Semantic Scholar Open Access 2020 460 sitasi

Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion

Emilio Calvano G. Calzolari V. Denicoló S. Pastorello

Lihat Sumber DOI

Abstrak

Increasingly, algorithms are supplanting human decision-makers in pricing goods and services. To analyze the possible consequences, we study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (Q-learning) in a workhorse oligopoly model of repeated price competition. We find that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand, changes in the number of players, and various forms of uncertainty. (JEL D21, D43, D83, L12, L13)

Topik & Kata Kunci

Economics

Penulis (4)

Emilio Calvano

G. Calzolari

V. Denicoló

S. Pastorello

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicoló, V., Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20190623

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber doi.org/10.1257/AER.20190623

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2020
Bahasa: en
Total Sitasi: 460×
Sumber Database: Semantic Scholar
DOI: 10.1257/AER.20190623
Akses: Open Access ✓