Competitive Strategies in the European High North

This article studies Russian military strategy, concepts and capabilities as we find them today and as we are projected to find them in 10 to 15 years and explores potential weaknesses in Russian military power. In this light, it scrutinises defence efforts made by NATO and its key allies and makes an assessment of military strategies and concepts to deter and, if needed, to deal with Russian action in the High North of Europe. The article applies a net assessment and competitive strategies approach, entailing study of Russian, Norwegian and NATO ends and concepts. Within this framework, the study discusses Norwegian response options, arguing that Russia’s layered defence in the European High North can be effectively deterred and defeated. This requires investment, firstly, in capabilities which both mitigate Norwegian and NATO weakness and offer the possibility of exploiting Russian weaknesses, and, secondly, in prudent and suitable strategies and operational concepts. 32 Halsne Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies DOI: 10.31374/sjms.93 INTRODUCTION In the event of a high-intensity war with Russia, parts of the European High North risk being isolated from the West behind Russia’s layered defence.1 Russian so-called Anti-Access/AreaDenial (A2/AD) capabilities such as long-range missiles, submarines, and modern air-defence systems form the cornerstone of an integrated and layered defence. While much has been written about hybrid threats and wars, this study deals primarily with security and war in the more traditional sense. In a Royal United Services Institute publication, Professor Rolf Tamnes calls for “a competitive strategy, capitalising on [Western] strengths and Russia’s weaknesses” (Tamnes, 2018, p. 22). Seeking to answer that call, this article analyses both the strategic challenges a high-intensity war with Russia in the High North would pose and how such a war can be deterred – or, if necessary, won. In order to do so, it will examine the key existing military balances in the High North, focusing on the triangular relationship between Russia, Norway and NATO allies. In order to limit the length of the article, the potential role of Sweden and Finland in such a conflict will not be discussed. I will analyse and discuss Russia’s capabilities and concepts today and in a 10–15-year perspective, scrutinising Norway’s and NATO’s response options; as Norwegian deterrence and defence relies heavily on NATO, the allied dimension of such a conflict will play a key part. While the main focus here is on military strategy, I will address matters from the levels of national strategy to operations. Apart from studying capabilities, plans and concepts, the article’s key aim is to create a better understanding of potential solutions for the dilemmas that might arise from Western strategies. To achieve this, the study will use a methodology inspired by net assessment and competitive strategies thinking.2 Strategic competition and warfare are relational and dynamic in their very nature. Actions taken or concepts and capabilities employed by one party in a conflict inevitably lead to reactions from the other. Strategic analysis should thus strive to analyse the interrelations between the players, not each player in isolation. The study does not discuss the likelihood of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO. As such a conflict cannot be categorically ruled out, it is worthy of study. The study spans both the current situation and what is assumed to be a relevant scenario in a perspective of 10–15 years. One should expect a Russian hybrid and multi-domain operation, launched well before any conventional phase, which may include manipulation of the political and public debate, cyber disruption of infrastructure, and clandestine special operations. In case of a conventional military attack, there might be some strategic warning, but not necessarily evident tactical warning. Were Russia to prepare or launch a conventional assault on NATO, it would ensure its strategic nuclear submarines were protected in the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk through the establishment of a layered defence, often termed a “bastion defence.” While this would not necessarily include a direct invasion of Norway, it could seriously hamper Norwegian freedom of action. In particular, Russian air defence systems, coastal defence missiles and submarines could pose a threat to Norwegian troop movements on land, in the air, and at sea. They could also obstruct both the deployment of NATO reinforcements into Norway and movements from the United States across the Atlantic. A Russian deployment of forces onto Norwegian territories outside mainland Norway such as Svalbard cannot be ruled out, nor can pre-emptive strikes against Norwegian high-value targets such as ports and air bases. In order to avoid “bean counting,” or capability comparison only, this article adopts a more instrumental approach. The design is informed by Joe Strange’s structural analysis of centre of gravity (Strange, 1996, p. 2). This framework will be used to analyse how different capabilities could underpin a military strategy in the given scenario. Based on a common understanding of Russia’s bastion defence, it will identify which effects Russia would need to create in order to establish a layered defence in the High North. This brings us to the question of those capabilities Russia will require to generate these effects, and whether the capabilities might exist today or in 10 to 15 years from now. 1 “The European High North” is meant in a functional manner, encompassing the European land and sea areas of the far north in line with Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014, p. 5. 2 For a detailed account of net-assessment, see Bracken (2006) and Elefteriu (2018). 33 Halsne Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies DOI: 10.31374/sjms.93 Compared to a traditional capability assessment, this approach has two major advantages. Firstly, it forces one to set finite resources into a strategic and operational framework, thus providing a more realistic and usable picture of military capabilities; secondly, it allows for a further analysis of how well NATO capabilities can defend against or deter a Russian layered defence; finally, it can identify capability gaps in both Russian and Western forces. Overall, Russia has the military capabilities necessary to establish a full-spectrum local dominance in the High North for a limited period. They also have clear vulnerabilities that Norway and NATO can exploit, however, both as an effective deterrent and as an effective defence in case deterrence fails. This would not only require investments in new capabilities, but a more collective and integrated approach to the problem posed by a Russian layered defence. RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER Successful military operations rely heavily on a command structure fit for purpose. After years of disorder and discussion, Russia has made tremendous progress, particularly since 2010, in designing a slim and efficient structure that has demonstrated its qualities in a number of conflicts. At the top of this structure, the president and his key men have the power to plan and execute operations without much delay and interference. The General Staff are central in carrying any plan into the theatre, a function they perform in tandem with the Joint Strategic Commands (OSK); the Military Districts, meanwhile, execute force production and support combatant forces in the campaign. The establishment in 2014 of a separate OSK North, and a distinct Military District from 2021 with the Northern Fleet as its main striking force, demonstrates the importance of the north to Russian military strategy (Whisler, 2020). Another factor of great importance is the manner in which Russia’s armed forces have integrated their different effectors in their command and control systems. Less bound by a strict domain-oriented mode of organising military power, and not hampered by a need for multilateral agreements across an alliance, their command and control system has effectively integrated sensors and effectors. The system is founded on the twin concepts of the operational reconnaissance fires complex and its tactical equivalent, the reconnaissance strike complex (Grau & Bartles, 2018; Kofman, 2019), affording the ability to seamlessly and rapidly transfer targeting data from sensors to weapons. This technology is, in itself, not new and revolutionary. Most NATO members have Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Information Systems (C4IS) with similar capabilities. If there is a Russian advantage in this area, it rests on the fact that national encryption protocols across an alliance are less of a concern. While one should be careful to accept Russian claims of the efficiency of such systems at face value, on a tactical level the system has proven effective in both Ukraine and Syria (McDermott, 2018). Russia’s military powers have obvious strengths and weaknesses. They are bound to lose any protracted conventional armed conflict with NATO, should major NATO members stick together and act in unity. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database confirms that the difference in GDP, production capacity, and potential military power is overwhelmingly in NATO’s favour (SIPRI, n.d.). In the unlikely event of a military conflict, Russia’s main hope for success is to rapidly achieve its military goals and to de-escalate before NATO can mobilise its superior resources. This logically dictates that Russia should pursue a high-risk, offensive strategy with the aim of expeditiously attaining its strategic goals. Such a strategy would rest on the ability to quickly establish a situation of local military dominance, the use of their robust A2/AD systems to isolate the area, and then the presentation of terms for a negotiated settlement as a fait accompli (Boston & Massicot, 2017, pp. 6–7). Russia has developed and honed an ability to quickly transit from peace to