Semantic Scholar Open Access 2012 41 sitasi

Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences

L. Schulman V. Vazirani

Lihat Sumber DOI

Abstrak

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.

Topik & Kata Kunci

Computer Science Economics

Penulis (2)

L. Schulman

V. Vazirani

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Schulman, L., Vazirani, V. (2012). Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2012
Bahasa: en
Total Sitasi: 41×
Sumber Database: Semantic Scholar
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543
Akses: Open Access ✓