The “Level-Based” System of Cognition of Law As an Epistemological Matrix of Jurisprudence

The direction of theoretical thinking was previously outlined by dialectical materialism (the philosophy and methodology of Marxism), which established general principles of knowledge, including in the field of studying legal reality. After downplaying the importance of this scientific cognitive system, a situation of methodological chaos arose. Legal ideas (concepts, theories, doctrines) began to be formulated in isolation from each other, without any obvious common guidelines. Sometimes this led to positive results and the emergence of new original approaches, but it did not become a general rule. People began to talk more and more often about the crisis of domestic jurisprudence. Despite the bias of such statements, it is necessary to recognize the presence of certain problems: “endless interpretations” and “reinterpretations”. To achieve new results, it is necessary to improve cognitive tools and discover new facets of seemingly already familiar phenomena. In this capacity, it is proposed to pay attention to the underestimated epistemological potential of the “level” system of cognition. In a truncated form, it existed “in the shadow” of the previously mentioned scientific cognitive system, in some aspects it was part of it, but its instrumental capabilities in the field of jurisprudence were used very limitedly. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the epistemological potential of the “level-based” system of cognition of law in relation to the needs of legal science. Research methods: at the stage of collecting empirical information: abstraction, induction, empirical analysis; at the stage of theoretical understanding: idealization, constructive introduction of theoretical objects, logical reduction; at the metatheoretical level: general scientific and philosophical justification. As a result of the study: the logical structure of the “level-based” system of cognition of law was clarified in terms of: a) identifying its two sublevels: legal metaphenomena of the theoretical level and legal metaphenomena of the philosophical level; b) establishing a “border of meaning” that unites bordering levels of knowledge; it was proposed to introduce the term “legal metaphenomena” into scientific circulation; the cognitive potential of the “level” approach has been explored in the following issues: systematization of legal categories through the study of categorical relationships, interdisciplinary interaction, transdisciplinary approach, formation of an epistemological agenda.