Reality and Possibility: A Defense of Kant against New Realisms
Abstrak
The movement of New Realism, which in Italy has been launched by Maurizio Ferraris, is conceived explicitly in opposition to Kant. In his defense of the distinction between ontology and epistemology, Ferraris starts from the presupposition that it is Kant himself who is responsible for their confusion because of his transcendental philosophy and its consequent constructionism. In this paper I will defend Kant’s perspective, explaining his reasons (or his concept of reason), even against Meillasoux’s “speculative realism.” The basic idea is that Kant’s transcendental philosophy requires a new philosophical attitude, which implies a shift from reality to possibility as the fundamental philosophical category, since only possibility enables a critical perspective on reality.
Topik & Kata Kunci
Penulis (1)
G. Chiurazzi
Akses Cepat
- Tahun Terbit
- 2018
- Bahasa
- en
- Total Sitasi
- 2×
- Sumber Database
- Semantic Scholar
- DOI
- 10.1163/15691640-12341391
- Akses
- Open Access ✓