation. Design/methodology/approach Fixed-effect regressions are used to check whether gender diversity, education, independence and size of the board of directors affect measures of corporate value creation. Findings The empirical results show that corporate value creation is positively influenced by the cross effect of the board independence and the presence of women. They also point out a positive impact of the cross effect of board independence and management education. They reveal that the board of directors contributes significantly to corporate value creation, particularly when there is a mix of independent, female and management-qualified directors. Originality/value The evidence presented and discussed in this paper should be of interest to managers and regulators. The methodological approach and the empirical results extend the existing literature. They enrich the limited empirical research devoted to this theme, especially in a continental European context, i.e. France. They shed light on the effect of board of directors’ disciplinary and cognitive influence on corporate value creation.
PurposeBoardroom’s effectiveness has emerged as an issue of considerable importance in the minds of academics and practitioners, particularly in the aftermath of the highly visible corporate governance scandals of the past few decades. The purpose of this paper is to shed new lights on this topic by proposing a robust design framework for boardroom’s effectiveness.Design/methodology/approachThe interpretative investigation is based on semi-structured interviews administered to directors of Fortune 500 firms. The adopted thematic analysis is phenomenology, or the feelings, experiences and perceptions of events as depicted first hand by individuals with significant boardroom’s experience.FindingsTwo central findings could be construed from this investigation. First, the optimum boardroom’s configuration is not a universal proposition. In other words, there are no magic recipes, and no one-size fits all approach. Rather, the optimum boardroom’s configuration ought to be framed in light of the overarching needs of the firm in relation to the dynamic forces in the external environment. Second, the design of boardrooms ought to span beyond structural aspects (i.e. the outwardly visible aspects) to also encompass two largely unobserved boardroom’s phenomena, namely, the directorship personal trait factors and the directorship behavioral patterns.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings presented herein may be contaminated with cognitive and personal biases, a common and unavoidable occurrence in qualitative research. A more integrative research approach using inductive and deductive techniques would allow for triangulation of results, thus providing an additional dose of validity and relevance to the research findings.Practical implicationsThere has been a growing disenchantment about themodus operandiof the board of directors among practitioners, particularly as it pertains to large corporations with diffuse and heterogeneous shareholders and stakeholders. New design guidelines for the board of directors would directly impact on corporate practices.Social implicationsThe design of high performance boardrooms is instrumental to shareholders, policymakers, directors, executives, rank and file employees, suppliers, customers and other direct and indirect stakeholders, as it may help avert future corporate governance mishaps.Originality/valueAs of today, the academic and popular literature has yet to provide unequivocal guidance for the development of high performance boardrooms. This study fills an important gap in the prevailing corporate governance literature by integrating both structural and socio-cognitive factors into the design framework of the board of directors.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to offer a political perspective on modifications in corporate governance regulation. In the wake of the financial crisis, the investment rationale of institutional investors is being pushed away from a focus on financial market liquidity and short-term trading. From a political perspective, this modification entails consideration both of investment horizon and of the definition of corporate value. Design/methodology/approach The paper narrates the historical policy debate on institutional investors as corporate governors. Building on this point, a conceptual framework is developed to further the understanding of the current shifts in policy debate of institutional investors as governors. Findings The authors find a strong policy impetus to move away from certain liberal market assumptions of efficient financial markets and the positive effects of privatization, toward viewing markets as institutionally embedded. Based on their knowledge of corporate governance regimes’ political economy, the authors argue that this shift brings intensified engagement of institutional investors in corporate affairs. The reasons for why and how this might be politically contested are specified. In conclusion, propositions regarding the outcome of such contestation in different national corporate governance regimes are offered. Originality/value Pointing to the predominantly European stakeholder value versus shareholder value discussion, the authors claim that the corporate governance policy debate related to intensified engagement of institutional investors in corporate affairs is still in its infancy. Their political perspective, including propositions for further elaboration, offers a contribution to further academic debate.