Embodied Simulation, Conceptual Metaphor, and Archaeological Interpretation

When I wrote my analysis of van Gennep’s rites of passage (Wiseman 2019), I introduced conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) to expose the conceptual foundations on which this class of rituals is built. Metaphors are pervasive in the formation of concepts, so analyzing them provides rich insights into people’s thought processes, both past and present. However, CMT has seen little use in archaeology and, indeed, fairly limited application in anthropology at large. Although my article included an annex on identifying conceptual metaphors in the archaeological record, the treatment was brief and discussed only some of the surface layers of this theory. Here Gibbs (2020) exposes much deeper strata. “Embodied simulation” is one of the basic ways humans think and the foundation on which many conceptual metaphors are built. “Simulation” in this context refers to the creation of mental experiences of action and perception without external stimuli. Conscious mental images—such as imagining a loved one’s face, or a melody, or the warmth of a fire—are one familiar type of simulation, but most are unconscious. Neuroimaging experiments have found that simulations are carried out in the parts of the brain that would normally process the real stimuli: a simulated face would be processed in the visual centers, simulated music in the auditory centers, and so on. Unsurprisingly, as a lot of the brain’s work is concerned with moving and sensing the body as well as monitoring the world around us, the simulations that are easiest for the brain to create are those physical actions and experiences that the body has performed before. It is in this sense that simulation is embodied. (For recent experimental evidence for the embodied simulation hypothesis, see Bergen [2012] and also Gibbs [2005].) Simulation is not, however, tied to experiences that people have already had: it is also used to project future events, or see alternative perspectives, or empathize with others’ feelings—all of which lie outside people’s direct experience. Mental simulation is also an important component of problem-solving— such as the types of problems that Gibbs poses in the experi-