Semantic Scholar Open Access 2026

The Probable Intent Standard in the Philosophy of Criminalization

Amna Aliwi Kadhim Al-Shammari

Abstrak

: Criminal intent constitutes a fundamental pillar in determining criminal liability. As for dolus eventualis (probable intent), some have argued that the law requires clear boundaries between intent and negligence, in a manner that ensures balance between the pursuit of justice and the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights. Accordingly, probable intent emerges as a form of criminal intent, though this concept raises both ethical and legal questions. At its core, understanding probable intent depends on a proper grasp of the elements of mens rea, which is subject to two main theories: the cognitive theory (perception) and the volitional theory (will). Thus, while the degree of foreseeability distinguishes probable intent from direct intent, it is the direction of the will that separates probable intent from fault (or negligence). To distinguish probable intent from other forms of fault, criminal jurisprudence has developed two primary theories: the probability theory and the acceptance theory.

Penulis (2)

A

Amna Aliwi

K

Kadhim Al-Shammari

Format Sitasi

Aliwi, A., Al-Shammari, K. (2026). The Probable Intent Standard in the Philosophy of Criminalization. https://doi.org/10.37651/aujlps.2025.160798.1536

Akses Cepat

Informasi Jurnal
Tahun Terbit
2026
Bahasa
en
Sumber Database
Semantic Scholar
DOI
10.37651/aujlps.2025.160798.1536
Akses
Open Access ✓