Semantic Scholar Open Access 2000 3929 sitasi

Collective action and the evolution of social norms

E. Ostrom

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Abstrak

I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

Topik & Kata Kunci

Economics

Penulis (1)

E. Ostrom

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. https://doi.org/10.1080/19390459.2014.935173

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber doi.org/10.1080/19390459.2014.935173

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2000
Bahasa: en
Total Sitasi: 3929×
Sumber Database: Semantic Scholar
DOI: 10.1080/19390459.2014.935173
Akses: Open Access ✓