Analysis of tax evasion from the informal market through real options and game theory

In accordance with Article 31, section IV, of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, it is established that it is the obligation of Mexicans to contribute to public expenditures, whether of the Federation, of the Federal District or of the State and Municipality in which Reside, in the proportional and equitable manner provided by the laws. It should also be noted that this precept is based on the fact that this obligation considers compliance based on the principles of generality, equity, obligations and transparency in the destination of public spending. However, when citizens perceive that their contributions do not comply with what is established in the regulations in question, there is a so-called tax evasion. Which in accordance with Camargo (2005), that concept is defined as the reduction of an amount of a tax produced within a country by those who are obliged to pay it do not, however, they do obtain benefits through a behaviour fraudulent. Based on this premise, the purpose of this study is to estimate in the best possible way the potential collection that could be obtained by the Federal Government, particularly from the payment of income tax by people who carry out transactions in the informal market, focusing on analysis on the citizens that are dedicated to the sale of merchandise in the markets on wheels, considering simultaneously the benefits that these people would obtain when paying this tribute. For this, 300 surveys were carried out, considering the answers, as well as the application of the Real Options methodology Trigeorgis y cols. (1996) and the Game Theory model (Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green y cols., 1995), the estimation of the collection by expanding the tax base and the benefits in monetary terms at the moment these people enter the formal market.