Semantic Scholar Open Access 1999 1932 sitasi

Rents, Competition, and Corruption

A. Ades R. Tella

Lihat Sumber DOI

Abstrak

Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.

Topik & Kata Kunci

Economics

Penulis (2)

A. Ades

R. Tella

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Ades, A., Tella, R. (1999). Rents, Competition, and Corruption. https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.89.4.982

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber doi.org/10.1257/AER.89.4.982

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 1999
Bahasa: en
Total Sitasi: 1932×
Sumber Database: Semantic Scholar
DOI: 10.1257/AER.89.4.982
Akses: Open Access ✓