Institutional Power and Political Stability – Three Key Interventions by the Bank of England (2016-2024)

This article examines how the Bank of England contributed to mitigating political instability in the UK between 2016 and 2024, a period marked by Brexit, rapid ministerial turnover and economic volatility. Using historical and discursive institutionalism as theoretical frameworks, the study analyses the Bank's interventions during three critical episodes: the Governor’s reassuring response following David Cameron's post-Brexit referendum resignation; the Bank's stabilising role during Liz Truss's mini-budget crisis; and its contested deployment of quantitative easing. Through analysis of the Bank's coordinative discourse among policy actors and communicative discourse with the public, the research demonstrates how this 330-year-old institution has deployed institutional authority and strategic communication to maintain financial and political stability during a period of enduring upheaval. The study reveals the complex interplay between technocratic expertise and democratic accountability, showing how the Bank's discursive power and perceived neutrality have allowed it to manage leadership vacuums during political crises. While these interventions helped preserve stability, they raise important questions about the democratic legitimacy of central bank independence and the concentration of macroeconomic power in unelected institutions. The findings contribute to our understanding of how institutional resilience can both temper political instability and potentially reconfigure power dynamics in liberal democracies.