Corporate Crime
Abstrak
This chapter surveys the law and economics literature on corporate crime, focusing on theory but also touching on empirical research and policy issues. We set the stage by updating some stylized facts about prosecuted firms. We then proceed to the theory, organizing the discussion within a unified framework provided by the principal-agent model. We distill several core principles from the theoretical literature concerning the optimal sanction level and the optimal sanction target (employee, shareholders, or both). The chapter further addresses more nuanced questions including among others whether the state should consider corporate misdeeds a civil or criminal violation and whether the state should forbid corporations from indemnifying employees. A final section concentrates on securities fraud, a topic of much academic interest in the wake of recent corporate scandals (Enron and WorldCom) and resulting policy reforms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). JEL Classification: K22, K14, K42, D86
Penulis (2)
Edward Elgar
Wallace P. Mullin
Akses Cepat
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Cek di sumber asli →- Tahun Terbit
- 2019
- Bahasa
- en
- Total Sitasi
- 213×
- Sumber Database
- Semantic Scholar
- DOI
- 10.4337/9781781950210.00014
- Akses
- Open Access ✓