Semantic Scholar Open Access 1983 9861 sitasi

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

Douglas W. Diamond Philip H. Dybvig

Lihat Sumber DOI

Abstrak

This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.

Topik & Kata Kunci

Business Economics

Penulis (2)

Douglas W. Diamond

Philip H. Dybvig

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Diamond, D.W., Dybvig, P.H. (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. https://doi.org/10.1086/261155

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber doi.org/10.1086/261155

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 1983
Bahasa: en
Total Sitasi: 9861×
Sumber Database: Semantic Scholar
DOI: 10.1086/261155
Akses: Open Access ✓