Critique of Halakhic Reason

Norms and obligations are central components of many religious traditions. Yet they have often been neglected as objects of reflection in the study of religion. Moreover, despite the centrality of mitzvah (commandment) in Judaism, halakhah (Jewish law) has only recently become a central topic in modern Jewish thought. This book rectifies these deficiencies while forging new connections between reflection on religion and modern Jewish thought by offering a critique of halakhic reason. It offers fresh assessments of twentieth-century Jewish thinkers as both deeply engaged in reason-giving about the commandments and yet simultaneously denying the normativity of practical reason. Against them, it contends that, when reasons are understood as generated by the structure of agency and the relations among subjects, they are the source of normativity. This constructivist theory of practical reason provides a basis for conceptions of authority, norms, and obligations that are applicable even to God’s commands. Divine commandments too operate within a “space of reasons” and so are constrained by rationality and morality. Whether commandments are justified and how they are implemented depends on the reasons that can be offered for and against them by human agents. Reasons and practices of reason-giving are thus central to religious thought and life. Critique of Halakhic Reason reveals the ubiquity of reasons within religious practice. It examines the reasoning operative in the justification and jurisprudence of the Jewish commandments and develops its consequences for theology, the study and philosophy of religion, as well as for moral, legal, and political philosophy.