{"results":[{"id":"ss_77cc19fa7d9a80bf921c9485fed8465b36a1d423","title":"Introduction to Metaphysics","authors":[{"name":"M. Heidegger"},{"name":"Gregory Fried"},{"name":"Richard Polt"}],"abstract":"This new edition of one of Heidegger's most important works features a revised and expanded translators' introduction and an updated translation, as well as the first English versions of Heidegger's draft of a portion of the text and of his later critique of his own lectures. Other new features include an afterword by Petra Jaeger, editor of the German text. \"This revised edition of the translation of Heidegger's 1935 lectures, with its inclusion of helpful new materials, superbly augments the excellent translation provided in the first edition. The result is a richly rewarding volume, to be recommended to every student of Heidegger's works, whether a novice or a long-time reader.\"--Daniel Dahlstrom, Boston University","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2017,"language":"en","subjects":["Psychology"],"doi":"10.5040/9781472546852.0021","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/77cc19fa7d9a80bf921c9485fed8465b36a1d423","pdf_url":"https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/imgsrv/download/pdf?id=mdp.39015026489115;orient=0;size=100;seq=11;attachment=0","is_open_access":true,"citations":1255,"published_at":"","score":91},{"id":"ss_0249137d29a4c76ebb81c36dfba9c31288bc8fdf","title":"I M M A N U E L K A N T Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals","authors":[{"name":"Immanuel Kant"},{"name":"Edited BY Jens Timmermann English"},{"name":"M. Gregor"}],"abstract":"","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2011,"language":"en","subjects":null,"doi":"10.1017/cbo9780511809590.004","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0249137d29a4c76ebb81c36dfba9c31288bc8fdf","is_open_access":true,"citations":1688,"published_at":"","score":85},{"id":"ss_b5bbfe870b4cc662a298ebfa6dd0e43fddb426f0","title":"Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals","authors":[{"name":"I. Kant"},{"name":"Arnulf Zweig"},{"name":"T. E. Hill"}],"abstract":"Immanuel Kant's \"Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals\" is one of the most important texts in the history of ethics. In it Kant searches for the supreme principle of morality and argues for a conception of the moral life that has made this work a continuing source of controversy and an object of reinterpretation for over two centuries. This new edition of Kant's work provides a translation that seeks to be faithful to the German original and is fully annotated. There are also four essays by well-known scholars that discuss Kant's views and the philosophical issues raised by his work. J.B. Schneewind defends the continuing interest in Kantian ethics by examining its historical relation both to the ethical thought that preceded it and to its influence on the ethical theories that came after it; Marcia Baron sheds light on Kant's famous views about moral motivation; and Shelly Kagan and Allen W. Wood advocate contrasting interpretations of Kantian ethics and its practical implications.","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2002,"language":"en","subjects":["Philosophy"],"doi":"10.12987/9780300235722","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5bbfe870b4cc662a298ebfa6dd0e43fddb426f0","is_open_access":true,"citations":3127,"published_at":"","score":80},{"id":"ss_2c213b6c8bdd1d413f0cf959be96aa6af9e5532a","title":"The Metaphysics of Morals","authors":[{"name":"I. Kant"},{"name":"M. Gregor"},{"name":"R. Sullivan"}],"abstract":"Introduction by Roger Sullivan The Doctrine of Right: private right Public right The Doctrine of Virtue: on duties to oneself as such Duties of virtue to others.","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":1997,"language":"en","subjects":["Philosophy"],"doi":"10.1017/cbo9780511809620.009","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c213b6c8bdd1d413f0cf959be96aa6af9e5532a","is_open_access":true,"citations":1995,"published_at":"","score":80},{"id":"ss_a1f219d725c6544339cee989136ad78a0a2becdc","title":"Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals","authors":[{"name":"I. Kant"},{"name":"R. Wolff"}],"abstract":"Foundations of the Metaphysics of MoralsQuine, New Foundations, and the Philosophy of Set TheoryThe Foundation of RealityFoundations of the Metaphysics of MoralsMoral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of MoralsFoundations of the Philosophy of ValueKant's ProlegomenaFundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of MoralsRelativism and the Foundations of PhilosophyMetaphysics as FoundationPlato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and TruthKant: Metaphysical Foundations of Natural ScienceThe Moral LawGrounding for the Metaphysics of MoralsCritique of JudgementKant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of MoralsFundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of MoralsFoundations of the Metaphysics of MoralsImmanuel Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of MoralsAristotle's RevengeContemporary Readings in the Foundations of MetaphysicsGroundwork for the Metaphysics of MoralsThe Philosophy of KantKant and the Foundations of MoralityThe Ant TrapKant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of MoralsThe Metaphysic of EthicsThe Foundations of NatureFundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of EthicsFoundations for a Metaphysics of Pure ProcessThe Foundations of Metaphysics in ScienceKant's Construction of NatureEntity and IdentityThe metaphysical foundations of modern physical sciencePhilosophy of PhysicsThe Metaphysical Foundations of LogicVarieties of ThingsHegel’s Foundation Free MetaphysicsTheoretical Philosophy after 1781Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2020,"language":"en","subjects":["Philosophy"],"doi":"10.2307/j.ctv16h2njd.11","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a1f219d725c6544339cee989136ad78a0a2becdc","is_open_access":true,"citations":329,"published_at":"","score":73.87},{"id":"ss_d917720c5536b65cb34e643a3db4d3154db02f85","title":"Metaphysics","authors":[{"name":"Charlie Kurth"}],"abstract":"MetaphysicsAristotle's Metaphysics LambdaAn Introduction to MetaphysicsThe MetaphysicsGroundwork for the Metaphysics of MoralsDiscourse on Metaphysics and Other EssaysMetaphysicsPsychological MetaphysicsThe Fundamental Concepts of MetaphysicsMetaphysics, Mathematics, and MeaningMetaphysicsNietzsche and MetaphysicsModal Logic as MetaphysicsGod without PartsScholastic MetaphysicsAristotle: MetaphysicsMetaphysics: A Very Short IntroductionCommentary on the MetaphysicsAn Introduction to MetaphysicsThe Oxford Handbook of MetaphysicsPractical MetaphysicsAn Elementary Christian MetaphysicsMetaphysicsAn Introduction to MetaphysicsInformation and the Nature of RealityMetaphysicsMetaphysicsMetaphysicsMetaphysicsMetaphysics as a Guide to MoralsThis Is MetaphysicsMetaphysicsThe Approach to MetaphysicsMethods of MetaphysicsMetaphysicsAristotle, Metaphysics LambdaA Survey of MetaphysicsIntroduction to MetaphysicsAristotle: Metaphysics ThetaThe Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2022,"language":"en","subjects":null,"doi":"10.3998/mpub.6618","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d917720c5536b65cb34e643a3db4d3154db02f85","is_open_access":true,"citations":193,"published_at":"","score":71.78999999999999},{"id":"ss_74d6606c36bb5952c85980fec40ead1bd9106775","title":"The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language","authors":[{"name":"R. Carnap"}],"abstract":"Nota de apresentacao: Traduzido da versao inglesa “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” (in Logical Positivism (1959), editado por Alfred Ayer), elaborada por Arthur Pap e autorizada pelo autor, Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970). A versao original desse artigo foi escrita em alemao e primeiramente publicada na revista Erkenntnis (vol. II), em 1932, sob o titulo “Uberwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache”. Por ser a versao inglesa mais difundida e discutida do que a original alema – em parte, em virtude da grande popularidade do livro organizado por Ayer em que aparece –, uma traducao desta para o portugues parece-nos ter prioridade em relacao a traducao da original, embora, e claro, desejamos que esta tambem seja feita. Vale ressaltar ainda que a versao que aparece em Logical Positivism difere consideravelmente do texto de 1932 (por exemplo, a secao 5 e as observacoes finais nao constam no original alemao).","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2021,"language":"en","subjects":["Computer Science"],"doi":"10.4324/9781003249573-2","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74d6606c36bb5952c85980fec40ead1bd9106775","pdf_url":"https://philpapers.org/archive/TEO.pdf","is_open_access":true,"citations":156,"published_at":"","score":69.68},{"id":"doaj_10.22091/jptr.2024.10640.3044","title":"A Defense of the Realism of Time: Analysis and\nCritique of McTaggart’s Theory of Non-Realism in\nthe Metaphysics of Time","authors":[{"name":"Ayoub Afzali"},{"name":"Ali Mahjor"}],"abstract":"McTaggart’s argument is the most famous argument in contemporary philosophy for the unreality of time. He proposes two models for explaining time: A-series and B-series. The A-series is a model that explains time based on the three concepts of past, present, and future. The B-Series is a model that explains time based on a dual model of the concepts of “earlier” and “later.” McTaggart contends that the B-series fails to explain change, which is a condition for the realization of time, and that the A-series possesses internal contradiction. Consequently, by rejecting the possibility of both models being real, he concludes that time is unreal. This article analyzes and critiques McTaggart’s view, and inspired by the linguistic analysis method of the late Wittgenstein, we show that, first of all, some things cannot be explained solely by a theoretical model. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality based on theoretical reflections and linguistic intuitions. Secondly, the B-series can indeed explain change. Also, the A-series is not contradictory; in this view, the objective aspect of time is explained by the B-series, and the subjective aspect of that is explained by the A-series. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality that cannot be explained by a single conceptual model.\nIntroduction\nThe aim of this article, aside from critical discussions, is to defend a specific approach to realism in the metaphysics of time that considers time as a multi-level reality necessitating a multi-level explanation. This approach is partly inspired by the philosophy of linguistic analysis, especially the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, which, instead of giving primacy to a single theory, considers attention to multiple meanings and applications as a way to solve philosophical problems. Unlike the late Wittgenstein, however, this article also focuses on theoretical models in the philosophy of time and does not limit itself to linguistic analysis and conceptual treatment. The innovation of this article lies in 1) presenting an innovative reading of the A-series;2) offering a specific reading of the multi-level explanation regarding the reality of time; and3) combining the method of linguistic analysis with the theory-based method.\nBody\nMcTaggart proposes two conceptual models (A-series and B-series) to explain time. TheB-series is criticized for its inability to demonstrate change, while the realization of time without change is not meaningful. Although the A-series can demonstrate change, it suffers from a self-defeating contradiction. In the A-series, on the one hand, each of the past, present, and future states are non-summable determinations because each event must have one of those states (e.g., the future) to be attributed to that state (e.g., the future), but on the other hand, each of the points attributed to the past, present, or future can simultaneously be attributed to the other three temporal determinations. This contradiction becomes clearer when there is no end point to find the beginning of this chain and the stability of temporal determinations, and it will continue into infinite regression. In our view, McTaggart’s main claims, including the inability of the B-series to explain change, the dependence of the B-series on the A-series, and the self-defeating contradiction in the A-series, are based on a misunderstanding of the A-series and B-series. Attention to linguistic and conceptual analyses leads us to a new understanding of them, as well as the metaphysical gap between the concept of time in these two models and the difference in their characteristics.\nDiscussion\nA careful analysis of the A-series and B-series reveals that, in addition to proving realism, they can be used as two independent and complementary explanatory models. The approach that makes it possible to use two independent models in explaining time is a multi-level explanation of the reality of time. Our first criticism of McTaggart is that both of his proposed models assume the quantitative nature of time, while denying that the two quantitative perceptions of time is not a valid reason to deny the qualitative perception of time (e.g., Heidegger’s view). Secondly, contrary to McTaggart’s claim, the B-series has explanatory power in explaining time independently of the A-series, because each of them belongs to different ontological realms. From this perspective, the B-series represents and explains an epiphenomenal reality. Thirdly, the realization of time in the A-series, which is equivalent to the realization of time in the human mental world, is not conditioned by change. Rather, for the realization of the A-series, merely the flow of mental awareness of the three states (future, present, and past) is sufficient.\nConclusion\nIn this article, we have gone beyond single-level approaches to the metaphysics of time and have explained the reality of time at two levels: objective and subjective (mental-linguistic). However, the qualitative/existential aspect of time has been omitted due to article limitations. In our opinion, both the A-series and B-series are successful options in explaining the reality of time, although in the B-series, change is a condition for the realization of time; in the A-series, such a condition is not necessary. The A-series explains the subjective aspect of time in the human mental world and their awareness of time, while the B-series elucidates its objective aspect in correspondence with the events of the external world, and hence time has an epiphenomenal reality in relation to objective events.","source":"DOAJ","year":2025,"language":"","subjects":["Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects"],"doi":"10.22091/jptr.2024.10640.3044","url":"https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3220_ab1d88fd384dce4a74ce3ce52489a0c9.pdf","pdf_url":"https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3220_ab1d88fd384dce4a74ce3ce52489a0c9.pdf","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"","score":69},{"id":"arxiv_2505.07751","title":"Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn't Lead to Realism about Metaphysics","authors":[{"name":"Raoni Arroyo"},{"name":"Matteo Morganti"}],"abstract":"In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context of naturalistic metaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science and metaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists about metaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists about metaphysics. We call this the `parity thesis'. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery's. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery's specific inference from scientific realism to realism about metaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science and metaphysics within the naturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular.","source":"arXiv","year":2025,"language":"en","subjects":["physics.hist-ph","quant-ph"],"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07751","pdf_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.07751","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"2025-05-12T16:58:08Z","score":69},{"id":"ss_81c2e3d05b9cb6452ccde353c22e4b1fdf2639ca","title":"On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research","authors":[{"name":"Peter Sjöstedt-Hughes"}],"abstract":"The essential proposal of this text is that psychedelic-induced metaphysical experiences should be integrated and evaluated with recourse to metaphysics. It will be argued that there is a potential extra benefit to patients in psychedelic-assisted therapy if they are provided with an optional, additional, and intelligible schema and discussion of metaphysical options at the integrative phase of the therapy. This schema (the “Metaphysics Matrix”) and a new Metaphysics Matrix Questionnaire (“MMQ”) stemming therefrom will be presented, the latter of which can also be used as an alternative or additional tool for quantitative measurement of psychedelic experience in trials. Metaphysics is not mysticism, despite some overlap; and certainly not all psychedelic experience is metaphysical or mystical—all three terms will be defined and contrasted. Thereafter psychedelic therapy will be presented and analysed in order to reveal the missing place for metaphysics. Metaphysics, with epistemology (theory of knowledge) and axiology (ethics and aesthetics), is a defining branch of Philosophy. Metaphysics, in contrast to mysticism, is considered to be based on argument rather than pure revelation. Thus, in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy one sees here the potential bridge between reason-based philosophy and practical therapy—or, more broadly, with psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy there is the potential and mutually beneficial fusion of philosophy with practical science.","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2023,"language":"en","subjects":["Medicine"],"doi":"10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81c2e3d05b9cb6452ccde353c22e4b1fdf2639ca","pdf_url":"https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1128589/pdf","is_open_access":true,"citations":36,"published_at":"","score":68.08},{"id":"arxiv_2410.19622","title":"The game of metaphysics","authors":[{"name":"Raoni Arroyo"},{"name":"Matteo Morganti"}],"abstract":"Metaphysics is traditionally conceived as aiming at the truth -- indeed, the most fundamental truths about the most general features of reality. Philosophical naturalists, urging that philosophical claims be grounded on science, have often assumed an eliminativist attitude towards metaphysics, consequently paying little attention to such a definition. In the more recent literature, however, naturalism has instead been taken to entail that the traditional conception of metaphysics can be accepted if and only if one is a scientific realist (and puts the right constraints on acceptable metaphysical claims). Here, we want to suggest that naturalists can, and perhaps should, pick a third option, based on a significant yet acceptable revision of the established understanding of metaphysics. More particularly, we will claim that a fictionalist approach to metaphysics is compatible with both the idea that the discipline inquires into the fundamental features of reality and naturalistic methodology; at the same time, it meshes well with both scientific realism and instrumentalism","source":"arXiv","year":2024,"language":"en","subjects":["physics.hist-ph","quant-ph"],"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.19622","pdf_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.19622","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"2024-10-25T15:21:25Z","score":68},{"id":"arxiv_2409.09859","title":"A proposal for a metaphysics of self-subsisting structures. II. Quantum physics","authors":[{"name":"Antonio Vassallo"},{"name":"Pedro Naranjo"},{"name":"Tim Koslowski"}],"abstract":"The paper presents an extension of the metaphysics of self-subsisting structures set out in a companion paper to the realm of non-relativistic quantum physics. The discussion is centered around a Pure Shape Dynamics model representing a relational implementation of a de Broglie-Bohm $N$-body system. An interpretation of this model in terms of self-subsisting structures is proposed and assessed against the background of the debate on the metaphysics of quantum physics, with a particular emphasis on the nature of the wave function. The analysis shows that elaborating an appropriate Leibnizian/Machian metaphysics of the quantum world requires a substantial revision of the notion of world-building relation.","source":"arXiv","year":2024,"language":"en","subjects":["quant-ph","physics.hist-ph"],"doi":"10.1007/s10701-024-00800-7","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.09859","pdf_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2409.09859","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"2024-09-15T20:41:28Z","score":68},{"id":"arxiv_2405.01549","title":"Exploring Conceptual Modeling Metaphysics: Existence Containers, Leibniz's Monads and Avicenna's Essence","authors":[{"name":"Sabah Al-Fedaghi"}],"abstract":"Requirement specifications in software engineering involve developing a conceptual model of a target domain. The model is based on ontological exploration of things in reality. Many things in such a process closely tie to problems in metaphysics, the field of inquiry of what reality fundamentally is. According to some researchers, metaphysicians are trying to develop an account of the world that properly conceptualizes the way it is, and software design is similar. Notions such as classes, object orientation, properties, instantiation, algorithms, etc. are metaphysical concepts developed many years ago. Exploring the metaphysics of such notions aims to establish quality assurance though some objective foundation not subject to misapprehensions and conventions. Much metaphysical work might best be understood as a model-building process. Here, a model is viewed as a hypothetical structure that we describe and investigate to understand more complex, real-world systems. The purpose of this paper is to enhance understanding of the metaphysical origins of conceptual modeling as exemplified by a specific proposed high-level model called thinging machines (TMs). The focus is on thimacs (things/machine) as a single category of TM modeling in the context of a two-phase world of staticity and dynamics. The general idea of this reality has been inspired by Deleuze s the virtual and related to the classical notions of Leibniz's monads and Avicenna's essence. The analysis of TMs leads to several interesting results about a thimac s nature at the static and existence levels.","source":"arXiv","year":2024,"language":"en","subjects":["cs.SE"],"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.01549","pdf_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.01549","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"2024-02-20T22:25:20Z","score":68},{"id":"ss_b0725f68587a8e187ab9d7ccfb8e4c4965af2224","title":"Stating structural realism: mathematics‐first approaches to physics and metaphysics","authors":[{"name":"D. Wallace"}],"abstract":"I respond to the frequent objection that structural realism fails to sharply state an alternative to the standard predicate-logic, object / prop-erty / relation, way of doing metaphysics. The approach I propose is based on what I call a ‘math-first’ approach to physical theories (close to the so-called ‘semantic view of theories’) where the content of a physical theory is to be understood primarily in terms of its mathematical structure and the representational relations it bears to physical systems, rather than as a collection of sentences that attempt to make true claims about those systems (a ‘language-first’ approach). I argue that adopting the math-first approach already amounts to a form of structural realism, and that the choice between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism is then a choice between a language-first and math-first view of metaphysics ; I then explore the status of objects (and properties and relations) in fundamental and non-fundamental physics for both versions of math-first structural realism. ordinary-language semantics: satisfaction.","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2022,"language":"en","subjects":null,"doi":"10.1111/phpe.12172","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b0725f68587a8e187ab9d7ccfb8e4c4965af2224","pdf_url":"http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20048/1/semantic.pdf","is_open_access":true,"citations":50,"published_at":"","score":67.5},{"id":"doaj_10.4102/ids.v57i1.2890","title":"Calvin’s human being: Intellect and will in Calvin","authors":[{"name":"Willem van Vlastuin"}],"abstract":"In Christian theological history, reflecting on the relationship between intellect and the will is an ongoing process. Roughly speaking, in Medieval Christianity, two concepts were employed to clarify the relationship between intellect and the will: intellectualism defended the primary role of the intellect, and voluntarism promoted the human will as decisive. These were represented respectively by Aquinas and Duns Scotus. After presenting these concepts as interpretive frameworks, the author examines Calvin. It appears that Calvin’s metaphysical structure of the human being can be characterised as intellectualistic. Richard Muller agrees with this, but he suggests that Calvin’s soteriology was influenced by voluntarism. From the fiducial character of faith, he argues the importance of the will in the fall from grace and suggests that Calvin placed himself in the voluntaristic tradition of Scotus. In this article, Muller’s arguments are investigated and evaluated, and the conclusion is drawn that there is no ground for soteriological voluntarism in Calvin. This conclusion led the author to question whether intellectualism can be spoken of in Calvin’s soteriology. His research into this question is answered affirmatively, leading to the conclusion that Calvin is best understood from an intellectualistic point of view in both his metaphysics and his soteriology.\n\nContribution: Firstly, this article contributes to a historical-theological discussion of the relationship of will and reason in Calvin. Secondly, this discussion is important for a reformed anthropology. Thirdly, this historical insight is important for contemporary anthropological reflection, for example in relation to neuroscience.","source":"DOAJ","year":2023,"language":"","subjects":["Practical Theology","Practical religion. The Christian life"],"doi":"10.4102/ids.v57i1.2890","url":"https://indieskriflig.org.za/index.php/skriflig/article/view/2890","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"","score":67},{"id":"arxiv_2308.16211","title":"The elimination of metaphysics through the epistemological analysis: lessons (un)learned from metaphysical underdetermination","authors":[{"name":"Raoni Arroyo"},{"name":"Jonas R. B. Arenhart"},{"name":"Décio Krause"}],"abstract":"This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.","source":"arXiv","year":2023,"language":"en","subjects":["physics.hist-ph","quant-ph"],"doi":"10.1142/9789811283598_0011","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.16211","pdf_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2308.16211","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"2023-08-30T12:51:35Z","score":67},{"id":"ss_eecfb075c7611fa9d9ff651f04b306e35b5fd723","title":"The Metaphysics of Biology","authors":[{"name":"J. Dupré"}],"abstract":"This Element is an introduction to the metaphysics of biology, a very general account of the nature of the living world. The first part of the Element addresses more traditionally philosophical questions - whether biological systems are reducible to the properties of their physical parts, causation and laws of nature, substantialist and processualist accounts of life, and the nature of biological kinds. The second half will offer an understanding of important biological entities, drawing on the earlier discussions. This division should not be taken too seriously, however: the topics in both parts are deeply interconnected. Although this does not claim to be a scientific work, it does aim to be firmly grounded in our best scientific knowledge; it is an exercise in naturalistic metaphysics. Its most distinctive feature is that argues throughout for a view of living systems as processes rather than things or, in the technical philosophical sense, substances.","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2021,"language":"en","subjects":null,"doi":"10.1017/9781009024297","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eecfb075c7611fa9d9ff651f04b306e35b5fd723","is_open_access":true,"citations":56,"published_at":"","score":66.68},{"id":"ss_1d9ee0153f76780fd79c615a7e97f9f5105c9719","title":"The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science","authors":[{"name":"T. Sider"}],"abstract":"Metaphysics is sensitive to the conceptual tools we choose to articulate metaphysical problems. Those tools are a lens through which we view metaphysical problems; the same problems look different when we change the lens. There has recently been a shift to \"postmodal\" conceptual tools: concepts of ground, essence, and fundamentality. This shift transforms the debate over structuralism, in many ways. For instance: structuralist theses say that \"patterns\" are prior to the \"nodes\" in the patterns. In modal terms it is clear what this means: the nodes cannot vary independently of the pattern. But it's far less clear what its postmodal meaning is. One expects it to mean that the pattern is fundamental, the entities in the pattern, derivative. But what would a fundamental account of reality that speaks only of patterns and not objects in the patterns look like? I examine three structuralist positions through a postmodal lens. First, nomic essentialism, which says that scientific properties are secondary and lawlike relationships among them are primary. Second, structuralism about individuals, a general position of which mathematical structuralism and structural realism are instances, which says that scientific and mathematical objects are secondary and the pattern of relations among them is primary. Third, comparativism about quantities, which says that particular values of scientific quantities, such as having exactly 1000g mass, are secondary, and quantitative relations, such as being-twice-as-massive-as, are primary. Finally, I take a step back and examine the meta-question of when theories are equivalent, and how that impacts the debate over structuralism.","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2020,"language":"en","subjects":["Philosophy"],"doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198811565.001.0001","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1d9ee0153f76780fd79c615a7e97f9f5105c9719","is_open_access":true,"citations":87,"published_at":"","score":66.61},{"id":"ss_c347fadd9f0592a58d5163ef5218da03bc0214cd","title":"Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender","authors":[{"name":"Robin Dembroff"}],"abstract":"","source":"Semantic Scholar","year":2020,"language":"en","subjects":null,"doi":"10.5840/philtopics201846212","url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c347fadd9f0592a58d5163ef5218da03bc0214cd","pdf_url":"https://philpapers.org/archive/DEMRTO-2.pdf","is_open_access":true,"citations":79,"published_at":"","score":66.37},{"id":"arxiv_2204.00659","title":"The (meta)metaphysics of science: the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics","authors":[{"name":"Raoni W. Arroyo"},{"name":"Jonas R. B. Arenhart"}],"abstract":"Traditionally, to be a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms about what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of an ontology that is scientifically informed. But according to some philosophers, the realistic attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics.","source":"arXiv","year":2022,"language":"en","subjects":["physics.hist-ph","quant-ph"],"doi":"10.1590/0100-512X2022n15201rwa","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.00659","pdf_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.00659","is_open_access":true,"published_at":"2022-04-01T18:55:44Z","score":66}],"total":131743,"page":1,"page_size":20,"sources":["DOAJ","arXiv","Semantic Scholar","CrossRef"],"query":"Metaphysics"}