DOAJ Open Access 2005

Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial Order

Stéphane Le Roux

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Abstrak

In sequential games of traditional game theory, backward induction guarantees existence of Nash equilibrium by yielding a sub-game perfect equilibrium. But if payoffs range over a partially ordered set instead of the reals, then the backward induction predicate does no longer imply the Nash equilibrium predicate. Non-determinism is a solution: a suitable non-deterministic backward induction function returns a non-deterministic strategy profile which is a non-deterministic Nash equilibrium. The main notions and results in this article are constructive, conceptually simple and formalised in the proof assistant Coq.

Topik & Kata Kunci

Mathematics

Penulis (1)

Stéphane Le Roux

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Roux, S.L. (2005). Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial Order. https://doi.org/10.46298/dmtcs.3468

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Lihat di Sumber doi.org/10.46298/dmtcs.3468

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2005
Sumber Database: DOAJ
DOI: 10.46298/dmtcs.3468
Akses: Open Access ✓